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In 2001, a U.S. nuclear submarine surfaced underneath a 
Japanese fishing vessel, causing it to sink—9 died. In 1999, 41 bullets 
fired by 4 New York police officers hit and killed Amidou Diallo, who 
pulled from his pocket a wallet rather than what the police thought 
was a gun. In both tragedies, one might ask how these central actors 
could have failed to see what was plainly visible. With this work, I ask 
how perceptual systems represent the surrounding world if not in a 
veridical manner. I propose that the perceptual representations of 
which perceivers are consciously aware are colored by nonconscious 
motivational forces. Motivations, including wishes, dissonance 
reduction, and visceral needs, bias visual perception.   
Three streams of research examined the ways in which 
motivations constrain perceptual processing. The first stream 
demonstrated that people’s wishes biased the resolution of visual 
ambiguity. In 5 studies, participants shown an ambiguous visual 
figure reported seeing the desired interpretation. This finding was 
affirmed by unobtrusive and implicit measures of perception including 
eyetracking, lexical decision response times, and experimental 
manipulations.  
In the second stream, I explored whether the motivation to 
reduce cognitive dissonance biased perception and assisted in the 
regulation of psychological states. In 2 studies, participants performed 
an aversive task under high or low choice conditions. Participants saw 
components of their environment in less extreme ways in order to 
reduce dissonance. Those experiencing high choice perceived 
distances to travel as shorter and slopes to climb as shallower.  
In the third stream, 5 studies showed that desires such as 
hunger, thirst, and general preferences led to a narrowed focus of 
attention on a desired object. Narrowly focusing attention reduced 
estimates of distance. Participants saw desired objects as closer than 
less desired objects. 
I end by discussing the implications for marketing, self-
screening in early cancer detection and relationship satisfaction 
among other applied domains. This work explores the limits of 
motivations, testing whether they cross the boundary separating how 
people think about their world and how they see it.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE WINDOW THROUGH WHICH PEOPLE SEE THEIR WORLD: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO MOTIVATED PERCEPTION 
Before a submarine surfaces, the surrounding waters are 
searched by sonar. If clear, the sub rises to periscope depth to visually 
survey the waters. After visual inspection, the submarine rises to the 
surface. Given this procedure, it was a surprising tragedy when, in 
2001, a U.S. nuclear submarine surfaced underneath a large Japanese 
fishing vessel off the coast of Honolulu. The collision ripped open the 
boat's engine room, flooding the vessel, causing it to sink within 
minutes. Aboard the Japanese fishing trawler was a crew of 20 in 
addition to 2 teachers and 13 students from a fishery vocational 
school. Although many reached the lifeboats, 4 students, 2 teachers, 
and 3 crew members did not and died in the tragedy (Marquis, 2001).  
In February 1999, 41 bullets were fired by 4 New York police 
officers that hit and killed Amidou Diallo, an unarmed immigrant from 
West Africa. When police officers ordered Diallo to stop, he reached 
into his pocket, producing an object that later turned out to be a 
wallet. The police defendants maintained that in this situation they 
acted on the information available to protect themselves from danger. 
In the end, the officers were acquitted as a jury was convinced these 
officers actually saw the object as a gun (McFadden & Roane, 1999).  
In both tragedies, it is difficult to imagine how these central 
actors missed what can be considered such obvious signals of 
upcoming disaster. Given the regimented safeguards submarines 
employ for surfacing, how is it possible that the Japanese fishing ship,  
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half of the size of the US nuclear submarine, could have been 
overlooked by visual inspection? How could the Navy periscope 
operator have failed to see what was plainly visible? How could each of 
the 4 police officers have mistaken the leather wallet for a loaded 
weapon? How could they have seen the object for something so 
different than what it really was?  
I.  The Perceptual Dilemma 
Perceptual systems face a dilemma: the world bombards 
perceptual systems with a wealth information at any given time, yet 
the systems’ abilities to process this rich world are limited. To combat 
this dilemma, perceptual systems enlist the assistance of a regiment of 
tools and strategies. In doing so, systems often create perceptual 
experiences that are inaccurate reconstructions of reality. My interest 
is to survey some of tools and strategies perceptual systems employ to 
assist in information processing and examine the consequences for 
biased perceptions of reality. I explore one specific tool shown to 
shape, sculpt, and mold other experiences in profound ways; I 
examine the influence of motivation on perception. 
To be sure, the environment showers sensory systems with 
much more input than limited attentional resources can process. To 
sort relevant information from less relevant types, one tool perceptual 
systems use are filters. Unfortunately, as might have happened for the 
submarine periscope operator, filters can fail, leading to blindness of 
key elements of the environment. For instance, pilots in a flight 
simulator crashed planes when they focused their attention on the 
multi-component console at the expense of information suggesting the  
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rapid approach of the runway (Haines, 1991). In addition, when 
engaged in a face-to-face discussion, approximately half of participants 
did not notice that the person with whom they were speaking was 
replaced by another person (Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris, 
2002). Given the wealth of information environments offer, the visual 
system must choose to attend to some types of information at the 
expense of others. What this suggests is that all information is not 
equal. Some information is powerful enough to pass through a filter, 
thereby capturing and holding attention while other information is 
missed.  
The dramatic course of action that led to the shooting of Amidou 
Diallo prompted researchers to ask why the police officers saw only 
one interpretation—the wrong interpretation—of the object rather than 
recognize its ambiguity. Among other factors tested in experimental 
paradigms, active race-based stereotypes contributed to the 
miscategorization of objects; a tool was often misidentified as a gun 
when held by an African American target (Correll, Park, Judd, & 
Wittenbrink, 2002, 2004). In addition, contexts such as visual 
backgrounds impact the speed (Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992; Boyce, 
Pollatsek & Rayner, 1989) and accuracy (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & 
Rabinowitz, 1982) of object identification. Prior exposure to images 
(Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; Leeper, 1935) and previous strains of 
thought (Balcetis & Dale, 2003, 2006) also bias what people see when 
they view objects with multiple resolutions. 
With this current work, I explore the tools perceptual systems 
use to make sense of a dense and taxing world. I investigate the  
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systematic biases on perception that lead people to see their 
surroundings without complete accuracy. Certainly, contexts and 
previous experiences play an active role in directing perception. 
However, I intend to expand this body of work to examine how 
psychological states shape perception in a similar manner. 
Specifically, I propose that psychological states such as motivations 
regulate perception. I explore such motivations as wishful thinking, 
the goal to reduce cognitive dissonance, and visceral need states. 
In addition, I examine the downstream consequences of 
motivated perception. In doing so, I suggest why perceptual systems 
might organize information without complete precision. Biased 
perception, I argue, might allow people to regulate psychological states 
in addition to serving an adaptive function. 
Beyond demonstrating that motivations sculpt perceptual 
processing, I explore a variety of tasks implicated in perception. 
Without a doubt, there are many tasks perceptual systems must 
undertake in order to make sense of the visual world. Such tasks 
include but are not limited to: the reception of afferent input, filtration 
of background noise from relevant foreground, directing attention, and 
categorization. All of these tasks and many more work in a dynamic 
and parallel manner to mold incoming information into a perceptual 
conclusion. I test the ability of motivations to shape 3 specific 
perceptual tasks including preperceptual activation of filters, the 
direction of attentional resources, and perceptual information 
processing.  
This work enters into two key debates. First, the following  
5 
chapters suggest that perceptual systems are indeed penetrable and 
subject to influence by higher-order, social constraints including 
motivational states. Second, the following chapters will explore the 
boundaries of motivated cognition to test whether, how, and when it 
crosses the boundary separating how people consciously think about 
their world and how they literally see it.  
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II.  History of Motivated Perception 
Throughout history, the interest in and support for motivated 
perception has waxed and waned. Pockets of researchers beginning in 
the early 1900’s have suggested that variance in perception cannot be 
accounted for by the interaction of the stimulus and the retina alone. 
Bartlett (1932), most remembered for his work on memory, forecasted 
this perspective on perception proclaiming that “what is said to be 
perceived is in fact inferred” (p. 33). Wertheimer’s investigation into the 
illusion of motion in sequential presentation of static images, and his 
collaboration with Kafka and Kohler on gestalt principles of 
perception, included mechanisms outside of direct sensation. 
Among those most notorious constructivists who proposed that 
motivations are a source of perceptual bias outside of direct sensation, 
Freud (1900/1953, 1899/1962; see also Erdelyi, 1990; Gilmore & 
Edward, 1999) argued that drives to defend oneself against impulses, 
to think favorably about one’s past, and to maintain emotional 
integrity influence the ways people think about, see, and act in the 
world. However, the field grew frustrated with the lack of empirical 
rigor and testable hypotheses generated by such an approach. As a 
result, researchers outside of clinical practice largely abandoned the 
psychoanalytic approach. In the next sections, I will discuss the major 
eras critical for the rejuvenation of interest in examining the interface 
between psychological states and perception, each one taking strides 
towards overcoming the pitfalls of the generations that preceded them. 
A.  NEW LOOK 1 
The New Look perspective that crested in the late 1950’s (Bruner  
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& Minturn, 1955) is considered among the most dedicated historical 
eras of psychology interested in examining how psychological states 
bias perception. Proponents of The New Look argued adamantly that 
complex, higher order processes, not necessarily available to verbal 
report or direct observation, impinge upon lower level processes such 
as sensory experiences. New Look researchers proposed a 
constructivist approach where states of the organism and complex yet 
unconscious processes interact with the visual input. Reacting to an 
overemphasis of the objective stimulus, the New Look resolved to 
demonstrate that perceptual experience was subject to other 
concurrent processes. Their goal was “to rid psychology of the pure 
percept” (Bruner, 1992).  
  According to New Look theorists, perception is an active and 
constructive process influenced by many top-down, psychological 
factors. One primary class of such factors was the needs and values of 
the perceiver. For example, Bruner and Goodman (1947) asked 
children of diverse social economic conditions to estimate the size of 
monetary coins by manipulating the diameter of a beam of light. 
Children of poorer families, for whom the value of money was greater, 
overestimated the size of the coins compared with children of more 
affluent families who were presumed to place less value on the same 
coins. Similarly, adult participants were asked to estimate the size of a 
Swastika, coins, and a neutral disc (Bruner & Postman, 1948). As 
expected, after controlling for absolute size, the swastika, the object of 
most extreme valence, was the most overestimated of the items.  
  These initial demonstrations were met with much enthusiasm,  
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which was then followed by withering critiques. Given the lack of 
empirical rigidity and theoretical falsifiability, the New Look assertion 
that motivations constrain perception fell by the wayside (Eriksen, 
1958, 1962; Eriksen & Browne, 1956; Goldiamond, 1958; Prentice, 
1958; Wohlwill, 1966). For example, it is uncertain whether 
participants took longer to report offensive words because they simply 
did not perceive them, did not do so as quickly, or because it took 
longer to get over the surprise of seeing them or the embarrassment of 
saying them (Erdelyi, 1974, 1985). Additionally, the relative 
unfamiliarity with threatening words or strongly valenced objects, and 
not their motivational punch, may have slowed participants’ 
recognition responses (Adkins, 1956; Howes & Solomon, 1950). For 
instance, children from lower socioeconomic status might have 
misjudged the size of coins not because they value them more, but 
because they have less experience with them (McCurdy, 1956). In 
addition, many designs lack baseline conditions and do not consider 
individual differences among groups of people. Consider that people 
with high anxiety recognized all words in a slower manner than those 
with low anxiety (Smock, 1956). Unfortunately, this group-based 
difference was rarely measured or corrected for within New Look 
research. 
  To be sure, much of what the New Look theorists proposed has 
lasted through today and informs contemporary cognitive and 
perceptual psychology in fundamental ways. Psychologists uniformly 
agree with the New Look tenet that much of cognition happens outside 
a person’s awareness, monitoring, or control (Greenwald, 1992;  
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Wegner & Bargh, 1998). It is accepted that identification, recognition, 
and categorization are directed by perceivers’ previous visual 
experiences as well as context (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 
1982; Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992; Li & Warren, 2004; Long & Toppino, 
2004). That is, the conscious representation people form has omitted a 
good deal of information that the environment actually contains 
(Allport, 1989).  
Indeed, New Look theorists have left their mark on contemporary 
cognitive and perceptual psychology. Although this literature initially 
engendered much support and enthusiasm, the problems that 
saturated this work produced a barrage of critiques that ultimately 
damned the enterprise. The empirical methodologies employed by 
these researchers, although state of the art at the time, allowed for too 
many alternative explanations. While the goal of New Look research 
was to demonstrate the role of nonconscious processes on the way 
people see and think about the world, the means to collecting this 
evidence required a conscious search strategy which undermined the 
conclusion that much perceptual work occurs without conscious 
awareness. As such, the influence of psychological states on 
perception was never firmly established (Dunning, 2001; Erdelyi, 
1974; Gilbert, 1998; Jones, 1985; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
B.  NEW LOOK 2 
Although generally declared insufficiently rigorous, 
methodologically flawed, and theoretically inconclusive by the field at 
large, the data generated by New Look I researchers continued to 
pique the interest of a small group of neo-Freudians. Proponents of  
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what is now called New Look 2 (Greenwald, 1992) returned to 
investigate the constructivist approach to perception but within a less 
introspective framework. In particular, these researchers investigated 
the functional goal constructed perception serves. New Look 2 
predominately argued for motivated perception as an unconscious 
defense mechanism.  
As a primary aim, New Look 2 attempted to define and explore 
the boundaries of unconscious biases. Erdelyi, spearheading the work 
of New Look 2, explored limens of consciousness and unconsciousness 
advocating for the position that such thresholds are moveable and 
dependent upon environmental and social variables (see Erdelyi, 1996 
for a review). When an impoverished although affect-laden target 
becomes the focus of attention, a perceptual signal will be amplified 
(Kitayama, 1990, 1991). Similarly, a perceiver’s negative emotional 
states and certain components of the environment intensify and 
exaggerate perceptual conclusions and memory. After watching an 
emotional movie, memory for subsequently presented letter matrices 
declines. This effect is strongest for those participants who describe 
the film as disgusting. This suggests that emotions, and disgust 
motivations in particular, bias recall in memory arguably because of 
perceptual processing strategies used when viewing the stimulus 
(Suedfeld, Erdelyi, & Corcoran, 1975).  
Although the majority of work during this era was generated 
within and for the benefit of clinical practice, researchers began to 
address some of the largest criticisms of original New Look work. 
Primarily, New Look 2 attempted to document the situations that  
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would promote perceptual defense and those that would promote 
perceptual vigilance. This wave of research offered support for the 
interactionist perspective with increased rigor. However, its audience 
expanded little from its clinical base making it difficult for this work to 
achieve longevity. 
C.  NEW LOOK 3 
Over a century after the initial interest, a new wave of research 
pushed the original New Look perspective back into the respected 
mainstream. Factions of current social cognition, dubbed New Look 3 
(Greenwald, 1992), investigate what situational constraints, 
motivations, goals, and expectations impact the ways people see the 
world around them. Although the theoretical interests of all variants of 
the New Look perspective were similar, the process by which they were 
investigated transformed substantially. For instance, with the 
increased precision and versatility of reaction time recording and 
stimulus presentation techniques, New Look 3 can more accurately 
test complex theoretical constructs.  
Offered as a central tenet by its predecessors, New Look 3 
argues that perceivers can be blind to information passing right before 
their eyes. For instance, within a short window of time immediately 
after first viewing a different attention-capturing object, perceivers are 
blind to target or even goal-relevant objects (Raymond et al., 1992). 
The blindness that occurs during the window of time following a 
consciously processed target item is called an “attentional blink” 
(Loach & Mari-Beffa, 2003). Interestingly, there are a few items 
perceivers are not blind to even when they appear during the blink.  
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For instance, one’s own name will capture attention while other nouns 
and other names are blinked out (Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 
1997).  This suggests that not all information is considered equal or 
processed with equal resources. Instead, some information in some 
situations seems to be favored. One goal, then, of New Look 3 is to 
investigate which psychological constraints lead to the discrepant 
processing of various types of visual information. 
  One prevailing psychological constraint that predicts discrepant 
processing is culture. Certainly, the way that a person thinks about, 
judges, and reacts to others is highly dependent upon the culture in 
which that person has been raised and currently resides, but culture 
influences how people literally see the world, as well. Using a variation 
of the traditional rod-and-frame test, Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, and 
Larsen (2003) found that individuals immersed in Asian cultures 
attended to contextual information, while those enveloped in North 
American cultures ignored it. Japanese inhabitants were more 
accurate in the relative task and American inhabitants more accurate 
in the absolute task. Compared with Caucasian Americans, Chinese 
participants detected covariation in visual scenes through their 
increased field dependence or reliance on contextual information (Ji, 
Peng, & Nisbett, 2000). Data such as this suggests that culture 
constrains visual processing; individualists’ myopic nature in social 
tasks may bleed into judgments at levels as fundamental as basic 
perception. 
Just as chronic psychological constructs including culture 
influence perceptual judgments, perceiver’s physical state also bias  
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attention and perceptual judgments in natural environments. For 
instance, thirsty people recalled more drinking related items from a 
previously visited room than did those whose thirst was sated (Aarts, 
Dijksterhuis, & De Vries, 2001). Thirst directed perceivers’ attention to 
objects in the environment that might satisfy their current desire at 
the expense of attending to objects that were less relevant to this 
desire. Similarly, perceptions of a hill’s slope were subject to influence 
by cumbersome additions to perceivers’ weight, level of fatigue and 
physical fitness, health, and age (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). Added 
weight led to overestimates of distance (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & 
Epstein, 2003). Women, during periods of high fertility as opposed to 
low, recognized the male gender in photographs faster than the female 
gender (Macrae, Alnwick, Milne, & Schloerscheidt, 2002). Importantly, 
the same comparative enhancement was not present for women taking 
a contraceptive pill or those who were pregnant (Johnston, Arden, 
Macrae, & Grace, 2003). This suggests an enhanced sensitivity for 
reproductively relevant stimuli during states where the costs of 
inappropriate mate choice would be most high. 
In sum, perception is not stable; rather it is highly malleable. It 
is dependent upon psychological and physical states among many 
other higher order constraints. These variables impinge upon visual 
processing quickly and outside of conscious awareness. Empirical 
investigations into such interests were a serious pursuit first by the 
original New Look researchers in the 1940s and 50s who proposed the 
role of needs, values, and desires as organizing factors in perception. 
Although current researchers maintain an interest in examining the  
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malleability of perception, the original interest in the constraining 
nature of desires has been subsumed under a larger goal. The main 
goal and the biggest contribution, arguably, of the current zeitgeist is 
the exploration of boundaries between and capabilities of conscious 
and unconscious processing. Importantly, the techniques used by New 
Look 3 researchers are increasingly rigorous. Thus, they offer answers 
to many of the perplexing questions left open by previous generations.  
D.  PRESENT INTERESTS 
My interests represent the union between the interests of New 
Look researchers from the 1950s and the technologies available to 
study such phenomena marketed by current social cognition. I am 
interested in testing how psychological states, needs, values, and 
desires—or motivations more generally—infiltrate the ways in which 
people perceive the world around them. To date there have not been 
empirical demonstrations of motivated perception that focus on 
desires, hope, or wishful thinking that can withstand methodological 
criticisms. My work provides some of the first demonstrations that 
people see the world in a biased manner—that the world they see is 
the world they want to see and not the world as it really is.  
In addition, I will explore why perceptual systems function in 
this manner. I start to address what role biased perception might play 
in self-regulatory strategies. Arguably, perception is filtered and biased 
to serve the end goal of allowing perceivers to act in the world in a way 
that allows them to manage their psychological states.  
In demonstrating that motivations bias perception and 
suggesting why this might be the case, there is one question that  
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lingers in the background: what perceptual tasks are psychological 
states and motivations capable of touching? Is the impact of 
motivation limited to high-order tasks, such as categorization, or 
would it extend to relatively more primitive tasks the perceptual 
system faces such as defining perceptual thresholds? Of course, to 
begin to address this question, it will be necessary to address how 
psychological states accomplish this—that is, to investigate the 
mechanisms behind the phenomenon of motivated perception.  
III.  Where Does the Bias Reside in the Perceptual System? 
Beyond the traffic ticket, talking on cell phones while driving is 
costly. A 20-year-old driver behind the wheel who is given a cell phone 
reacts with the same speed as a 70-year-old driver who is not using 
one (Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Drivers on cell phones react to brake 
lights 18% slower and take 17% longer to regain their original speed. 
In fact, chatty motorists perform worse in driving simulations than 
drunken drivers with blood alcohol levels exceeding 0.08.  
The common assumption that the eye functions like a camera 
leads drivers to assume a false sense of security, relying on the notion 
that they see what is out there by merely opening their eyes and 
looking. However, perception does not work that way. Among the 
causes of these driving errors is the simple fact that perceivers have a 
finite perceptual and attentional capacity that must be distributed 
among many forms of sensory information. Perceivers cannot process 
all the sights, sounds, and other input that overwhelm the senses at 
any given moment. To avoid drowning in a flood of information, 
perception is filtered. Perceptual filters focus attention on important or  
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relevant raw information and decrease attention to less important 
information so that processing resources are devoted to the most 
relevant information in their environments. Effective perceptual 
filtering amplifies relevant input and attenuates irrelevant input. In 
this way, relevant sensory information becomes the perceptual 
foreground and the irrelevant sensory information recedes into the 
background. Unfortunately, rather than the traffic ahead, sometimes 
the most relevant information is the heated argument on the other end 
of the phone call.  
Without a doubt, there are theorists and researchers who are 
less willing to state perception itself is filtered, or more generally, that 
it can be influenced by external, higher-order sources. Indeed, 
suggesting that perception lacks veridicality and positing when 
perception begins to lose its veracity has provoked major theoretical 
and empirical battles throughout many eras and continues to this day. 
Central to their critique, critics argue that higher-order constraints 
influence not basic perception but rather later stages of the perceptual 
process. Pylyshyn (1999), for example, asserts that perception occurs 
only during “early vision.” In this stage, the visual system receives 
input then forms a 3-D representation of the external world. This 
stage, which he defines as perception proper, is immune to external 
influence. Simply put, he argues that motivations cannot penetrate 
perception. As a second stage, the mind filters, interprets, and 
categorizes the representation after early vision forms it. Pylyshyn 
(1999) refers to this manipulation of the raw data as post-perception 
or “perceptual decision making.” Higher-order influences, such as  
17 
motivation, have an impact predominantly on this latter stage which 
he asserts is not perception but judgment. 
Given recent evidence and debate (see the commentaries that 
accompany Pylyshyn, 1999), it is increasingly difficult for theorists to 
assert that perception is impenetrable. For instance, higher-order 
constraints, such as conscious attention, exert an influence on 
processing in areas even as early as V1, the most temporally primary 
region of visual cortex. When perceivers attend to one of two 
overlapping images, fMRI activity patterns in early visual areas, 
including V1, contain information that can predict conscious 
perception (Kamitani & Tong, 2005). Given the close proximity in 
space and time between V1 and the retina, it is almost illogical to 
claim higher order constraints infiltrate only later stages of perceptual 
decision making rather than the early stages Pylyshyn calls pure 
perception. 
Although still an open interest and a contended issue, it is clear 
that motivations penetrate perceptual processing in many different 
ways, during many different tasks the perceptual system faces. In the 
sections that follow, I will discuss the specific ways in which 
motivations interact with a variety of tasks perceptual systems face. 
First, I will suggest that motivations begin to bias perception even 
before visual information is offered to the perceptual system. Before 
processing begins, motivations activate 'sets' through which 
perceptual information will be channeled. Incoming information 
congruent with or contained within the set will be processed further 
while incongruent information will not be picked up by the perceptual  
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system. Secondly, after an initial scan of the environment, motivations 
can direct attentional resources to some areas of a visual scene at the 
expense of others leading to blindness or a narrowed focus of attention 
on some types of information. Finally, motivations can bias the 
amount and degree of processing perceptual information receives after 
it is perceived. The amount of information required for categorizing an 
object might depend on whether the visual information presented 
suggests a favorable or disfavored outcome. The threshold for 
identifying a visual stimulus that resembles a preferred object might 
be lower than the threshold for identifying a stimulus that resembles a 
less preferred object.  
A.  MOTIVATED PRE-PERCEPTION 
Psychological states can act as perceptual filters, thereby biasing 
perception very early on—even before information is presented to 
visual faculties. Filters, often called informational sets, sift perceptual 
information to shape perceptual experiences, sort the incoming stream 
of information, and assist in categorization and identification. Filters 
can be further distinguished by the type of information contained 
within the set (for a discussion of this distinction see Balcetis & Dale, 
2006) but are generally comprised of expectations, past experiences, 
underlying assumptions, beliefs, attitudes, among many other types of 
information.  
The first type of set is perceptual set. Perceptual set (Bruner & 
Minturn, 1955) is a form of filter that involves specific, directly 
relevant perceptual information immediately descriptive of upcoming 
visual stimuli. Classic work with ambiguous visual figures provides  
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clear examples of the role of perceptual sets. Leeper (1935) exposed 
participants to a simplified version of Boring’s (1930) young/old 
woman ambiguous figure that emphasized characteristics of either the 
young or old woman. This perceptual filter biased subsequent 
identification of the original, truly ambiguous figure such that 
participants reported an interpretation that was congruent with their 
prior visual experience (see also Fisher, 1967). Pictures of animals led 
perceivers to see the rat/man ambiguous figure as a rat while pictures 
of human faces led to an interpretation of the figure as a man 
(Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; see also Crandall & de Lissovoy, 1977). 
Similarly, Epstein and Rock (1960) biased interpretations of the 
young/old woman figure by exposing participants beforehand to less 
ambiguous versions of the same figure.  
A second type of set—conceptual set—contains incidental, 
loosely related information that is not perceptual in nature, which can 
subtly guide the perceptual system. For instance, relative spatial 
positioning is a type of conceptual set that biases object identification. 
Bar and Ullman (1996) showed participants pairs of objects that were 
either in the correct relative spatial positions (e.g., a hat above a leg) or 
in incorrect relative positions (e.g., a leg above a hat). Participants 
more accurately and more quickly identified the objects when the 
objects satisfied the correct position relation than when they violated 
it. In addition, conceptual sets assist in the resolution of visual 
ambiguity. Balcetis & Dale (2003, 2006) demonstrated that resolution 
of the Necker cube is biased by imagining looking up a tall building, 
down a deep canyon, or across the Great Plains. Participants were  
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more likely to see the Necker cube as an object they were standing 
underneath and looking up at after reading a description of a 
skyscraper seen from below. 
Just as sets filter perception, psychological states such as 
preferences or desires might privilege one filter over another. The net 
effect of such filtration is that the perceiver tends to see information 
consistent with a desire (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sanitioso, 
Kunda, & Fong, 1990). Desires can serve as conceptual sets, leading 
perceivers to interpret an ambiguous figure in a manner that would 
bring about the desired outcome (Balcetis & Dunning, in press). 
During a lexical decision task just before participants viewed the 
ambiguous figure, participants were quicker to identify words 
associated with the desired outcome than words associated with the 
undesirable one, a pattern which suggests that desires activated a set 
associated with the desired outcome even before perceptual systems 
were exposed to the target object.  
Importantly, the specific conceptual set participants might have 
used to disambiguate the stimulus was not closely tied to the 
stimulus. Perceivers were not given specific hints (i.e. seal) about what 
the upcoming stimulus might be (i.e. horse/seal ambiguous figure). 
Instead, broad categories (e.g., sea animal), even ones that that are 
composed of a set of features that is much too large to enact a specific 
feature search strategy, biased perception. Thus, desires can activate a 
conceptual set prior to exposure to stimuli. This conceptual set directs 
the identification of subsequently experienced objects with multiple 
interpretations.  
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One important note is that the distinction between perceptual 
and conceptual set should, perhaps, be appreciated for its descriptive 
ability rather than its truthful representation of the organization of 
mental contents. Although I have suggested perceptual and conceptual 
sets are distinct and separable forms of filters, it is most probable that 
both types of information play an active, equal, and simultaneous role 
in filtering incoming information. The activation of one type of set will 
activate the other in an interactive manner. In addition, the term ‘set’ 
may suggest that the contents of a filter are discrete—some concepts 
definitively excluded while others definitively included. However, it 
might be more accurate to describe both perceptual and conceptual 
filters as members of ‘fuzzy sets’ where membership is considered 
gradual and probabilistic. Rather than positing that discrete symbols 
are, in a binary sense, either members or not, fuzzy sets allow for 
graded inclusion of membership status. In this way, both perceptual 
and conceptual information can be activated to varying degrees within 
the same distributed representation. 
B.  MOTIVATED DIRECTION OF ATTENTION 
Motivations infiltrate perceptual processing by directing 
attention to certain elements of the environment at the expense of 
others. When bar hopping on a Friday night, the clubs are usually 
packed with people talking, singing, and laughing. Yet, when it is time 
to start flirting with the bartender in order to get ahead in the drink 
queue, the background noise seems to subside and the bartender’s 
voice becomes easier to hear. Although incessant, the coughs of the 
audience and squeaks of the chairs at a symphony concert usually slip  
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by the engrossed listener unnoticed. When New York Yankees pitcher 
Randy Johnson steps up to the mound, Red Sox fans shout, wave, and 
toss props about with the hopes of leading his pitches astray, yet they 
rarely accomplish their goal.  
How does Randy Johnson’s visual system make sense of the 
busy visual backdrop to focus on the catcher’s glove when pitching at 
Boston's Fenway Park against the Red Sox? I suggest that 
psychological states act as perceptual filters, after input is received, to 
assist in deciphering of the complex visual environment. After an 
initial scan of the surroundings, attention might be directed to certain 
elements of the environment at the expense of others—a process called 
selective attention (see Yantis, 1996). This selection is often described 
as a spotlight that highlights a definite region (Posner & Petersen, 
1990), like the Yankee catcher’s glove, where perceptual processing is 
facilitated at the expense of information in other locations, like the 
enthusiastic Red Sox fans behind home plate. Again, I propose that 
motivational states can direct attention. For instance, when thirsty, 
perceivers focus their attention on objects in the room that might 
satisfy their thirst like a water bottle, increasing the likelihood that 
they will remember the object as having been in the room later on 
(Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & de Vries, 2001; Balcetis & Ferguson, in prep).  
This focused attention, importantly, comes at the expense of 
attention to peripheral objects. Forster, Lieberman, and Higgins (2005) 
explain that a motivation to fulfill a goal, a powerful psychological 
state, increases the allotment of energy towards goal pursuit. Such 
prioritization helps to achieve the focal goal, but at the same time, it  
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could interfere with achieving other goals (Shah, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2002). For example, the goal to find one’s glasses when 
rushing off to the office increases the accessibility of ‘‘glasses’’ and its 
associates, but would most likely detract attention from 
simultaneously pursuing other goals such as locating one’s keys. 
Attention cannot and should not always be directed to a single 
stimulus in a single location. To accommodate this limitation, 
psychological states bias the scope of the attentional beam, adjusting 
its size in order to process all objects in all locations in a parallel 
manner. For example, when driving a car, attention needs to be 
directed to as much of the visual field as possible to guard against 
obstacles on all sides of the car. On the other hand, when trying to 
find a friend at an outdoor concert, it would be helpful to narrowly 
focus attention on likely locations, so that resources can be allocated 
to processing the faces, the voices, and other distinguishing features of 
people in those locations. In other words, processing resources can 
either be focused on a small region, allowing fast and precise 
processing in this restricted region, or they are distributed over a large 
region, allowing the processing of multiple stimuli in a less efficient 
manner.  
Eriksen and St. James (1986; see also Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; 
Castiello & Umilta, 1990) have suggested a "zoom lens" model of visual 
attention to account for this type of expansive versus narrow beam of 
attention. The zoom lens can vary the size of the attentional focus 
continuously as environments and goals necessitate. Recently, 
neurophysiologists have sought support for the zoom lens model of  
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visual attention by using fMRI to measure activation patterns during 
visual tasks. In particular, researchers measure the Blood 
Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) signal, which represents 
changes in the concentration of deoxygenated hemoglobin. BOLD 
signals correlate with changes in blood flow, observable electrical 
activity, and population synaptic activity. Measuring the BOLD signal 
using fMRI allows researchers to ask where activity occurs and what 
relative amount of resources the process requires. 
Neurophysiological, eye-tracking, and behavioral data serves as 
a neurological analog supporting the zoom lens model of visual 
attention. Using fMRI, Mueller, Bartelt, Donner, Villringer, & Brandt 
(2003) observed that across V1, V2, primary visual cortex, and V4, the 
amount of visual cortical surface that was activated increased when 
attention had to cover a large region. Thus, when attention spanned a 
large surface area, a larger proportion of the visual cortex’s surface 
area was activated. Importantly, the percent signal change in the 
BOLD signal within all 4 visual cortical areas dropped when the size of 
the attentional focus increased. This suggests then that as attention 
increased in span, fewer processing resources were allocated per 
square unit of visual cortex. When the amount of surface area that 
was attended to increased, the surface area of the neural correlates 
responsible for processing visual information also increased. 
Importantly, this study tested the number and location of 
saccades in a pretest with the same participants while outside of the 
fMRI magnet. Eye movements were eliminated as a cause of the 
observed effects, as participants were able to suppress eye movements.   
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Indeed, it is not the case that a large cortical surface area was called 
upon to process visual information because the eyes were moving 
around more, but instead it was the expansiveness of the span of 
attention that called upon the greater amount of resources. 
Additional support for the combined role of attentional spotlight 
and the zoom lens mechanisms comes from work on weapon focus. 
When experiencing a crime, witnesses maintain a poorer memory for 
important details about the crime, such as the perpetrator’s face or 
clothing, if a weapon is used (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). A 
weapon is looked at longer and more often than at a control object 
(Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987) resulting in poorer performance in a 
line-up or recognition task to identify the perpetrator (e.g. Maass & 
Kohnken, 1989; Tooley, Brigham, Maass, & Bothwell, 1987). Although 
several mechanisms have been suggested for why people focus on the 
weapon, receiving most support is the proposition that weapons 
capture and hold attention at the expense of other objects in the scene 
because they are unusual (Pickel, 1998; Shaw & Skolnick, 1999). As 
explained by Loftus et al. (1987), a banana or a gun in the hand of the 
robber in a fast food restaurant might narrow the scope of attention to 
just that object.  
Given the state of the literature at this point, I broadly conclude 
that attention will be differentially allocated to some forms of 
information at the expense of others. Some information captures 
attention when others types do not. Some environments will be 
scanned broadly and expansively, while others contain elements that 
will be scrutinized and fixated upon at the expense of other elements.  
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A key interest of mine is contemplating how these informational filters 
such as selective attention are developed—how an attentional filter 
might sort the stream of perceptual information as it enters.  
C.  MOTIVATED VISUAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 
Motivations exert an influence over perception during a third 
perceptual processing task. Namely, motivations lead to differential 
styles of processing favored and disfavored perceptual information. A 
graduate student teaching assistant, endowed with 150 undergraduate 
essays to review and only a week to accomplish the task, might work 
quickly and with poor penmanship. An undergraduate, ever hopeful 
for a passing grade, receives his graded paper from this graduate 
student and might be convinced that the ambiguous squiggle at the 
top is a “B” rather than the “13” that it really is. That same graduate 
student (who is quite the defensive pessimist) might meet with her 
advisor later on. She will be convinced that when her advisor says he’s 
“somewhat glad to work with her” and says so with an unusual look 
upon his face, that he is really saying there’s room for improvement in 
the quality of her performance. And, without a doubt, she will certainly 
see the face he is making as a smirk rather than a smile. 
People are motivated to come to a specific conclusion (see 
Kunda, 1990 for review), and the ways in which they process 
information come to reflect this bias. This is no less true in perception. 
Beyond pre-perception and the first tasks implicated in filtration, I 
propose that psychological states infiltrate other perceptual tasks as 
well. Motivations bias the manner in which perceptual information is   
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processed after it is perceived but still before people are consciously 
aware of the conclusion their perceptual system has reached.  
Building support through a broad sample of research, Kunda's 
(1990) theory of motivated reasoning posits that "people rely on 
cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired 
conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these 
will be used on a given occasion" (Kunda 1990, p. 480). I suggest 
modifying this statement regarding social judgments to reflect biased 
perceptual judgments as well. Motivations play a role in determining 
the type and amount of perceptual processing that will be allocated to 
information consistent or inconsistent with the motivation.  
In order to arrive at the preferred perceptual outcome, perceivers 
hold information to different levels of scrutiny. Other work in 
motivated reasoning has shown that information consistent with a 
favored conclusion is held to a lower standard of scrutiny than 
information consistent with an unwanted one (Dawson, Gilovich, & 
Regan, 2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Trope & Ferguson, 2000). Schaller 
(1992) found that self-enhancement motives affect the type of 
reasoning style used to process information about the self and others. 
Logic and statistics are set aside in order to see one’s in-group in a 
favorable light. Further, participants switch between simple and 
complex processing in order to find support for goal-enhancing 
evidence rather than goal-threatening evidence (Klaczinski, Gordon, & 
Fauth, 1997, p. 481). Complex reasoning is used to avoid accepting 
information that is threatening to current beliefs. However, flawed 
scientific evidence is accepted when it supports their beliefs  
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(Klaczinski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997). Similarly, research in motivated 
skepticism found that people are less critical of information that 
supports a desired or existing belief (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). People are 
more likely to accept positive information without question, while they 
seek more evidence before accepting a conclusion that is inconsistent 
with prior beliefs (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). 
Just as people consciously weigh and deliberate over favored 
and less favored pieces of information to different degrees, people also 
differentially allocate processing resources to visual scenes that offer 
positive and negative information. This type of motivated visual 
information processing manifests itself in several specific ways, none 
of which are at the exclusion of the others. It could be the case that 
perceivers scan the visual environment in a biased manner, searching 
for desired objects or favorable information rather than information 
that suggests the world is not as pleasant as one might wish. 
Alternatively, motivations might lower the threshold a visual feature 
must reach before the visual system allows it into consciousness. 
Desired components of the environment might be recognized faster or 
more easily because the perceiver requires less of a match between 
what he or she hopes to see and what is offered by the environment.  
  Importantly, regardless of what mechanism mediates 
psychological states and perception, it occurs preconsciously. Filters 
are engaged without requiring awareness, attention is directed without 
knowledge of that fact, and visual information processing occurs at 
different levels of intensity nonconsciously. That is to say, people are   
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not aware that they have come to see the world the way they have 
been set up to see it.   
IV.  Overview of Chapters 
  Johnny Nash famously said, “I can see clearly now – the rain is 
gone.” As Nash’s lyrics imply, people tacitly assume their perceptual 
experience of the world is a veridical representation of reality. People 
assume that only a downpour, typhoon, or other major calamity 
stands between them and an accurate perception of reality. Daily life 
experiences aside, the chapters that follow call this supposition into 
question and instead suggest the vantage is cloudy at best.  
  I explored one general psychological state shown to have a 
profound influence on the ways people come to judge themselves, 
evaluate others, and navigate their social world. That influence is 
perceivers’ motivational drive to see the world as they want to see it, 
rather than how it actually is.  
  Indeed, people work diligently to see themselves in a favorable 
light. People expend much effort regulating their self-assessments and 
judgments of others to believe that they will achieve success while 
avoiding the pitfalls of life that others experience and to maintain high 
self-worth and esteem. Nestled among the literature on motivated 
reasoning, self-affirmation, and defensive processing, evidence 
indicates that people use these self-regulatory strategies to shape how 
they think about their physical, social, and mental worlds. 
Importantly, these forces impinge upon the judgments and decisions 
people reach with regard to information of which they are consciously 
aware.   
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  I examined the scope of this type of deliberative motivated 
reasoning to see if motivations extend to levels of processing more 
primary than conscious, effortful judgment and decision-making. I 
investigated whether the motive to see the world through rose-colored 
glasses crosses the boundary between how people think about their 
world and how they perceive it. Chapter 2 offers evidence of times in 
which people see the world not how it is, but how they hope it would 
be. In Chapter 3, I examine the consequences of motivated perception 
and suggest that motivated perception might be used as a self-
regulatory strategy. In Chapter 4, I investigate one possible 
mechanism by which they might accomplish this. That is, I test 
whether motivations bias the scope and direction of attention. In sum, 
I tested if people literally see what they want to see, arguing along the 
way the reasons why and how it might occur. Finally, in Chapter 5, I 
review the ways in which the previous chapters inform the 
understanding of what motivated perception is, why it is useful, and 
how motivations penetrate perception. In addition, I examine the ways 
in which motivated perception permeates daily life, exploring the 
applied nature of this enterprise. 
A.  CHAPTER 2: SEE WHAT YOU WANT TO SEE—MOTIVATIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON VISUAL PERCEPTION 
  In this chapter, I asked if perceiver’s perceptual experiences could 
be molded, in part, by such psychological states as personal wishes 
and preferences. I examined if perceivers, when presented with 
ambiguous visual information, would resolve the ambiguity in such a 
way that they might see what they want to see. Across these studies, I  
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provided converging evidence to suggest that participants’ desires, 
hopes, or wishful thinking led them to see information they desired 
over what they did not.  
     1.  Overview 
In all studies, participants knew they would perform either a 
desirable task, such as consuming orange juice, or an undesirable 
task, such as drinking a gelatinous, green slime labeled organic veggie 
smoothie. Participants learned that their assignment would be 
determined by what category of stimuli appeared on their computer 
screen. For all participants, I manipulated what type of stimulus 
would bring about the desired and undesired outcomes. Then, 
participants saw an ambiguous figure that could be interpreted as a 
member of both categories. I measured participants’ immediate 
perceptual experience of that ambiguous figure. I predicted and found 
that desire led perceivers to resolve the ambiguous nature of the 
stimulus in the desired way. Perceivers saw what they wanted to see. 
Overall participants interpreted an ambiguous visual stimulus 
in a manner that fit with their wishes and preferences over one that 
did not. By using nonconscious measures of perceptual experience, I 
eliminated the possibility that the bias resided at the level of response 
selection. In particular, a hidden video camera tracked gross eye 
movements without participants’ awareness, lexical decision tasks 
measured concept accessibility, and paradigm variations suggested 
participants actually saw, rather than simply reported seeing, the 
favored interpretation. Wishful thinking constrained interpretations 
before perceptual judgments were made.   
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  This motivated perceptual bias may be the byproduct of a 
broad-reaching mechanism that allows people to maintain overly 
favorable beliefs about the self. That is, to believe oneself as above 
average across the majority of domains, a logically implausible feat, it 
is necessary that the cognitive work it takes to get to that belief would 
have to stay behind the scenes—unconscious, in other words. This 
process may bleed over from cognition to perception, filtering the world 
before the information reaches conscious awareness so that people 
can see things as they wish to rather than how they really are. This 
self-regulatory strategy, whether occurring in cognition or perception, 
allows people to think of themselves as loveable and capable, and the 
world as benevolent and charitable. 
B.  CHAPTER 3: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND THE PERCEPTION 
OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that intrapsychic motivations like 
cognitive dissonance reduction influenced perceptual processes. This 
work suggested that motivated perception serves a self-regulatory 
function. Self-regulation can bias perception of the element of the 
environment one is interacting with at the time that such regulation is 
required. Perceivers see the world the way they want to see it so that 
they might feel good about themselves, their choices, and the world 
around them.  
Cognitive dissonance theory assumes a drive-like motivation to 
maintain consistency among relevant thoughts and actions (Festinger, 
1957). Although it is well documented that when attitudes and actions 
contradict one another, a drive-like motivation is produced that aims  
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to restore harmony by shifting beliefs to realign them with behavior. 
Most documented is the restoration of harmony via a change in 
judgments, decisions, or attitudes (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Knox 
& Inkster, 1968; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980). In this research, I 
investigated whether restoration of harmony could prove successful 
through shifting perceptions. That is, I asked if this form of self-
regulation could extend down to visual perception of natural 
environments when one is experiencing dissonance. 
     1.  Overview 
  In both of the studies discussed in this paper, participants 
performed an aversive or embarrassing task. In each study, I 
manipulated participants’ subjective feelings of choice about 
completing the task to be either high or low. Under high choice, people 
needed to resolve the dissonance caused by their voluntary agreement 
to perform an aversive action such as walking across a campus quad 
in a costume and rolling up a grass hill kneeling on a skateboard. 
Under low choice, this dissonance is easily resolved because 
participants can attribute their agreement to lack of choice (Linder, 
Cooper, & Jones, 1967). I found that participants resolved their 
dissonance in high choice conditions by altering their perception of the 
environment to make the task less aversive relative to perceptions 
reported by low choice and control condition participants. Across both 
studies, high choice participants saw the distance they had to walk as 
shorter and the hill as less steep than the other participants. 
In this paper, I explored the consequences for perception of 
people’s self-regulatory goal to reduce cognitive dissonance. In  
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particular, I investigated if the motivation to alleviate dissonance 
associated with psychological distress and mental turmoil can lead 
people to see their world in a way that allows them to feel better. 
Specifically, I investigated whether the drive toward dissonance 
reduction can bias the way people perceive an element of their 
environment that they are interacting with at the time of experiencing 
dissonance. 
C.  CHAPTER 4: DISTANCE AND THE FOND HEART—AN 
EXAMINATION OF HOW DESIRES CONSTRAIN DISTANCE 
PERCEPTION 
Although the first two papers provide evidence that perceptual 
experiences do not accurately represent reality, the process by which 
motivation infiltrates perception is, as of yet, ill-defined. In this 
chapter, I propose that perceptual systems are tuned to positive 
information. I proposed that motivated perception occurs because 
perceivers narrowly focus their attention on positive information at the 
expense of comparatively less desired information. In addition, I 
examined the downstream consequences of such focused attention on 
other perceptual tasks such as estimating distances.  
In these studies, participants estimated distances between 
themselves and an appealing object, like chocolate truffles, or a less 
appealing object, like dog poop. I predicted and found that distances to 
appealing objects appear shorter than distances to less appealing 
objects. In addition, I offered evidence that motivation influences 
perception via changing the expansiveness of attention span. In short,   
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perceivers tended to focus their attention on desired objects resulting 
in decreased perceptions of distance.  
These studies again beg one to ask what perceptual tasks 
motivations penetrate. Across these studies, I provided convergent 
evidence suggesting that desires led participants to see what they want 
to see in their visual environment—to focus their attention on objects 
of their desire. Perceivers’ attention was held by the object which led 
them to see the object of their desires as closer than it really was. 
Although not exclusively so, I suggest that motivations affect the 
allocation of attention.  
D.  THE FETTERS OF ONE’S DESIRES: A SYNOPSIS OF 
MOTIVATED PERCEPTION 
  The final chapter illustrates how each of the preceding ones offer 
unique insight into motivated perception. Certainly, the main goal of 
each of these chapters is to explore the variety of psychological and 
physical motivations that bias perception. However, in the final 
chapter, I explore the specific ways in which each takes this 
exploration further and in a slightly different direction. For instance, I 
discuss how each chapter argues that motivations infiltrate different 
processing tasks. In addition, I discuss how each chapter explores the 
downstream consequences of motivated perception on the self-
regulation of goals and internal states in addition to suggesting that 
motivated perception is adaptive. Finally, I will discuss the various 
instances of motivated perception outside of the lab in such domains  
as self-screening for cancer, body image issues, and marketing 
strategies among others.   
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The final chapter also addresses an important theoretical 
concern—one that has circulated for several instantiations of interest 
in the New Look perspective. The traditional conception of perception 
is a stage-like, linear series of independent processes. However, just as 
preceding generations came to realize, there are problems with 
accepting this conception of perception. If one accepts the stage-like 
conception of perception, then one must accept that the mechanisms 
underlying motivated perception require that an object first be 
perceived before motivational filters can be employed. That is, by the 
time motivational forces know that the object in question is 
consequential, the object has already been perceived. To address this 
concern, I will discuss a new approach to perceptual processing (see 
Spivey, in press) that integrates higher and lower order constraints 
suggesting they work in tandem, in parallel, to produce a perceptual 
conclusion and promote action. I will use this approach to discuss the 
next steps in motivated perception research. I propose that the goal for 
motivated perception researchers is to eventually offer a complete 
picture of the mutually constraining, dynamic processes that are 
implicated in perception.  
V.  Conclusion 
George Bernard Shaw (1903) accurately summarized a wealth of 
research suggesting inner, psychological states are a central 
determinant in perceptual experience when he admonished “better 
keep yourself clean and bright; you are the window through which you 
must see the world.” Perhaps it is through such biased perception 
that, in fact, perceivers are able to continue feeling positive, clean, and  
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bright. Motivations lead people to see the world as they want to, and 
perhaps this is one strategy by which perceivers continue to maintain 
positive self-views, optimistic predictions for their future, and a rosy 
outlook on their surroundings. The distortions that result from seeing 
the world through motivated lenses might promote a sense of safety 
and happiness. In return, this general positivity continues to tint the 
lenses through which perceivers view the world. Certainly, the view we 
have of the world will depend on the window through which we see it. 
The goals of the following work are to explore the different ways people 
view the world, the downstream consequences of idiosyncratic 
perceptions, and one mechanism by which perceptual distortions 
arise. In general, I hope to offer insight into the architecture of the 
window through which people see their world.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
SEE WHAT YOU WANT TO SEE: MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES  
ON VISUAL PERCEPTION
∗  
  The world that people know is the one they take in through their 
senses.  This  is  the  world  they  react  to—the  one  their  conscious 
thoughts, feelings, and actions are predicated on. People act on the 
presumption  that  the  world  they  are  consciously  aware  of  is  a 
comprehensive  and  accurate  representation  of  the  environment  that 
exactly copies the outside world as it truly is.  
  Decades of research in psychology, however, tend to undermine 
the assumption that what people see or hear is an exact replica of 
what is out in the world, in two different ways. First, perception is 
selective. People are not aware of everything that is going on around 
them. Consider, for example, recent studies of “attentional blindness.” 
Of undergraduates asked to monitor how many times people in a 
videotape pass a basketball among themselves, 40% failed to see the 
woman in a gorilla suit saunter into the middle of the group, turn to 
the camera, beat her chest, and then walk out (Simons & Chabris, 
1999). Second, perception is often biased. Hills are not as steep as 
they appear to be (Bhalla & Proffitt , 1999; Creem & Proffitt, 1998; 
Proffitt, Creem, & Zosh, 2001). Distances are not as short as they look 
(Baird & Biersdorf, 1967; Durgin, Proffitt , Olson, & Reinke, 1995;  
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Galinsky, 1951; Tittle, Todd, Perotti, & Norman, 1995; Todd & 
Bressan, 1990; Todd & Norman, 1991). Large objects are not as tall as 
they seem (Yang, Dixon, & Proffitt, 1999). Everyone knows that the 
speck of a pebble at the bottom of one’s shoe is never nearly the rock it 
feels like when one steps on it. 
Moreover, perception is malleable. It is responsive to “top down” 
influences that flow from the perceiver’s cognitive and psychological 
states or from environments (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999). To be 
sure, much of perception is “bottom up,” with sense organs and 
perceptual systems working inflexibly and automatically to form a 
representation of a stimulus that the perceiver passively accepts. The 
perceptual system pieces together the fine-grained bits of information 
the senses acquire to create a coherent percept, analyzing and 
synthesizing basic components of objects (Kosslyn & Koenig, 1992; 
Michelon & Koenig, 2002) including focal areas, critical features (Long 
& Olszweski, 1999), fixation points (Meng & Tong, 2004; Toppino, 
2003), and spatial proximity or “crowding” (Pelli, Palomares, & Majaj, 
2004).  
But a substantial volume of psychological research reveals that 
top-down influences also inform perception. For example, context 
matters. Prior exposure to images of animals or people biases what 
people see when they view classic ambiguous figures, such as the 
“rat/man” and “old woman/young woman” figures so often featured in 
introductory psychology textbooks (Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; Leeper, 
1935). Estimates of a man’s walking speed are biased after thinking 
about fast animals like “cheetahs” or slow animals like “turtles” (Aarts  
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& Dijksterhuis, 2002). Interpretations of an ambiguous figure that can 
be seen as a woman’s face or as a man playing a saxophone depend on 
whether perceivers have been recently primed with the concepts of 
flirtation or music (Balcetis & Dale, 2003). Perceptions of how steep a 
hill is become more extreme after participants jog vigorously for an 
hour (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). The distance to a goal seems longer if 
people strap on a heavy backpack (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & 
Epstein, 2003).  
  In this manuscript, we explore one possible top-down influence 
on perception that has been shown to have a profound and ubiquitous 
impact in other arenas of social cognition. That influence is the 
perceiver’s motivational states—more specifically, the motivation to 
think of one’s self and one’s prospects in a favorable way, to believe 
that one will achieve positive outcomes while being able to avoid 
aversive ones, and to enhance self-worth and esteem. This motivation 
in the psychological literature has several names, such as motivated 
reasoning, self-affirmation, wishful thinking, and defensive processing, 
and has been shown to have a widespread influence in shaping how 
people think about their world—that is, how they interpret information 
of which they are consciously aware. This motive has been shown to 
influence such higher-order tasks as judging other people, evaluating 
the self, predicting the future, and making sense of the past (for 
reviews, see Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Dunning, 2001; Kunda, 
1990; Pittman, 1998).  
  In the studies that follow, we examine the scope of motivated 
reasoning to see if it crosses the boundary between how people think  
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about their outside world and how they perceive it. Certainly, 
motivated reasoning influences conscious, deliberate, and effortful 
judgments, but we ask if it can constrain what information reaches 
consciousness in the first place? Does the impact of motivated 
reasoning or wishful thinking, more specifically, extend down to 
preconscious processing of visual information? We test, in essence, 
whether people literally are prone to see what they want to see.  
The Impact of Motivational States 
  There exist some indirect hints that the motives underlying 
wishful thinking will have an impact on visual perception. Recent work 
focusing on more biologically-oriented motivational states shows that 
they influence the perception of visual stimuli. For example, Changizi 
& Hall (2001) demonstrated that participants who were thirsty 
perceived more transparency in ambiguous visual stimuli than do 
those who were not thirsty, presumably because transparency is a 
characteristic associated with water. Women during periods of high 
fertility were faster to categorize male photographs than female ones 
by gender, relative to those not in such a fertile state (Macrae, Alnwick, 
Milne, & Schloerscheidt, 2002). Importantly, the same comparative 
enhancement was not present for women taking a contraceptive pill or 
those who were pregnant (Johnston, Arden, Macrae, & Grace, 2003). 
Both of these examples suggest an enhanced perceptual sensitivity for 
features in visual stimuli that are relevant to biological drives or 
desires.  
  But would a drive toward wishful thinking similarly influence 
perception? In a sense, this question is a revisiting and a reopening of  
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one of the focal issues of the New Look approach to perception that 
arose in psychology during the 1940s and 1950s (Bruner & Minturn, 
1955). According to New Look theorists, perception was an active and 
constructive process influenced by many top-down factors. One class 
of such factors was the needs and values of the perceiver. For 
example, Bruner and Goodman (1947) asked children in diverse social 
economic conditions to estimate the size of monetary coins by 
manipulating the diameter of a beam of light. Poorer children, for 
whom the value of money was greater, overestimated the size of the 
coins compared with more affluent children who were presumed to 
place less value on the same coins. In studies of perceptual defense, 
New Look theorists concluded that participants inhibited the 
recognition of threatening stimuli, such as troubling words (Postman, 
Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948). 
  These initial demonstrations of motivational influences on 
perception were met with much enthusiasm, which was then followed 
by withering critiques. To be sure, much of what the New Look 
theorists proposed has lasted through today and informs 
contemporary cognitive and perceptual psychology in fundamental 
ways. Psychologists uniformly agree with the New Look tenant that 
much of cognition happens nonconsciously—that is, outside a 
person’s awareness, monitoring, or control (Greenwald, 1992; Wegner 
& Bargh, 1998). Many modern textbooks describe the New Look 
proposal that perception is filtered—that the representation of the 
environment that people have in consciousness has omitted a good 
deal of information that is actually in the environment (Allport, 1989;  
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Miller, 1987). Similarly, perception of an object is importantly 
influenced by the perceiver’s expectations as well as the context 
surrounding that object (Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; 
Boyce & Pollatsek, 1992; Li & Warren, 2004; Long & Toppino, 2004). 
  However, the specific New Look assertion that motivational 
states influence perception did not achieve the same stature and 
longevity as these other insights. It, instead, ran aground in the 1950s 
on the rocky shoals of methodological difficulties and theoretical 
controversies (Eriksen, 1958, 1962; Eriksen & Browne, 1956; 
Goldiamond, 1958; Prentice, 1958; Wohlwill, 1966). Critics pointed out 
that poorer children might misjudge the size of coins because they 
were not as familiar with them, or that their misjudgments might 
involve problems of memory rather than perception (McCurdy, 1956). 
Critics also noted in studies of perceptual defense that participants 
might have taken longer to report troubling words not because it took 
them longer to perceive them, but rather because it took longer to get 
over the surprise of seeing them or the embarrassment of saying them 
(Erdelyi, 1974, 1985). Others lamented that the relative unfamiliarity 
of threatening words, and not their motivational punch, was the key 
ingredient that slowed participants’ recognition responses (Adkins, 
1956; Howes & Solomon, 1950). As such, the influence of motivational 
states on perception was never firmly established. And as the 1950s 
closed the study of the relation between motivational states and 
perception, this pursuit fell by the wayside and ceased to have the 
major impact—if any at all—enjoyed by other insights from the New   
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Look tradition (Dunning, 2001; Erdelyi, 1974; Gilbert, 1998; Jones, 
1985; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).  
Perception of Ambiguous Figures 
  In the present research, we examine the impact of motivational 
states on perception by focusing on interpretations of ambiguous or 
reversible figures—visual stimuli, like the famous Necker cube, that 
people can interpret in two different ways but for which they tend to 
see only one interpretation at any given time (Long & Toppino, 2004; 
Rock & Mitchener, 1992).  
  In each of five studies, we told participants that they were about 
to be assigned to one of two experimental tasks, one being much more 
desirable than the other. We also told participants that a computer 
sitting in front of them was about to present them a stimulus that 
would indicate which task they were assigned to. In fact, in each 
study, the computer presented a figure that could be interpreted in 
two different ways—one way that would assign participants to their 
favored task and one that would assign them to the opposite. We 
expected that participants would tend to see the interpretation that 
assigned them to the outcome they favored. 
  Because our experimental stimuli, like much of the contents of 
our surroundings, lack clarity and contains multiple interpretations, 
potential interpretations of a visual stimulus can be likened to a 
hypothesis (Gregory, 1974). Given a constrained set of bottom-up 
features and top-down influences, the perceptual system considers 
certain ideas of what an ambiguous stimulus might be and ultimately 
selects one interpretation. For example, given the distinct features of a  
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four-legged shape in a distant field, one can entertain different 
hypotheses about the identity of the shape. For example, to test 
whether the shape is a cow, the perceiver might examine whether the 
shape has a stocky snout and black spots.  
  Just as expectancies and contexts can suggest a testable 
perceptual hypothesis, a preference or desire might privilege a favored 
interpretation or hypothesis over a disfavored one. Wishful thinking 
might shape the specific hypothesis that individual’s tests when given 
such ambiguous information. In particular, the perceiver might scan 
the visual stimulus in a biased manner searching for features that 
match those of the desired animal rather than those that match an 
undesired one. The net effect of focusing on a hypothesis is that the 
perceiver tends to seek out information that would confirm it rather 
than disconfirm it (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Sanitioso, Kunda, 
& Fong, 1990;).  
  Alternatively, a motivated preference might lower the threshold a 
feature must reach before the visual system decides it matches the 
favored interpretation. Other work in motivated reasoning has shown 
that information consistent with a favored conclusion is held to a 
lower standard of scrutiny than information consistent with an 
unwanted one (Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; 
Trope & Ferguson, 2001). It could be then that those features most 
representative of the desired animal category are recognized faster or 
more easily because the perceiver requires less of a match between 
what he or she hopes to see and what is offered by the stimulus.  
  The key of whatever process is at play is that it takes place  
55 
preconsciously. People are not aware that they have selected one 
interpretation over another. Indeed, they are not even aware of the 
alternative interpretation. Whatever work the visual system has done 
to bias the interpretation that people see involves processes below the 
level of awareness. 
Overview of Studies 
  Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants tended to report 
seeing the interpretation of an ambiguous figure that fit with their 
wishes and preferences over one that did not. Studies 3 and 4 added 
implicit measures to ensure that participants truly saw the 
interpretation they reported rather than simply reporting the preferred 
interpretation. Study 5 added a procedural twist to affirm that 
participants saw only the interpretation they usually wanted to see as 
they viewed the stimulus—and that it was not the case that they saw 
both interpretations and then only reported the favored one. In short, 
people tended to honestly see only that interpretation that was 
suggested, in part, by their motivational state. 
Study 1: Disambiguating an Ambiguous Figure 
Study 1 was designed to provide an initial demonstration that 
wishful thinking could influence the interpretation of an ambiguous 
stimulus. Participants were brought into the laboratory and told that 
they would be assigned to one of two tasks. One was favored (i.e., 
drinking freshly-squeezed orange juice); the other was not (i.e., 
drinking a noxious-smelling and vile-looking health food drink). They 
were told that the computer would assign their beverage by presenting 
either a number or a letter. For roughly half of participants, a letter  
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would indicate that they were assigned to the desirable beverage. For 
the other half, the reverse was true. However, what the computer 
flashed very briefly was an ambiguous figure that could be interpreted 
either as a number or letter. Our prediction was that participants 
would tend to report seeing the interpretation that offered them in the 
coveted beverage. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 88 undergraduates at Cornell University who 
earned extra credit in their psychology or human development courses 
for taking part in the study.  
Procedure 
In what was advertised as a taste-testing experiment, an 
experimenter explained that participants would predict taste 
sensations for 2 beverages, consume only 1 beverage, and describe 
their actual taste sensation of that 1 beverage. On the table in front of 
participants sat the two beverages. The first was the desirable one: 
freshly squeezed orange juice. The second was the less desirable 
alternative: a gelatinous, chunky, green, foul-smelling, somewhat 
viscous concoction labeled as an organic veggie smoothie1. The 
experimenter invited participants first to smell each beverage. Then, 
participants spent 3-min predicting what they might experience if  
asked to drink 8-oz of each beverage to heighten the appeal of the 
orange juice and strengthen their disgust with the veggie smoothie.  
                                                 
1 Recipe available upon request.  
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Participants were seated in front of a 15-in G3 iBook. The 
experimenter then explained that a computer program would 
randomly select a beverage for the participant to consume. 
Specifically, the computer would select either a single letter or a single 
number from a set of 26 letters and 26 numbers. Roughly half of the 
participants, those in the number-desirable condition, were told that if 
the computer selected a number from the set, they would drink 8-oz of 
orange juice, and if a letter was selected, they would drink 8-oz of 
veggie smoothie. The remaining participants in the letter-desirable 
condition learned that a letter would result in their assignment to the 
orange juice and a number to the veggie smoothie.  
After inviting the participant to review these directions on a 
computer screen, the experimenter stepped away to ostensibly 
complete some paperwork. Participants focused on the center of the 
monitor on which was displayed a static fixation point. After 3-sec, 
this fixation point was replaced with an ambiguous figure (1-in in 
height, 1-in in width) that could be interpreted as either the capital 
letter B or the number 13 (see Figure 2.1) for 400 msec. The 
presentation of this figure was followed by a 200 msec mask, then 
finally an image that was meant to look as though the computer 
program had crashed. The experimenter continued to focus on the 
paperwork until the participant called her attention to the computer 
crash. The experimenter feigned surprise, exclaimed that “this always 
happens to old Macs,” and stated that she would have to ask the 
graduate student she worked for what she should do. As the 
experimenter approached the door to leave the lab, she asked if  
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Figure 2.1. Ambiguous B/13 Figure Used in Study 1.  
 
the program displayed anything before crashing. At this point, most 
participants reported whether they saw a B or a 13. If participants did 
not offer a response, the experimenter asked again if anything was 
shown or if it immediately crashed. If at this point participants still 
refused an answer, the experimenter left the room, returned a few 
minutes later to ask a final time if anything was shown.  
After offering an answer, the experimenter handed the 
participant a questionnaire to complete while she supposedly left to 
prepare the beverage. This questionnaire probed for suspicion of the 
purpose of the study, suspicion of the computer crash, and in a 
funneled manner queried participants to see if they realized the 
ambiguity in the figure shown before the computer crash. 
Results  
A priori, we established conditions for the inclusion participants’ 
data. Participants were excluded if they recognized the figure was 
ambiguous, were able to explain the purpose of the study in 
debriefing, or mentioned they wished to be assigned to what was 
considered by most participants to be the less desired task (i.e. 
consumption of veggie smoothie). Given these criteria, 15 people were 
excluded for recognizing the ambiguity in the figure when viewing the  
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figure, 4 for explaining that we were interested in how their desires 
could influence the way they saw the figure, 3 for stating they hoped to 
consume the smoothie, and 3 simply refused to participate when they 
heard that they might be asked to consume the smoothie. This left 
data from 63 participants for analysis. Although a few participants 
indicated the computer crash was suspicious, none of these 
participants were able to describe the purpose of the study or the 
reason for the crash.  
Responses from those 63 participants were coded using the 
following method. Reports of the letter B were given a score of +1, and 
reports of the number 13 a score of -1. Those who did not offer a 
response or indicated that nothing was shown before the crash 
received a score of 0. We then subjected these scores to an ordinal 
logical regression analysis (the constrained range of the coding system 
made more usual statistical procedures less appropriate) to see if 
participants tended to see different interpretations of the ambiguous 
figure depending on which interpretation was more desirable.  As 
expected, participants’ desire to see either letters or numbers 
influenced their interpretation of the B-13 ambiguous figure, χ2(1) = 
23.92, p < .001. In particular, when hoping to see a letter, 72% (n = 
18) of participants reported seeing the capital letter B while 0% 
reported seeing a 13. When hoping to see a number, 60.5% (n = 23) 
reported seeing a 13 and 23.7% (n = 9) reported seeing the B. Some 
people in each condition reported that in fact nothing was shown  
before the crash (28%, n = 7, in the letter-favorable condition; 15.8%, 
n = 6, in the number-favorable condition).   
60 
Our specific prediction focuses on the responses of those who 
offered an interpretation of the figure. When excluding those responses 
from participants who reported that nothing was shown before the 
crash, participants’ desire to see either letters or numbers influenced 
their interpretation of the B-13 ambiguous figure, χ2(1) = 23.96, p < 
.001. Additionally, we can collapse across the specific character 
participants were motivated to see and look at just the reported 
interpretation for those participants who offered one. In fact, 82% (n = 
41) of participants report the desired interpretation, χ2(1) = 20.48, p < 
.001.  
In addition, including those people in the analyses who 
indicated that the figure was ambiguous does not change this pattern 
as similar numbers of participants across both motivational conditions 
reported the ambiguity of the figure (n = 8 when hoping to see letters, 
n = 7 when hoping to see numbers). That is, we gave a score of 0 to 
those people who indicated the figure was ambiguous and again 
conducted an ordinal logistic regression. Still, participants’ desire to 
see either a letter or a number influenced their interpretation of the 
ambiguous figure, χ2(1) = 22.95, p < .001. 
Discussion 
  In sum, Study 1 provided evidence that people’s motivational 
states can influence their interpretation of ambiguous objects in their 
environment. When faced with an ambiguous figure that could be 
interpreted as either a number or letter, the interpretation that 
reached consciousness and was reported tended to be the one that   
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placed participants in a desirable circumstance rather than in an 
unwanted one. 
However, it is possible that the participants’ responses did not 
reflect their true percept. Instead of reporting what they saw, they 
instead just offered a report that assigned them to the orange juice. 
Put simply, participants may have lied about what they saw. Although 
we suspect this is not the case, we conducted a follow-up to assess 
this counter-explanation. In a design similar to Study 1, 28 
participants were either motivated to see letters or numbers to avoid 
the veggie smoothie but were then shown unambiguous figures of B or 
13, rather than an ambiguous figure, during the computer assignment 
process. For half of the participants, a letter assigned them to the 
orange juice whereas for the other half a number assigned them to the 
veggie smoothie. Crossed with this, half of the participants were shown 
a B and the other half were shown a 13, resulting in a 2 (desired 
character: letter or number) X 2 (character shown: B or 13) factorial.  
The alternative account predicts that participants’ reports of the 
figure shown to them would be influenced by which character was 
desired as well as what character was shown to them. However, 
inconsistent with that account, we found that what participants 
reported depended only on the character shown to them. In all 
conditions, 100% of participants (n = 7 in every cell) reported the 
actual figure shown, regardless of what figure was shown to them and 
what participants were motivated to see.  
62 
Study 2: Replication 
  Study 2 was designed as a conceptual replication involving a 
different ambiguous figure and a different procedure. In addition, in 
Study 1, we noted that a small but notable minority of participants 
was able to spot the ambiguity of the figure we showed them. In Study 
2, we used a figure whose ambiguity was more opaque, and thus not 
as likely to be noticed by participants. 
Method 
Participants 
  Participants were 52 undergraduates at Cornell University who 
received extra credit in their psychology course for taking part. 
Procedure 
Participants completed a task ostensibly about differences in 
predictions of and actual taste experiences. The experimenter 
explained that participants would be experiencing and describing 
different taste sensations. Participants would predict taste sensations 
for 3 food items but actually consume only one of them. First, 
participants predicted what each of the following items would taste 
like: a bottle of Aquafina water, a bag of Jelly Belly candies, and a bag 
of gelatinous and partially liquefied canned beans.  
After participants predicted taste sensations of each item, 
participants were seated in front of a 17-in iMac 64 desktop computer. 
Again, supposedly to eliminate bias from the selection process, a 
computer program would randomly assign the item participants would 
consume. The experimenter explained that participants would play a 
game, their score at the end of which would determine what item was  
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consumed. In this game, the computer displayed pictures of animals 
worth positive and negative points. On the top of their response sheet 
was a table listing every animal that could be selected and the specific 
number of points each animal was worth. For half of the participants, 
farm animals were worth positive points while sea creatures were 
worth negative points. For the other half of participants, this was 
reversed. Black and white drawings of the full bodies, heads, and 
artistic renditions of animals were displayed in the rounds that 
preceded the final round. 
Although the computer would be keeping an ongoing tally of the 
points accumulated, participants recorded the animal shown to them, 
the points that animal was worth, and their ongoing score ostensibly 
to corroborate the computer program. If their score at the end of 15 
cards was zero, participants would consume the water. If their score 
was positive, they would consume the candies, but if their score at the 
end was negative, participants would consume the canned beans. 
Although participants were told that the program randomly selected 
animals from a set of 4 farm animals and 4 sea animals, the program 
was actually rigged such that every participant experienced one of two 
sequences of animals and point tallies, depending on what category of 
animal was worth positive point values. 
As the game progressed, ongoing scores, predetermined and 
consistent across participants, fluctuated between positive and 
negative. However, the last 3 rounds brought increasingly negative 
point totals. That is, ongoing scores became evermore suggestive that 
participants would consume the canned beans. Ongoing scores at the  
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end of the penultimate round were such that only 1 animal was worth 
enough positive points to be able to pull participants from the negative 
and bring a positive final score, thus avoiding the canned beans. For 
half of the participants, this animal was a horse; for the other half, it 
was a seal. The animal displayed during the final trial was in fact an 
ambiguous figure (2.75-in wide, 3.75-in tall) that could be interpreted 
as either the head of a horse or the full body of a seal (see Figure 2.2). 
All animals including the last figure remained on the screen for 1000 
msec. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Ambiguous Horse/Seal Figure Used in Studies 2 through 4. 
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After the game, participants completed a funneled debriefing 
that probed for suspicion of the purpose of the study, possible 
alternate interpretations of the figure, and asked if they had seen the 
figure before.  
Results 
Given the criteria we established a priori, 5 participants were 
excluded for articulating the purpose of the study and 4 for 
mathematical errors that precluded them from desiring the target 
animal. No one reported seeing both interpretations of the ambiguous 
figure. These omissions left data from 43 participants for analysis.  
We used the same type of coding scheme for interpretations as 
in the previous studies. Given the natural bias of this ambiguous 
figure was to see a horse, those who reported a horse received a score 
of +1. Because the less common interpretation of the figure was as a 
seal, those who reported a seal received a score of -1. Using an ordinal 
logistic regression, we found that participants’ interpretations 
depended upon what category of animal was worth positive points, 
χ2(1) = 6.89, p = .009. When hoping to see a horse, 66.7% (n = 14) of 
participants saw the figure as a horse, and 33.3% (n = 7) saw a seal. 
However, this bias reversed when hoping to see a seal. Only 27.3% (n = 
6) of this group sees a horse, but 72.7% (n = 16) reported a seal, χ2(1) 
= 6.70, p = .01.  
Discussion 
In sum, Study 2 replicated the findings of the first study with a 
different figure and experimental procedure. Participants tended to see 
the interpretation of the figure that they desired to see, rather than  
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one they wished to avoid. In addition, no participant, either 
spontaneously or in debriefing, noted the ambiguous nature of the 
figure they saw. 
However, a reader can propose one counter-explanation for 
these findings, one that we decided to test in a control study. Given 
that the 3 rounds preceding the ambiguous figure included animals 
that brought participants’ scores down, it is possible that participants’ 
expectations about the next type of animal and not their desire 
predisposed them to see an animal worth positive points. That is, 
participants fell prey to a gambler’s fallacy, assuming that a run of 
negative scores made positive-scoring animals more likely to appear 
next.  
To test this alternative explanation, we reran a version of Study 
2, asking participants to follow along with the computer game and to 
record their points on a response sheet. However, we made clear to 
them that they would not be consuming any products after the game 
and that there would be no consequence for the final score they 
earned. Instead, they were to act as proofreaders, reading the 
directions thoroughly and evaluating the clarity of them. As was the 
case in Study 2, half of the participants encountered a game that 
made the horse the most valuable animal while the other half were led 
to believe the seal as the most valuable animal. Thus, this group of 
participants, aware of the point structure and the progression of 
animals, too would be susceptible to the gambler’s fallacy but have 
little reason to be motivated to see the most valuable animal in the 
final round.   
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In this control study, interpretations of the figure were not 
biased by what animals were most valuable. Those for whom farm 
animals would have been the most valuable were not more likely to see 
a horse than were those for whom sea animals would have been the 
most valuable, χ2(1) = .11, p = .74. When farm animals were the most 
valuable, 65% (n = 13) of participants saw the figure as a horse and 
35% (n = 7) saw it as a seal. When sea creatures were the most 
valuable, 70% (n = 14) saw the figure as a horse and 30% (n = 6) as a 
seal.  
The results of this study can be compared with those of Study 2 
to suggest that reducing desire to see a particular animal can reduce 
the bias in interpretations. Because we are making comparisons 
across studies, it is necessary to use a Stouffer’s Z-test (see Darlington 
& Hayes, 2000, for a review) to test if the effect of desire in Study 2 is 
sufficiently different from the effect of desire in this control study. That 
turns out to be the case, Z = 2.58, p < .005. 
Study 3: Adding an Unobtrusive Measure 
  Study 3 was designed to provide convergent evidence that the 
interpretations participants reported were, indeed, the sole 
interpretations that came to consciousness as they viewed the 
ambiguous stimulus. One can propose, instead, that participants saw 
both interpretations and then simply chose the one to tell the 
experimenter that placed them in a happier circumstance.  
  One way to test whether participants saw only one versus both 
interpretations is to collect more unobtrusive measures that 
participants would not suspect were designed to test which  
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interpretation they had seen—if they knew the measure was being 
taken at all. As was the case in the previous studies, we asked 
participants to provide a verbal or written report of whether they had 
seen a horse or a seal after being shown a figure that could be 
interpreted as either. However, in addition, we also measured 
participants’ eye movements to see if they would give clues as to how 
participants had interpreted the figure. Recent evidence suggests that 
initial eye movements upon presentation of a stimulus are not 
influenced by conscious processing (Allopenna, Magnuson & 
Tanenhaus, 1998; Richardson & Spivey, 2000; Tanenhaus, Spivey-
Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995). Thus, we examined whether the 
first saccade (eye movement) after presentation of the ambiguous 
figure would be to a label on the computer screen marked “farm 
animal” or one marked “sea creature.” We expected that such saccades 
would indicate that participants had interpreted the figure in a way 
that placed them in a favorable circumstance.  
Participants 
  Participants were 79 undergraduates at Cornell University 
completing the study in exchange for extra credit. 
Procedure 
Participants came into the lab alone and were seated 
approximately 20-in from a 21-in Apple cinema display monitor (17-in 
viewable). As was the case in previous studies, participants completed 
a task ostensibly about differences in predictions of and actual taste 
experiences of Aquafina, orange juice, and veggie smoothie. After 
participants predicted taste sensations of each item, the experimenter  
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explained that in order to eliminate bias from the selection process, a 
computer program would randomly assign the item they would 
consume based on their score at the end of a game similar to the one 
used in study 2. As described in the previous study, the computer 
displayed pictures of farm and sea animals counterbalanced between 
participants to be worth either positive and negative points. 
Participants kept a record of the animal shown to them, the points 
that animal was worth, and their ongoing score ostensibly to 
corroborate the computer program.  
  Participants were told that although the computer would be 
keeping an ongoing tally of the points accumulated, they would still 
categorize the animal as either a farm animal or sea creature by 
clicking on a box on the computer screen to advance the computer to 
the next animal. The program displayed each animal for 1000 msec, 
followed by a 500 msec blank screen, and finally a request to 
categorize the figure, remaining on the screen until participants 
responded. On the extreme left side of the categorization screen was a 
box labeled “farm animal” and on the extreme right was a box labeled 
“sea creature.” Participants were instructed to categorize the animals 
on the computer correctly to avoid point penalties. In addition to losing 
points for incorrect categorization, participants learned that a portion 
of their final score would be determined by the speed of their 
categorization, thus they were advised to categorize animals as quickly 
as possible.  
Unbeknown to them, a video camera was hidden approximately 
15-in behind the monitor and trained on participants’ eyes. Thus every  
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time the categorization task appeared on the cinema-display monitor, 
we were able to capture participants’ initial eye movements. As 
practice to familiarize them with the task of viewing and categorizing 
animals, participants categorized filler animals 8 times. After this 
practice session, participants completed 15 trials, the last of which 
displayed the ambiguous figure. Thus, participants were well-
acquainted with the 3-step process to complete a single trial: 1) view 
animal, 2) categorize animal on the computer screen, and 3) record 
animal and points on written response sheet.  
We were interested in the way in which participants interpreted 
the ambiguous figure. Their interpretation was measured in 2 ways: 
the written self-report and participants’ eye movements immediately 
upon perceiving the categorization screen. Given that initial eye 
movements are not influenced by conscious processing (Richardson & 
Spivey, 2000), we can suppose that immediate looks either the “farm  
animal” or “sea creature” box are representative of participants’ 
interpretations of the figure without concern for conscious, calculated 
response selection.  
We expected then that desire to see a particular animal would 
influence the way that the ambiguous figure was reported on the 
response sheet. Specifically, we expected that participants, hoping to 
drink orange juice, would see the most valuable animal. In addition, 
we expected that participants’ eye movements would corroborate their 
self-reports such that initial saccades would be towards the box 
labeled as the most desired animal.   
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Coder Reliability 
A coder, blind to condition, hypotheses, and purpose of the 
study watched the videotaped eye-movements and noted the initial 
direction of movement for half of the data set. For the other half of the 
data set, a second coder, blind to condition, coded the videotaped eye 
movements. A third coder, blind to condition, randomly selected 18 
participants from the complete data set and noted the initial direction 
of eye movement. Eye movements recorded by this third coder then 
served as a measure of interrater reliability. Across 213 individual 
trials from the 18 randomly selected participants, the third coder and 
the original coder agreed in 92% of the cases. If there was 
disagreement, the direction of eye movement as indicated from the 
original coder was used in analyses. 
To assess the validity of our nonconscious measure of initial eye 
movement, seeing whether eye movements corresponded with 
participants later reports, we randomly selected 48 participants and 
coded their eye movements in response to the 10 unambiguous 
animals that preceded the ambiguous figure. Across 480 trials, initial 
eye movements went to the correct categorization box 86% of the time. 
Results 
Explicit Reports  
Using the same coding scheme as in the previous studies that 
used the horse/seal ambiguous figure, we ran an ordinal logistic 
regression. As expected, desire facilitated the disambiguation of the 
figure, χ2(1) = 5.62, p < .02. When hoping to see farm animals, 83.7% 
(n = 36) of participants saw the figure as a horse, and 16.3% (n = 7)  
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saw a seal. However, the pattern changes when hoping to see sea 
creatures. That is, 58.3% (n = 21) of this group saw a horse, 33.3% (n 
= 12) reported a seal, and 8.3% (n = 3) of participants did not indicate 
their interpretation. When looking only at the interpretations of those 
who offered one, it appears that desire influenced the disambiguation 
of the figure. Those who were motivated to see farm animals were more 
likely to report seeing a horse than were those who were motivated to 
see sea animals, χ2(1) = 4.02, p < .05. 
Eye Movements 
We used the same coding scheme in analyzing the 
interpretations gathered from participants’ eye movements. Again, 
those whose initial look was to the farm animal box received a score of 
1, to the sea creature box received a score of -1, and those participants 
who looked down to their response sheet and not to either the farm 
animal or sea creature box received a score of 0.  
We conducted an ordinal logistic regression and found that 
desire facilitated the disambiguation of the figure, χ2(1) = 10.24, p < 
.001. When hoping to see farm animals, 62.8% (n = 27) of participants 
looked to the farm animal box, 14.0% (n = 6) looked to the sea creature 
box, and 23.3% (n = 10) looked down to their score sheet. However, the 
pattern changes when hoping to see sea animals. That is, 30.6% (n = 
11) looked to the farm animal box, 41.7% (n = 15) looked to the sea 
creature box, and 27.8% (n = 10) looked down to their score sheet. 
When looking only at the interpretations of those who looked to either 
box, it appears that desire influenced the disambiguation of the figure. 
Those who were motivated to see farm animals were more likely to look  
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to the farm animal box than were those who were motivated to see sea 
animals, χ2(1) = 9.90, p = .002.  We should note that scores on our 
eyetracking measure significantly correlated with the score 
participants received from their explicit reports, Spearman’s rho = .42, 
p < .001. 
Study 4: Converging Evidence from Lexical Decision Data 
Study 4 served as a conceptual replication of Study 3 but 
employed a different type of indirect measure of perception. A good 
deal of research (e.g. Neely, 1991) suggests that a picture of an object 
serves as a prime for concepts associated with that object—even if 
people are not aware that they have seen the object (e.g., Loach & 
Mari-Beffa, 2003; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). Thus, in Study 
3, we motivated participants to interpret an ambiguous figure as either 
a horse or a seal. Participants again provided an explicit report of the 
interpretation they saw. 
  However, we also collected reaction time data to gain an 
additional measure of whether participants had specifically seen the 
interpretation they had reported—and only that interpretation. Just 
after viewing the figure, participants completed a lexical decision task 
(LDT) in which they were presented letter strings and had to decide 
whether those letter strings formed English words. Each participant 
saw a word related to the concept of horse (e.g., cowboy) or seal (e.g., 
blubber). We predicted that participants would more quickly respond 
to a word in the LDT exercise when that word was related to the 
interpretation they preferred to see rather than to the opposite 
interpretation. If participants actually saw both interpretations, no  
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such difference should be seen in participants’ decision speed to words 
related to desired versus undesired interpretations. 
  We also wanted to make sure that participants’ interpretations 
of the ambiguous figure were, indeed, responsible for priming their 
reactions in the lexical decision task, rather than an overall desire to 
see a farm animal or sea creature. Thus, as a control condition, 
roughly half of the participants responded to the lexical decision task 
just before they saw the ambiguous figure rather than just afterward. 
If participants responded more quickly to desired-concept words to a 
greater degree after they viewed the ambiguous figure, that fact would 
suggest that the interpretation participants saw was the one 
influencing the speed of their lexical decisions. However, if just a 
desire to see one type of animal over the other is enough to prime 
performance in the lexical decision task, then desired-concept words 
should be facilitated in both before and after conditions to an equal 
degree. 
This design also allowed us to investigate one mechanism by 
which participants’ perceptions were influenced. Collecting lexical 
decision task reaction times just before participants viewed the 
ambiguous figure allowed us to gauge whether people’s preferences 
suggested a perceptual set (Bruner & Minturn, 1955)—a preparedness 
to see the ambiguous figure as the desired object rather than the 
alternative. If participants provided quicker reaction times to words 
associated with the desired object than they did to words associated 
with the undesirable object, that pattern would be suggestive of a 
perceptual set.   
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Method 
Participants 
  Participants were 166 undergraduates at Cornell University who 
received extra credit in their psychology courses for taking part. 
Procedure 
Participants came into the lab in groups of 2 to 4 to complete a 
task ostensibly about differences in internal and external evaluations 
of vocal abilities. The experimenter explained that approximately 75% 
of participants would evaluate various aspects of a person’s vocal 
performance, while the remaining 25% would be asked to perform a 
tune as if in a karaoke bar. The experimenter clarified that these 
percentages mean that approximately 1 person in each session will be 
the singer and subject of evaluation while the remaining people will be 
observers. After performing a tune, singers will evaluate their own 
vocal abilities on rhythmic ability, skill, and general appeal. The 
experimenter explained that these scores would be corroborated 
against those provided by the observers on the same dimensions. At 
this point, participants were shown a 60-sec video clip ostensibly of 
past participants and observers completing the performance 
evaluation portion of the experiment to heighten anxiety about the 
potential assignment to the singer role. In this video, a stocky Italian 
man in his early 20’s held a microphone while singing and dancing 
along to Gloria Gaynor’s rendition of “I will survive.”  
Participants were seated approximately 24-26-in from a 17-in 
iMac G4 or a 17-in eMac desktop computer. As was the case in 
previous experiments, the experimenter explained that in order to  
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eliminate bias from the selection process, a computer program would 
randomly assign participants to either the role of singer or observer. 
Participants played the same animal game as described in Study 3 
ostensibly to determine whether they danced or observed. Again, 
participants kept a record of the animal shown to them, the points 
that animal was worth, and their ongoing score ostensibly to 
corroborate the computer program. Additionally, participants 
categorized the animal as either a farm animal or sea creature on the 
computer.   
Finally, participants completed a number of lexical decision 
tasks (LTD) during the animal categorization task, supposedly meant 
to impair their ability to categorize the animals. That is, participants 
categorized strings of letters as words or nonwords. In a “go-no go” 
paradigm, participants hit the space bar if the string of letters was a 
word and did nothing if the string of letters was not a word. All strings 
of letters disappeared from the screen if no key was hit within 2000 
msec.  
Participants randomly assigned to the control condition 
completed the LDT at the beginning of each trial, that is, before seeing 
each animal. Participants randomly assigned to the experimental 
condition completed the LDT at the end of each trial, after seeing each 
animal but before categorizing it on the computer or recording it on 
their response sheet. Participants completed between 1 and 3 lexical 
decisions during each trial for the first 12 trials. In the last round, 
participants responded to 3 strings of letters. In this last trial, all 
participants responded to one word related to farm animals, one  
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related to sea animals, and one nonword, the order of which were 
counterbalanced between subjects. Although for each participant only 
a single farm and sea-relevant word was included in the last trial, the 
particular word selected was counterbalanced between subjects. 
Specifically, there were 4 words related to farm animals (cowboy, 
saddle, stallion, pasture), 4 words related to sea animals (blubber, 
flipper, ocean, whale), and 4 nonwords (blevre, yaver, dreas, puli) that 
were varied between subjects. That is, a participant would react to a 
single word from each of these sets.  
Again, the ongoing score at the end of the penultimate round 
were such that only 1 animal was worth enough positive points to 
produce an assignment to the observer role. For roughly half of the 
participants, the only animal capable of this was a horse, while for the 
other half, it was a seal. The last animal displayed was again the 
horse/seal ambiguous figure.  
We presumed that participants, going into the final trial with a 
negative score, would be hoping to see the animal worth the greatest 
number of positive points. We expected then that desire to see a 
particular animal would influence the way that the ambiguous figure 
was interpreted. Additionally, we expected that the desire to see a 
particular set of animals would influence the speed at which the target 
words was categorized—but only after participants had viewed the 
ambiguous figure. In particular, we expected that the control group 
that completed the LDTs before seeing the ambiguous figure would be 
equally likely to categorize the horse-relevant fragments and seal-
relevant fragments as words. However, we expected that the  
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experimental condition that completed the LDTs after having seen the 
ambiguous figure and interpreted it as the desired animal would be 
faster to categorize words related to the desired animal type. 
Specifically, those participants in the experimental condition for whom 
farm animals were worth positive points were expected to categorize 
the farm-relevant words faster than sea-relevant words.  
Results 
  Although a small number of participants questioned why they 
had to play a computer game to determine their role, no participant 
was able to explain the purpose of the study. Additionally, in 
debriefing some indicated disbelief that the performance evaluation 
component of the experiment would take place. Again, these people 
were unable to explain the purpose of the study. Thus no participant 
was excluded for either of these reasons. 
Explicit Reports 
Omitting the one participant who did not offer an interpretation, 
we calculated the proportion of participants who had reported seeing a 
horse in each cell in a 2 (desired animal type: farm or sea) X 2 (task 
order: LDT before or after figure) design.  Performing arcsin transforms 
on these proportions, using the procedure outlined by Langer and 
Abelson (1972), allowed us to assess all main effects and interactions 
inherent in the design.  This analysis indicated that desire facilitated 
the disambiguation of the figure. Whether or not participants saw a 
horse or a seal depended on whether participants were motivated to 
see farm animals or sea animals, Z = 4.15, p < .001. No other effects 
were significant. When hoping to see farm animals, 97.2% (n = 69) of  
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participants saw the figure as a horse, and 2.8% (n = 2) saw a seal. 
However, the pattern changed when hoping to see sea creatures. That 
is, 76.0% (n = 73) of this group saw a horse, 22.9% (n = 22) reported a 
seal, and 1.0% (n = 1) of participants did not indicate their 
interpretation.  
Lexical Decision Task 
However, we were most interested in the speed with which 
strings of letters are categorized as words. The complete design was a 
2 (word type: related to farm or sea animals) X 2 (desired animal: farm 
or sea) X 2 (task order: LDT before or after the ambiguous figure) with 
the first variable being within-subjects.  
Two participants (1 in the farm animal control condition, 1 in 
the sea animal experimental condition) made errors on categorizing 
during the LDT talk; their data are omitted. Given the skewed nature 
of the reaction time data, we conducted all analyses on natural log 
transformations. However, note all means reported in the text and 
tables are the original reaction times. In general, participants were no 
faster at responding to farm or sea words, F(1, 159) = 2.14, p = .15. 
Likewise, participants were no faster to respond to words when 
motivated to see either farm or sea animals, F(1, 159) < 1, p = .54. 
However, unexpectedly, it appears that those who completed the LDT 
task before seeing the figure were generally faster (M = 778 msec) to 
respond than those completing the LDT task after seeing the figure (M 
= 890 msec), F(1, 159) = 13.97, p < .001. Presumably, after viewing the 
ambiguous figure, participants were slowed somewhat knowing that   
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they would soon have to report the category of the creature they had 
seen. 
More interestingly, the 2-way interaction between word type and 
desired animal was significant, F (1, 161) = 4.00, p = .05, but this 
interaction was qualified by the predicted 3-way interaction between 
word type, desired animal, and LDT time, F (1, 159) = 5.99, p = .02. As 
seen in Table 2.1, when completing the LDT task before seeing the 
figure, the motivation to see a particular type of animal influenced the 
speed at which participants reacted to the words, as confirmed by a  
 
 
Table 2.1. 
Reaction Times (in msec) to Identify Word as a Function of Timing of 
Lexical Decision Task and Desired Interpretation of the Ambiguous 
Figure. 
 
        
Target Word 
   
 
Timing of LDT Task/ 
Desired Interpretation 
 
 
 
Farm-Related 
 
 
Sea-Related 
 
 
Difference 
 
Before       
     Horse  746  819  -73 
     Seal  815  730   85 
After       
     Horse  716  1034  -318 
     Seal  958  853   105 
Note. Reaction times depicted are average original times. 
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significant desired animal X word type interaction that focused only on 
participants in the before condition, F (1, 91) = 5.49, p = .02. 
Participants more quickly responded to words associated with the 
desired category more than they did words associated with the 
undesired category. However, this advantage for words associated with 
desired categories was significantly stronger for participants 
completing the LDT after viewing the ambiguous figure, as evidenced 
by a significant desired animal X word type interaction, F(1, 68) = 
25.05, p < .001. That is, those motivated to see farm animals 
responded faster to farm related words than sea related words by some 
318 msec. Those motivated to see sea animals were faster to respond 
to sea related words than farm related words by some 105 msec2.  
Unlike Study 3, for participants in the group who viewed the 
ambiguous figure before completing the LDT task, scores on this 
implicit measure (reaction time to farm words minus reaction time to 
sea words) did not correlate with their explicit reports, point-biserial  
r = .05. 
                                                 
2 The effects and conclusions reported in the text remain virtually the 
same if we control for the specific words participants reacted to in the 
lexical decision task.  We should also note that all participants in a 
particular session, when multiple participants were run, were assigned 
to the same condition.  Thus, although participants were assigned 
randomly, they were not assigned independently.  This led cell sizes to 
differ somewhat.  We should note that we ran supplemental analyses 
to gauge whether any of our results were due to session effects.  When 
we control for the particular session participants were run in (by 
conducting analyses in which session is added as a random variable 
nested within our conditions), we find our findings remain intact. 
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Summary 
In sum, Study 4 provided more convergent evidence that 
participants were more likely to interpret an ambiguous figure in line 
with their preferences. Participants again were more likely to explicitly 
report seeing a horse or a seal when they preferred to see that animal 
relative to when they did not. Their performance on a lexical 
decision task also indicated that they had interpreted the ambiguous 
figure in a manner consistent with their desires. After seeing the 
ambiguous figure, participants more quickly recognized those words 
associated with the desired animal than they did words associated 
with an undesired animal—indicating that they had seen only the 
interpretation consistent with their desires. This performance 
advantage for words associated with desired animals was not as 
evident when participants completed a lexical decision task before they 
viewed the ambiguous figure. 
  However, participants who completed the lexical decision task 
before they viewed the ambiguous figure still classified words 
associated with the desired interpretation more quickly than they did 
words associated with the opposite, although this tendency was much 
more muted relative to participants completing the lexical task after 
viewing the figure. This last result suggests a hint of a perceptual set: 
Participants showed some preparation or bias to see the desired 
interpretation over the undesired one before viewing the stimulus. 
However, this result is preliminary and tentative, and there is much 
more to explore regarding the processes that lead people to see what 
they want to see.   
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Study 5: Ruling Out Participant Deception 
This study was also designed to reduce suspicions about 
participants’ possible construction of responses to ensure favorable 
outcomes. If participants saw both interpretations and selectively 
reported the favorable interpretation, then both percepts in previous 
studies (e.g., horse vs. seal) would have to be accessible to them, in 
that participants would have to have seen both interpretations and 
selected only one when asked for an interpretation. To test this 
possibility, we again told participants that they were here to predict 
and describe taste sensations of freshly squeezed orange juice and 
organic veggie smoothie. They were shown an ambiguous figure, but 
before they could report what they had seen, the experimenter 
reported that he or she had made a mistake—that the participant 
would be assigned to the orange juice condition if the computer had 
shown him or her the other category of animal.  
Of key importance was what interpretation participants would 
report—the one they desired at the time they viewed the ambiguous 
figure or the one desired at the time they had to report what they saw. 
If participants saw only one interpretation in consciousness as they 
viewed the figure and if that interpretation was influenced by their 
motivational state, they should be more likely to report the figure they 
desired at the time the figure was presented to them. However, if they 
saw both interpretations and just reported the one that was desired 
when the experimenter asked for their report, then they should more 
likely report the figure that ran counter to their desires at the time 
they viewed the figure.  
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were 27 undergraduates at Cornell University who 
received extra credit in their psychology courses for taking part. 
Procedure 
The procedures for this experiment were modeled closely upon 
those used in Study 1. Again, the computer would assign the 
participant to drink freshly-squeezed orange juice or an off-putting 
veggie smoothie based on the single item that it randomly selected 
from a database. In this study, though, for half of the participants, if 
the computer displayed a farm animal, participants would consume 
the orange juice while a sea creature would bring the veggie smoothie. 
For the other half of the participants, this was reversed. After these 
instructions were explained to participants, the experimenter 
supposedly “calibrated” the computer program. In a practice phase, 
the program displayed 4 animals as examples of what would be 
shown. Two of these examples were farm animals, and 2 were sea 
creatures. Crossed with this, two of the animals were drawings of the 
full bodies of animals while 2 were just of animal heads.  
Following the examples, participants fixated on a red dot 
flashing in the center of a 15-in G3 iBook screen for 3 sec. This 
fixation points was then replaced by the horse/seal ambiguous figure 
(3.75-in in height, 2.75-in in width) displayed for 1000 msec followed 
by the same staged computer program crash. The experimenter 
remained preoccupied with paperwork until the participant got her 
attention.   
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Unlike the previous study, the experimenter did not ask the 
participant at this point if anything was displayed before the crash. 
Instead, she immediately offered that the crash was most likely 
because she made an error during the calibration. For those 
participants for whom farm animals were valued, she continued by 
saying the error was that in fact sea creatures were supposed to signal 
the consumption of orange juice. For those valuing sea creatures, she 
said the error was that farm animals were in fact supposed to signal 
the consumption of orange juice. To rephrase, after the crash, the 
experimenter switched which animals were desired. After explaining 
this confusion and making the switch, the experimenter asked if 
anything was shown before the crash.  
Results 
The procedure of Study 5 put two accounts for our data in 
opposition. Our guiding hypothesis is that participants’ motivational 
states influence the interpretation of the ambiguous figure that is 
presented to consciousness at the time the figure is viewed. If 
motivational states help to disambiguate the figure during the time it 
is viewed, we would expect that after the switch participants would 
tend to report seeing the animal from the desired category at the time 
of viewing the object even though this animal, after the switch in 
instructions, ultimately consigned them to drink the veggie smoothie. 
However, if participants see both interpretations and then just report 
the one that they favor, then we would expect that participants would 
be more likely to report seeing an animal from the category that is 
desirable after the switch.  
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We used the same type of coding scheme for interpretations as 
in the previous studies. Using an ordinal logistic regression, we found 
that participants were more likely to report the animal that was 
originally the most desired even when this meant they would complete 
the less desirable task, χ2(1) = 9.48, p = .002. When participants 
originally hoped to see farm animals, 100% (n = 13) reported seeing a 
horse even when the horse ultimately meant drinking the veggie 
smoothie. When participants originally hoped to see sea creatures, 
28.6% (n = 4) reported seeing a seal, 57.1% (n = 8) saw a horse, and 
14.3% (n = 2) said nothing was shown before the crash. Focusing on 
only those participants reporting an interpretation, we again find that 
participants were more likely to report a horse or a seal when they 
were originally motivated to see that type of animal, Fischer’s exact p = 
.039. Although a larger percentage of participants reported seeing a 
horse than a seal when originally hoping to see sea creatures, what is 
important is that the percentage who saw a seal is biased between 
conditions based on original desire. That is, when originally hoping to 
see a horse, none saw a seal, but when originally hoping to see a seal, 
nearly 30% saw one. 
General Discussion 
  The world people know is the one they take in through their 
senses. In these studies, we examined the extent to which what people 
take in could be guided by such top-down constraints as personal 
wishes and preferences.  
  Across these studies, we provided converging evidence to suggest 
that participants’ desires, hopes, or wishful thinking led them to  
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perceive a representation of the visual environment they desired. 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants tended to interpret an 
ambiguous figure in a manner that fit with their wishes and 
preferences over one that did not. Studies 3 and 4 added implicit 
measures to ensure that participants actually saw the interpretation 
they favored and not just what they chose to report seeing. 
Specifically, for a clear majority of participants in Study 3,  their first 
saccade  after presentation of an ambiguous stimulus tended to be to 
the favored category label rather than to the disfavored one. In Study 
4, after viewing an ambiguous figure, participants reacted more 
quickly  in a lexical decision task to words consistent with a preferred 
interpretation than to words consistent with the less preferred one. 
Importantly, this facilitation after seeing the ambiguous stimulus was 
greater than it was for those performing the lexical decision task before 
viewing the stimulus—indicating that the ambiguous figure primed 
concepts associated with the preferred interpretation more than it did 
the less preferred one.  
  Study 5 added a procedural variation to affirm that participants 
did not see both interpretations in our experiments and then just 
report the one that brought about the favored outcome. Participants 
viewed an ambiguous stimulus while hoping for one outcome, but then 
the experimenter switched which interpretation was the favored one 
before participants reported what they had seen. Participants tended 
to report seeing the interpretation they favored at the time they viewed 
the stimulus, even though that report, after the switch, assigned them 
to a less desired task. Importantly, Study 5 demonstrated that wishful  
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thinking constrains perceptual processes preconsciously—before the 
products of those processes become available to conscious awareness.  
Alternative Accounts 
  A critic might argue that the paradigms we used might have 
taken advantage of other psychological processes, instead of 
motivational states, that could influence participants’ interpretation of 
ambiguous stimuli. For example, participants’ interpretations of 
ambiguous figures could have been due to differences in expectation. 
In Studies 2, 3, and 4, participants were exposed to a series of stimuli 
they did not want to see just before they viewed the critical ambiguous 
stimulus. Participants’ might have fallen prey to the “gambler’s fallacy” 
and expected that a favored animal was bound to show up after a 
string of unwanted ones. However, Study 1, the control study 
associated with Study 2, and Study 5 all argue against this 
explanation. For example, Studies 1 and 5 presented participants with 
a single stimulus, and still found that people tended to see the 
interpretation they wanted to see over the one they did not. In 
addition, the control study associated with Study 2 specifically tested 
whether a gambler’s fallacy alone would influence what they saw in 
the ambiguous figure when participants had no motivation to interpret 
the ambiguous figure in a certain way. Further, it is implausible that 
our results are explained by cognitive or perceptual salience. That is, 
one could argue that the desired interpretation was highlighted and 
more easily seen by participants because that perceptual outcome was 
paired with a desirable event. However, in our experiments we were 
careful to pair both the favored and less favored interpretations with  
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salient events. In Study 1, for example, seeing a number might be 
associated with drinking delicious orange juice but seeing a letter was 
associated with an event—drinking a foul smelling and looking 
concoction—that was at least as salient. Thus, salience is not a viable 
alternative explanation for the pattern of responses we observed. 
Notes on the Mechanism Underlying Biased Perception  
  Our results suggest that people’s desires for a particular 
outcome bias their perceptual set, such that they are more prepared to 
see what they hope for rather than what they fear. In fact, in a 
funneled probe for suspicion, one participant offered, “I kept getting +5 
and –5 over and over, making me worry about eating the beans. At the 
last minute, I was sure I would have to eat the heinous beans and I 
prayed for the horse to give me a +5. I got it! Yes!” Of course, prayer 
may not always be the precise mechanism biasing all participants’ 
interpretations, but we do feel this illustrates a possible chain of 
events leading to differences in what participants saw. A desire to see 
one stimulus over the other led to the formation of a perceptual set 
that included features and concepts related to the desired stimulus 
over the undesired one. Indeed, in Study 4, we discovered initial 
evidence of a perceptual set biased toward the favored hypothesis. 
Just before viewing the ambiguous stimulus, participants were 
slightly—but significantly—faster at recognizing words associated with 
the favored interpretation than they were words associated with the 
disfavored interpretation.  
Two notes are in order concerning this finding and the potential 
role of perceptual set in motivational influences on perception. First,  
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the specific perceptual hypothesis that participants might be using to 
disambiguate the stimulus need not be closely tied to the nature of the 
stimulus. To be sure, in Studies 2, 3, and 4, participants were given a 
rather narrow hypothesis (i.e., the desirable stimulus will be either a 
horse or a seal) about what the computer might show them. In this 
way, our work is reminiscent of previous work concerning contextual 
effects on visual perception of ambiguous figures, in which 
participants are given primes whose appearance is quite close to that 
of the ambiguous stimulus (i.e., they are shown drawings of women) 
before they view that stimulus (e.g., one seen as either a man or 
woman) (Long & Toppino, 2004).  However, in Studies 1 and 5, 
participants were not given such specific hints about what the 
stimulus might be. Instead, they were given broad categories (e.g., a 
letter versus a number; a farm versus a sea animal). As a result, they 
were not necessarily able to look for features of a specific stimulus but 
rather had to search for any number of possible stimuli to satisfy 
these broad categories.  Even in this circumstance, participants 
tended to see what they wanted to see. This suggests that the top-
down influences on perception inspired by motivation can be quite 
diffuse and nonspecific—that when disambiguating an ambiguous 
figure people do not need concrete features specified a priori. Instead, 
the “clues” or context surrounding the perceptual judgment can be 
quite vague, indirect, abstract, or higher-order. This conjecture is 
consistent with other recent evidence showing that priming people 
with abstract categories (such as flirting or music) has an impact on   
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how they interpret ambiguous figures they subsequently view (see 
Balcetis & Dale, 2003). 
  Second, these studies left open one ambiguity about perceptual 
set that future work could profitably address. Across five studies, we 
found that people tended to see an interpretation they favored over one 
they did not. But did this bias arise because the perceptual set 
associated with their motivational state was an “approach” one, 
facilitating processes associated with seeing the favored interpretation, 
or a “avoidance” one, inhibiting processes that could lead them to see 
the disfavored interpretation? Any route—facilitation of the favored 
interpretation, inhibition of the disfavored one, or a mixture of the 
two—could lead to the pattern of responses we observed. Future work 
could potentially tease apart whether the phenomenon we uncovered 
is one in which people are biased toward seeing wanted stimuli or 
biased against seeing stimuli they wish to avoid, or both.  
Where Does the Bias Reside in the Perceptual System? 
One remaining question that this work leaves open is 
determining the stage in the perceptual process at which motivational 
factors, begin to guide perception. Such a question is relevant not only 
to work on motivation, but also to work on other higher-order 
constructs (e.g., stereotypes, expectations, frames) that have been at 
the focus of social cognitive work. Is the impact of motivation limited to 
later stages of perception, such as categorization, or does its influence 
extend to earlier and more primitive tasks the perceptual system faces 
(e.g., noticing lines and edges in a visual scene)? This question became 
a major theoretical battle during the New Look period, one that  
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continues to this day. In particular, Bruner and Goodman’s (1947) 
theory of perceptual defense was criticized by opponents who asked 
how a perceiver could selectively defend against a particular stimulus 
unless the stimulus is first perceived (Eriksen & Browne, 1956; Howie, 
1952; Spence, 1967). Critics of Bruner and Goodman (1947) and more 
recent ones, argue that higher-order constraints influence not early 
perception but rather later stages of the perceptual processes that 
could be termed “post-perceptual” or “perceptual decision making.” 
Pylyshyn (1999), for example, asserts that the act of perceiving an 
object contains at least two processes. One process, termed “early 
vision” works, immune to higher-order influences, to provide 3-D 
representations of the surfaces of objects.  A later process takes any 
created representation and then identifies or categorizes it. Pylyshyn 
(1999) argues that higher-order influences have an impact 
predominantly on this latter stage3. 
However, this assertion is a contentious one (see the 
commentaries that accompany Pylyshyn, 1999), and more recent 
evidence suggests that higher-order processes can impose their 
influence on perception very early in the perceptual process. Emerging 
evidence, for example, suggests that higher-order influences can be 
detected as early in the visual system as V1, which is a mere two 
synapses away from the eye (Boynton, 2005). For example, when 
perceivers are asked attend to one of two overlapping orthogonal line 
patterns, fMRI activity patterns in early visual areas, including V1, 
                                                 
3 Pylyshyn (1999) also allows for the possibility that higher-order 
processes might guide attentional mechanisms that guide “early 
vision.”  
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contain information that can predict what the participant consciously 
perceives (Kamitani & Tong, 2005). Perceptions of patterns in V1 also 
occur even if participants are clearly unaware that a pattern has been 
shown to them (Haynes & Rees, 2005).  
Implications for Self-Deception 
  The data from these five studies also have implications for 
another enduring issue in psychology. Over the decades, social, 
personality, clinical, and cognitive psychologists have catalogued a 
myriad of ways in which people engage in wishful thinking (for reviews, 
see Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Dunning, 2001; Kunda, 1990; Mele, 
1997; Pittman, 1998). However, people remain seemingly unaware that 
they do all this cognitive work; they remain innocent of the fact that 
their fears and desires have shaped how they view themselves and 
think about the world around them (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005; 
Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Mele, 1997; 
Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross, 2004).  
Indeed, for people to reach their motivational goals, it is 
imperative that they remain unaware of the distortions they place on 
their thinking. If they knew that they believed some pleasant thought 
merely because they wanted to believe it, they would also know, at 
least in part, how illegitimate that thought was. How, then, do people 
pull off the self-deception crucial to the execution of motivated 
reasoning?  
  Our data provide one answer to this riddle. People fail to 
recognize such self-serving biases if those processes remain outside of 
conscious awareness, monitoring, or control. If those processes take  
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place preconsciously, before any content of perception and cognition 
reaches consciousness, people can construct pleasant thoughts yet 
remain unaware of the construction. The only content that would be 
available in consciousness would be the product and not the process 
of motivated reasoning. 
  There exist some shards of evidence that motivational processes 
operate on a nonconscious level (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
& Solmon, 1997; Fein & Spencer, 1997).  The present studies enlarge 
the types of nonconscious processes that motivational states may 
influence, and it may be profitable to consider other automatic or 
nonconscious processes that might be molded, in part, by the 
motivation toward believing in a masterful self in a congenial world.  
  One also wonders about the full range of nonconscious processes 
that might be tainted by motivational pressures. The world people 
know is the one they take in through their senses, but it is also formed 
by other preconscious processes. To what extent is the representation 
of the world furnished to conscious awareness by all these processes 
one that reproduces the outside world faithfully versus the one that 
people just wish they could inhabit?  
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CHAPTER THREE 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCEC AND THE PERCEPTION  
OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS  
People commonly assume that they perceive the external world 
the way it really is. However, considerable research challenges this 
intuition. A walker does not move as fast as a perceiver may think 
(Jacobs & Shiffrar, 2005), and objects fail to be as big (Wesp, Cichello, 
Gracia, & Davis, 2004) or as tall (Yang, Dixon, & Proffitt, 1999) as they 
seem.  
In recent years, research has increasingly demonstrated that an 
individual’s internal states can influence perception of the external 
world. Thirsty people find their attention drawn to thirst-quenching 
objects in the environment (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & de Vries, 2001), and 
see objects as more transparent, a property characteristic of water 
(Changizi & Hall, 2001). Spider phobics misperceive the direction of 
moving spiders, seeing those creatures as approaching themselves 
rather than approaching others who are equally close to the spider 
(Riskind, Moore, & Bowley, 1995).  
In two studies, we explored whether a different internal state 
could influence the perception of natural environments. That internal 
state is cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory assumes a 
drive-like motivation to maintain consistency among relevant thoughts 
and actions (Festinger, 1957). When attitudes and actions contradict 
one another, discomforting arousal results, leading to a drive-like 
motivation to restore harmony by shifting beliefs to realign them with  
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behavior. This motivation maintains a widespread influence, changing 
attitudes (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), likelihood estimates (Knox & 
Inkster, 1968), and perceptions of self (Sherman & Gorkin, 1980). In 
this research, we asked if the impact of cognitive dissonance could 
extend down to visual perception.  
  Participants performed an aversive task. In Study 1, participants 
walked across a campus quadrangle while wearing a costume inspired 
by Carmen Miranda, the Brazilian singer, dancer, and actress of the 
1940’s and 50’s invariably clad in a large fruit-basket headdress. In 
Study 2, participants knelt on an all-terrain skateboard and pushed 
themselves up a grassy hill.  
Our tasks and measures were modeled after work by Proffitt and 
colleagues (e.g., Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), who argued that conscious 
perception serves the regulation of physical behaviors. Key to their 
argument is the notion that the amount of effort a person must expend 
to complete an action influences their perception of the relevant 
environment. When people must expend more effort to complete some 
physical action, the perceptual system portrays the environment as 
more challenging, presumably to guide the individual toward what 
actions to take (or to avoid) as well as how to execute those actions 
successfully. Distances to walk seem longer after strapping on a heavy 
backpack (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003). Hills appear 
steeper when perceivers wear a backpack, are fatigued after a long 
run, suffer from low physical fitness, or are in poor health (Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999). Here, we examined whether a different sort of   
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regulation, one associated with dissonance reduction, produced 
similar changes in perception of natural environments.  
In each study, we manipulated participants’ subjective feelings 
of choice about completing the task to be either high or low. Under 
high choice, people must resolve the dissonance caused by their 
voluntary agreement to perform an aversive action. Under low choice, 
this dissonance is easily resolved because participants can attribute 
their agreement to lack of choice (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). We 
predicted that participants would resolve their dissonance in high 
choice conditions by altering their perception of the environment to 
make the task less aversive, relative to perceptions reported by low 
choice and control condition participants. In Study 1, high choice 
participants would see the distance they had to walk as shorter. In 
Study 2, they would see the hill as less steep. 
Study 1: Perceptions of Distance 
Method 
Procedure 
In exchange for course credit, participants (n = 44) were taken 
outside to a highly trafficked, grass quadrangle at the center of 
campus and were randomly assigned to high choice, low choice, or 
control conditions. In both choice conditions, participants were told 
that because emotional reactions are difficult to predict, they would 
report their reactions to a real emotion—namely embarrassment. At 
this point, the experimenter handed participants a bag containing a 
Carmen Miranda costume, including a grass skirt, coconut bra, a hat 
adorned in plastic fruit, and a flower lei.   
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To those participants in the high choice condition (n = 22), the 
experimenter explained that in lieu of the emotion test, there were 
other options available, although none were ever discussed with any 
participant. The experimenter continued by sating that although other 
options were available, it would be preferable if he or she could choose 
to perform the emotion test. The experimenter ended by asking if the 
participant would choose to do the emotion task. After verbally 
agreeing, the experimenter asked participants to complete a waiver 
labeled “freedom of choice.” Participants signed their name indicating 
that they had freely chosen to perform the emotion task. 
Participants assigned to the low choice condition (n = 12) 
learned that other tasks were available but that a supervisor had 
selected the emotion task for them. Participants completed a similar 
waiver this time labeled “experimenter choice.” Participants signed 
their name indicating that they had not chosen the emotion task. 
Participants then walked across the width of the quad from one 
statue to another and back (365-ft each way) and completed a survey 
asking them to estimate the one-way distance from one statue to the 
other. Before providing a response, the experimenter showed 
participants a ruler, explained that this was the length of 1-ft. To 
complete the distance estimate, participants wrote down a number 
that represented the distance in feet between the statues. Additionally, 
participants indicated on a 9-point Likert scale the degree to which 
they felt like they chose to perform this task.  
The remaining participants were randomly assigned to the  
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control condition (n = 10)1. Control participants were not informed 
about the emotion test involving the Carmen Miranda costume nor 
alternative choices to the emotion test. Instead, they accompanied the 
experimenter outside to the quad ostensibly as a part of a survey of 
natural object perception. 
Results  
Perceptions of Choice 
  The choice manipulation left participants in the high choice 
condition feeling more choice (M = 7.1) than those in the low choice 
condition (M = 5.5), t(32) = 2.09, p = .05, prep = .92 d = .75. 
Distance estimates 
Across conditions, participants tended to underestimate the 
distance between the statues (M = 142.0-ft), one-sample t(43) = -16.86, 
p < .001, prep = .99, d = 2.54.  Importantly, this underestimation was 
moderated by the choice manipulation, F(2, 41) = 3.18, p = .05, prep = 
.88, hp2 = .13. Participants in the high choice condition estimated the 
distance to be shorter (M = 111.1-ft) than did those in the low choice 
condition (M = 182.5-ft), t(32) = 2.71, p = .01, prep = .97, d = .97. 
Estimates between those in the high choice and control condition (M = 
161.5-ft) were not significantly different, t(30) = 1.63, p = .11, prep = 
.87, d = .62, although they trended in the expected direction.  
To test the specific prediction that those in the high choice 
condition would estimate a shorter distance than either the low choice 
                                                 
1 Due to the sometimes inopportune nature of random assignment, the 
cell counts in Studies 1 and 2 are unequal. This inequality was neither 
intentional nor the product of varying attrition rates in each condition.  
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or control condition, we performed a linear contrast. Assigning weights 
of -2, +1, and +1, respectively, the contrast was significant, F(1, 41) = 
4.62, p < .04, prep = .92, hp2 = .10. This specific contrast accounted for 
over 91% of the total between-group variance associated with 
participants’ estimates2. 
Study 2: Perception of Slope 
Study 2 was designed to replicate the finding that the motivation 
to resolve cognitive dissonance could influence perception of a hill’s 
slope. We used a dependent measure that relied less on conscious 
judgments and explicit reports of estimates but was instead more 
perceptual in nature. Rather than assigning a number to reflect their 
perceptual experience, participants drew an angle and manipulated 
the arm on a protractor to estimate slope. Additionally, Study 2 
addressed the alternative that distance estimates were a result of 
memory biases rather than perceptual processing. Thus, participants 
estimated the slope of the hill before they performed the task. 
                                                 
2 One might speculate that it is the physiological arousal that 
accompanies dissonance and not the psychological motivation to 
reduce dissonance that biased perception of environments (Zanna & 
Cooper, 1974). Arousal may have been energizing, thus leading people 
to perceive the environment as not as much of a challenge. Data from 
Study 1 speak against this alternative explanation. If dissonance 
arousal in the high choice condition enhanced energy and 
performance, then high choice participants should have walked faster 
(Ozel, Larue, & Dosseville, 2004). Walking speed did vary across 
conditions, F(2, 40) = 3.19, p = .05, prep = .88 hp2 = .14, but high 
choice participants took more time (M = 61.2 sec), not less, to walk 
than low choice participants (M = 55.0 sec), t(31) = -2.34, p = .03, prep 
= .94 d = .94. Participants in high choice and control conditions took 
the same amount of time (M = 60.0-sec), t(30) = -.42, p = .68, prep = 
.68 d = .18. 
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Method 
Procedure 
In exchange for course credit, an experimenter accompanied 
participants (n = 51) individually outside to the foot of a hill (47-ft in 
length, 19 degree incline) to complete a test of strength. The 
experimenter explained that participants would kneel on an all-terrain 
skateboard and push themselves up a hill using their hands. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the high choice (n = 12) or low 
choice condition (n = 15), which was manipulated in the same manner 
as Study 13.  
Participants estimated the incline of the hill using perceptual 
measures rather than explicit judgments. They did this in two ways, 
the order of which was counterbalanced. In the drawing measurement, 
participants saw a 4-inch line labeled on one end with an “X”. 
Participants drew a diagonal line emanating from the X to represent 
the slope of the hill. In the protractor measurement, participants were 
handed a protractor with an attached arm. They moved the arm until 
the angle formed by the arm and the bottom of the protractor was 
equal to the slope of the hill. Additionally, participants indicated on a 
9-point Likert scale the degree to which they felt they chose the task. 
Participants in the high choice and low choice conditions then 
completed the strength test (or attempted it for 3-min if it was too 
difficult to complete) by pushing themselves up the hill while kneeling 
to avoid promoting suspicion in our participant pool.  
                                                 
3 All but 1 participant performed the strength test in the choice 
condition.  
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Participants in the control condition (n = 24) were not informed 
about the strength test. Instead, they accompanied the experimenter 
outside to the hill to complete the two measurement estimates 
ostensibly as a survey of natural object perception. 
Results  
Perceptions of Choice 
The choice manipulation left participants in the high choice 
condition feeling more choice (M = 4.8) than low choice participants (M 
= 3.4), t(25) = 2.22, p = .04, prep = .93, d = .95. We suspect, although 
do not have data to conclude, that subjective feelings of choice were 
lower in this study than the previous because, in addition to being 
embarrassing, this task was also difficult. 
Distance Estimates 
Drawing and protractor measurements were significantly 
correlated, r(51) = .45, p = .001, prep = .99. Thus, we averaged both 
estimates to form a composite measure. Overall, participants tended to 
overestimate the steepness of the hill (M = 29.2 degrees), one sample 
t(50) = 9.30, p < .001, prep = .99, d = 1.30, a result replicating past 
work. However, choice moderated this overestimation, F(2, 48) = 4.10, 
p = .02, prep = .93, hp2 = .15. Participants in the high choice condition 
estimated that the hill was less steep (M = 23.9 degrees) than did those 
in the low choice condition (M = 31.0 degrees), t(25) = 3.50, p = .002, 
prep = .99, d = 1.14, or the control condition (M = 30.8 degrees), t(34) = 
2.45, p = .02, prep = .95, d = .86.  
To test whether those in the high choice condition would 
estimate that the slope of a hill was less steep than either the low  
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choice or control condition, we performed a linear contrast, assigning 
weights of -2, +1, and +1, respectively, which was significant, F(1, 48) 
= 9.36, p = .003, prep = .98, hp2 = .15, accounting for over  
99% of the total between-group variance in participants’ estimates. 
General Discussion 
Two studies demonstrated that the motivation to resolve 
cognitive dissonance influenced perception of natural environments. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate that motivational 
pressures, including higher-order, intrapsychic motivations like 
cognitive dissonance reduction, can have an influence on perceptual 
processes. In doing so, this work adds to an emerging body of 
literature in cognitive and social psychology demonstrating that 
internal states influence perception. For example, previous work has 
shown that perceptions of distance and slope can be influenced by the 
need to regulate the amount of effort one will expend (Proffitt et al., 
2003; Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2004). Here a different type of 
regulation biased perception. People, wishing to maintain consonance 
in their beliefs, tended to perceive an environment that would help 
them avoid dissonance. 
In a sense, the studies here constitute a revisiting of the classic 
proposal by New Look theorists that values and needs influence 
perception (e.g., Bruner & Goodman, 1947), a proposal that ultimately 
sank into a morass of theoretical and empirical controversies (e.g., 
Eriksen, 1958). However, these findings, combined with the recent 
observation that wishful thinking influences how people perceive 
ambiguous stimuli (Balcetis & Dunning, in press), suggest that  
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intrapsychic motives may, indeed, have a significant impact on what 
people perceive in the physical world around them. 
One could speculate what other intrapsychic motives might 
influence what people perceive. People commonly possess a 
fundamental need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Could this 
motive influence how they perceive the expressions they see on other 
people’s faces when conversing with them? Or might this need, when 
threatened, bias perceptions of physical distance between oneself and 
others? People who are risk averse tend to avoid making judgments 
and acting in uncertain situations (Baron, 1994). Could risk aversion 
bias judgments of temporal distance to decision-making deadlines? 
Since the collapse of the New Look approach to motivation and 
perception in the 1950s, such hypotheses have largely been avoided, 
but the time might be ripe to explore these hypotheses with theories 
and methods that are more nuanced and sophisticated than what was 
available fifty years ago.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISTANCE AND THE FOND HEART:  
AN EXAMINATION OF HOW DESIRES BIAS DISTANCE PERCEPTION 
People assume that they see the outside world the way it really 
is. However, research aside, even anecdotal evidence undermines this 
assumption. Perceptual experiences rarely represent reality completely 
and accurately. First, environments often offer far more data than 
limited perceptual capacities can process. As a result, a great deal of 
information is pushed to the side. When speaking to a large although 
deadpan audience, does the lecturer attend to the sea of sullen faces 
or the captivated lone wolf nodding away in agreement? In addition to 
information overload, environments offer information that maintains 
more than one possible interpretation. A patron might ask if the 
Starbucks barista is smiling at her as she again orders her usual 
“chantico hold the whipped cream” or smirking at her for not being 
able to pronounce it correctly.  
Perceptual systems have developed a number of strategies to 
cope with the barrage of information they receive. First, the stream of 
perceptual input is filtered. Some information is put aside perhaps for 
later processing or might be overlooked entirely, as evidenced by the 
fact that people are not aware of everything around them. When spring 
arrives, an allergy suffer is quite likely to notice the display of 24-hour 
fast-acting Claritin promising same-day, non-drowsy allergy relief on 
the drugstore shelf without even realizing the many other pills, tablets, 
ointments, and creams the same shelves carry. In an empirical test of 
a similar type of blindness, data indicates that even a brief exposure to  
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a gory or an erotic photo can preoccupy or distract perceivers such 
that they are blind to subsequently displayed salient and important 
stimuli appearing in plain sight (Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005).  
Second, when it is possible to perceive information in multiple 
ways, perceptual conclusions that resolve the ambiguity are reached 
quickly, effortlessly, and often outside of awareness. These 
conclusions are, however, often biased by top-down, social constraints 
such as expectations, current cognitions, and active goals (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2002; Burton, 2002; Long & Toppino, 2004). For 
example, attempting to detect deception in a couple’s conversation 
increases the likelihood that a subsequently viewed, ambiguously 
drawn figure will be interpreted as the word “liar” written in script 
rather than the outline of a man’s face (Balcetis & Dale, 2003). 
In a series of studies, we explored whether a different type of 
top-down, social constraint might act as a filter on perception. In 
particular, we investigated if and how a social constraint known to 
bias many other facets of social cognition—namely the motivational 
state of desire—might also penetrate perception of the surrounding 
world. We explored how desires allow perceivers to see the world as 
they want to see it. In particular, we asked if desire changes how 
much distance perceivers feel the world has placed between them and 
the objects of their desire. In doing so, we test the extent to which 
motivations can penetrate basic visual processing of the external 
world.  
117 
Motivated perception 
  As of late, researchers have renewed interest in systematic 
biases in perception; of particular interest in this paper is the search 
for those that are motivational in nature. Certainly, motivational forces 
have played a staring role in the theater of social judgment. The desire 
to think well of one’s self and one’s prospects leads people to faulty 
judgments about themselves, others, and the world. For instance, 
lottery ticket purchasers do not believe they are nearly as likely as are 
others to experience negative outcomes if they won the jackpot (i.e. 
increased extravagance, greedy extended family members) (Nelson & 
Beggan, 2004). People are prone to take credit for personal successes 
but blame failures on external causes (Moon, 2003) and assume they 
are more likely than their peers to experience the positive outcomes in 
life while steering clear of the bad (Weinstein, 1980). But of course, 
people believe that when they make these types of judgments, they are 
less prone to bias than when others reach similar conclusions 
(Ehrlinger, Gilovich, & Ross, 2005). 
The desire to think well of oneself and see oneself in a positive 
light are motivations that reside within conscious judgment processes. 
In this paper, we ask if such forms of motivation can penetrate 
perception of the physical world, as well. The motivated strategy that 
allows people to look fondly upon their own skills, traits, abilities, and 
outcomes is the result of biased cognition. In studies that follow, we 
explore the limits of this type of positivity. We ask if judgments of one’s 
social world are overly rosy, favorable, optimistic, and flattering not 
just because people process the information of which they are  
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consciously aware in a biased manner. We ask if motivation can bias 
not only how people think about their world but how they perceive it, 
as well. 
As an analog or theoretical framework in which to ground our 
theory of motivated perception, work within motivated cognition 
suggesting that desires filter how people think about their world, only 
entertaining thoughts related to the desire. Desires lead to a type of 
tunnel vision that focuses cognition solely on activities associated with 
the desire and objects that might satisfy the desire (see Lowenstein, 
1996 for a discussion). Cocaine addicts report that virtually all 
thoughts are focused on cocaine during binges at the expense of 
eating, sleeping, money, maintaining relationships with others, and 
personal responsibility (Gawin, 1991).  
  Just as motivations filter cognition and action, desires lead 
people to literally see the world through rose-colored glasses—to watch 
the reactions of the attentive student or see the Starbucks barista as 
smiling rather than smirking. In an empirical test of the role of desire 
in perceptual tasks, Balcetis and Dunning (in press) demonstrated 
that perceivers’ interpretations of ambiguous visual information were 
molded by their motivations, and specifically wishful thinking. In these 
studies, participants knew that they were about to be assigned to one 
of two experimental tasks, one being much more desirable (i.e. acting 
as an evaluator of vocal abilities) than the other (i.e. performing as a 
karaoke singer who would be judged by the evaluator). The computer 
presented a visual stimulus that would assign them to either the 
desirable or undesirable task. Unbeknown to participants, this visual  
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stimulus could be interpreted in two different ways—one way that 
would assign participants to their favored task and the other to the 
less favored one. As expected, desire led participants to preconscioulsy 
reach a perceptual conclusion that allowed them to literally see what 
they wanted to see at the expense of a less desirable alternative.  
Perception of the natural world 
In recent years, research has increasingly demonstrated that 
motivations, mostly visceral in nature, can influence perception of the 
external world. Thirsty people find their attention drawn to thirst-
quenching objects in the environment (Aarts, Dijksterhuis, & De Vries, 
2001), and see objects as more transparent, a property characteristic 
of water (Changizi & Hall, 2001), suggesting a perceptual sensitivity to 
objects and qualities of objects that might satisfy a need. Visceral fear 
such as that experienced by spider phobics leads to misperception of 
motion direction whereby phobics see spiders as approaching 
themselves rather than approaching others who are equally close to 
the spider (Riskind, Moore, & Bowley, 1995).  
In the studies that follow, we were particularly interested in 
investigating how states of the perceiver bias perception of specific 
elements of the natural environment—namely distance. Certainly, 
there is a precedent for this interest. In a pair of studies, Balcetis & 
Dunning (2006) investigated how a need to regulate internal states 
biases perception of slope and distance. In each study, participants’ 
either experienced high or low subjective feelings of choice about 
completing an embarrassing task. Under high choice, people are 
motivated to resolve the dissonance caused by their voluntary  
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agreement. Under low choice, this dissonance is easily resolved 
because participants can attribute their agreement to lack of choice 
(Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). These studies predicted and found 
that participants resolved their dissonance in high choice conditions 
by altering their perception of the environment to make the task less 
aversive. High choice participants estimated using objective measures 
that the distance they walked was shorter and the hill was less steep 
relative low choice and control condition participants. 
In addition, Proffitt and colleagues investigated the effect of a 
different form of regulation on perception of natural environments. 
Proffitt and others argued that perceptual systems distort the manner 
in which environments are perceived in order to dissuade the 
organism from taking action that would be costly or effortful. In 
particular, they argued that a need to regulate physical efforts and 
stores of energy bias perceptions of egocentric distances and slant. 
That is, perception of natural elements is a function of both the actual 
distance, as specified by optics, and the effort required to maneuver 
within that physical space. When resources are depleted, and the 
anticipated effort to climb a hill is great, as is the case when tired, 
encumbered by wearing a heavy backpack, in poor physical condition, 
or elderly (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999; Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & 
Midgett, 1995) hills appear steeper. Similarly, resource depletion and 
increased anticipation of effort leads to exaggerated perceptions of 
distance (Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003).  
In addition, when the visual system relies on anticipated effort 
in perceptual judgments, it is often tricked. For instance, removing  
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optic flow when walking forward on a treadmill leads the visiomotor 
system to recalibrate (Stefanucci, Proffitt, Banton, & Epstein, 2005). In 
the zero optic flow condition, perceptual systems learn that more effort 
needs to be expended in order for the body to move a certain distance. 
This type of recalibration leads people to overestimate distances. When 
anticipated effort increases, whether because resources have been 
taken away or because the visual system has been duped, estimates of 
distance increase.  
We propose that motivations like desire serve a similar 
regulatory function guiding efforts while allocating energies. When 
need states arise, it would be wise for an organism to ensure that the 
resources required to satisfy that need are plentiful. Thus, 
motivational regulatory systems can serve an adaptive function.  
There are two ways in which a motivational regulatory system 
might accomplish this functional goal. First, motivations might 
actually open the doors to the stores of energy, restoring or topping off 
energy reserves such that perceivers feel that the resources they have 
are sufficient to undertake the task of reaching for or approaching the 
desired object. Secondly, a motivational regulatory system might trick 
the perceptual system. Consider a situation where perceptual systems 
see a desired object as further away than it really is, or at least further 
away than a control object. Seeing the object as further away may lead 
the organism to simply give up because the distance it must travel or 
the hills it must traverse appear overwhelming. A distance that 
appears insurmountable might actually become so. However, a 
perceptual system that under-represents the actual distance, or at  
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least makes the desired object appear closer than a control, might 
motivate the system to take on the task of approaching the object as 
the distance appears reachable.  
Given these pockets of research, we propose that desires 
influence perceptions of the surrounding world allowing perceivers to 
see the world as they want to see it. Desires tune perceivers to 
elements of the environment that are favorable, flattering, or positive. 
In this manuscript, we ask if the motivations fostering desire can also 
change how much distance perceivers feel the world has placed 
between them and desired objects.  
Thus far, we have suggested that perceptual systems are tuned 
to positive relative to negative information—perceivers see information 
in their surroundings that they want to see. However, the process by 
which motivation infiltrates perception is, as of yet, ill defined. It is 
also our goal to investigate the second of the two proposed 
motivational regulatory system mechanisms. That is, we will 
investigate how the motivational regulatory system might trick or bias 
perception in order to assist in achieving the desired end state.  
We chose to investigate one proximal mechanism among what might 
be many routes to such regulation via motivated perception.  
With support from Easterbrook (1959), I propose that desire 
narrows attention, leading to a focus on fewer items and only the most 
important items in the environment. Perceivers see what they want to 
see because they narrowly focus their attention on positive 
information, and specifically desired objects, at the expense of 
comparatively less desired forms.   
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Overview of Studies 
In the studies that follow, we asked participants to estimate 
distance between themselves and a desirable or less desirable object 
predicting that distances to desired objects will appear shorter than 
distances to less desired objects. In study 1A, participants estimated 
the distance to a plate of chocolates or a neutral object, while in study 
1B they did the same to either chocolates or dog feces. In study 2, we 
captured people’s naturally occurring state of hunger as they entered a 
dining hall in contrast with their state as they exited a dining hall after 
dinner and asked them to estimated distance to 2 slices of fresh 
cheese pizza or a control object. In studies 3 and 4, we manipulated 
participants’ visceral need to satisfy thirst by asking them to consume 
a large portion of dry, salty pretzels or to drink 4 8-ounce glasses of 
water then estimate the distance to a bottle of water.  
Across these studies, we predicted that participants would see 
the objective distance separating themselves from the more desired 
object as smaller than the distance to a less desired object. 
Specifically, we expected that participants would see the distance 
between themselves and the chocolates as smaller than the distance to 
either the control object (Study 1A) or the feces (Study 1B). Hungry 
participants entering a dining hall would see the distance to the pizza 
as smaller than participants in any of the other 3 conditions (Study 2). 
Finally, we predicted that thirsty participants would see the distance 
to the bottle of water as smaller than control or quenched participants 
(Studies 3 and 4).  
In addition, we intended to offer evidence that motivation  
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influences perception by changing how narrowly focused attention is 
on elements of the environment (Study 4). We predicted that a 
narrowed focus of attention on the desired object would decrease 
perceptions of distance. Studies 5A and 5B used an “experimental 
chain” methodology (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005) to further affirm 
that desire leads to decreased perceptions of distance. We predicted 
that visceral states lead to changes in the ratings of an object’s 
desirability which narrows the focus of attention on that object (Study 
5A). Then, we predicted that when attention is manipulated to be 
narrowed as opposed to expanded on a toaster oven baking fresh 
chocolate chip cookies, perceptions of distance would decrease (Study 
5B). With this work, we argue that people see distances to desired 
objects as smaller than distances to less desired objects. This occurs 
because people narrowly focus attention on the desired object.  
Study 1A: Demonstrating that Desire Decreases Distance Estimates 
Study 1A provided an initial demonstration that desired objects 
in the environment appear closer than objects that are relatively less 
desired. Participants estimated the distance between themselves and 
one of two objects—either a pile of chocolates covered in attractive, 
shiny wrappers or a neutral object created by stacking 3 red plastic 
cups in a pyramid. Our prediction was that participants would 
estimate that objective distances separating themselves from an object 
were smaller when that object was the desired pile of chocolates rather 
than the neutral object.   
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Participants 
Seventy Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for 
candy. 
Procedure 
The experimenter recruited participants from the hallways and 
sidewalks outside of the lab asking if they might participate in a short 
experiment in exchange for candy. After agreeing, participants were 
seated at a desk inside a small lab room. Participants sat in front of a 
short podium, the back of which was nestled up to the edge of a table. 
On the table, 35-in away from the participant, sat an object. For half 
of the participants this object was a plate piled with shiny, individually 
wrapped candy bars (n = 37). For the other half of participants sat 3 
red plastic cups (n = 30) stacked in a pyramid to reflect the general 
shape assumed by the pile of chocolates.  
  While seated at the podium and after having directed 
participants’ attention to either the candy or the cups, participants 
completed a survey. Embedded within this survey were a few 
questions of interest. First, on their survey participants saw a 1-in 
long line to be used as reference. They estimated, without measuring 
in any way, how many inches separated themselves and the object. 
After estimating the distance, participants rated how appealing, 
satisfying, and tempting the object was. Participants indicated their 
impression on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) Likert-scale. After 
completing these few questions, participants were debriefed before 
being escorted out of the lab.   
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Results   
Exclusions and transformations 
  Data from one participant were excluded by her request and 
from one other because of experimenter error. In addition, data from 
one participant who voluntarily offered that she was fasting was 
excluded. In this and all but one of the studies that follow, 
participants’ estimates of distance were skewed. To account for the 
non-normality of this data, we performed nonparametric tests on the 
rank order all distance estimates. Specifically, we conducted Mann-
Whitney tests on participants’ distance estimates when the design 
used 2 independent conditions and Kruskal-Wallace tests when the 
design used 3. However, the means reported represent the original, 
non-transformed distances. 
Objects’ desirability 
  We asked participants how appealing, satisfying, and tempting 
the object was. We averaged responses to these 3 questions to form an 
overall measure of the object’s desirability (a = .81). As expected,  
participants rated the plate of chocolates as more desirable (M = 3.5) 
than the pyramid of cups (M = 2.0), t(66) = 4.34, p < .001. 
Distance estimates 
  We expected that participants estimating the distance between 
themselves and chocolate would see the object on the table as closer 
than did participants estimating the distance between themselves and 
the cups. As expected, participants saw the object as closer to when it 
was chocolate (M = 24.4-in) than when it was a stack of cups (M = 
29.2-in), U = 4.26, p = .05.   
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Study 1B: Testing an Attitude Accessibility Alternative Explanation 
Study 1B served as a replication and addressed the alternative 
argument that objects about which people hold a strong attitude 
regardless of whether they are either positive or negative will 
automatically attract attention (Pratto, 1994; Pratto & John, 1991; 
Rothermund, Wentura, & Bak, 2001; Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005; 
Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000). That is, objects toward which 
individuals hold attitudes that are highly accessible, presumably 
because they are firmly established and strongly felt, are more likely to 
attract attention (Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992). A critic might 
argue that attitude-laden objects regardless of whether positive or 
negative will attract attention and, as a result, appear closer. Thus, in 
this study participants estimated the distance to one of 2 objects that 
both hold an affective charge an about which participants hold strong 
attitudes. Participants either estimated the distance to chocolates or to 
dog feces. 
In addition, we gathered distance estimates using a different, 
nonverbal dependent measure. Instead of asking participants to report 
the number of inches that separated them from the object, 
participants performed a distance-matching task. The experimenter 
showed participants two pieces of tape on the wall behind the object. 
Participants were told to approach the object until the distance that 
separated themselves from the object was equal to the distance that 
separated to two pieces of tape. We again predicted that participants 
would see the distance to the desired object, a pile of chocolates, as 
smaller than the attitude laden and affectively charged yet less desired  
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object, dog feces. Because the distance that separated themselves from 
the chocolates would appear comparatively smaller, we predicted that 
participants would stand further back from the chocolates than they 
would from the feces.  
Pretest 
  To test the idea that chocolates, in this case Lindt chocolate 
truffles, were more desirable than feces, we asked a separate group of 
participants (n = 20) to view and describe their reactions to both 
objects. Participants were seated individually at a table upon which 
sat the truffles and the feces that was ostensibly freshly collected just 
that morning. Participants described the object using a 1-7 Likert 
scale where higher numbers indicated greater endorsement of the 
adjective.  
To gauge general desirability, participants rated how appealing, 
positive, likable, attractive, and interesting the object was. Obviously, 
the truffles were described as more desirable (M = 5.5) than the feces 
(M = 2.1), paired t(19) = 17.44, p < .001. To account for the alternative 
explanation that desired objects hold attention only because the 
strength of the attitude people hold towards them exceeds that of 
alternative objects, we examined desirability ratings in comparison to 
the midpoint of the scale marked as “no opinion.” The desirability of 
the chocolates was significantly greater than the midpoint, one sample 
t(19) = 14.99, p < .001. In addition, the desirability of the feces was 
significantly less than the midpoint, t(19) = -5.47, p < .001, suggesting 
not only less desire for the feces than the chocolates but an absolute 
as opposed to relative negative attitude.   
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Again, to address the alternative explanation that objects with a 
strongly associated attitudes hold attention, we measured the strength 
of each attitude object. We computed the absolute value of the 
difference between desire and the midpoint of the scale as a measure 
of the strength of the attitudes perceivers hold towards both feces and 
truffles. It is not the case that the desired object is associated with a 
stronger attitude than the less desired object. In fact, the absolute 
value of the difference score is actually marginally larger for the feces 
(M = 1.94) than for the truffles (M = 1.45), paired t(19) = 1.79, p = .09. 
This evidence does not support the attitude strength alternative 
explanation. 
Participants 
  Sixty-one Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for 
extra credit in their psychology or human development class.   
Procedure 
  The experimenter escorted participants individually into a 
medium sized room and asked each to stand behind a piece of tape on 
the floor. On the opposing wall, 150-in away from participants, were 
two strips of tape separated by 90.5-in of white wall. Just below the 
tape and nestled against the wall was a shallow table that supported a 
small object covered by a towel. The experimenter directed 
participants’ attention to the opposite wall and pointed out the pieces 
of tape and the object on the table. The experimenter explained to 
participants that they would estimate distance. Then participants 
learned that they would estimate the distance between the two pieces 
of tape, but instead of offering an estimate in inches or feet, they  
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would perform a matching task. As explained by the experimenter, 
participants would move themselves closer to or further away from the 
object on the table until the distance between themselves and the 
object was equal to the distance between the two pieces of tape. After 
offering these instructions, the experimenter removed the towel to 
uncover the object on the table. 
Unbeknown to participants, the object participants approached 
or receded from varied. For approximately half of the group (n = 31), 
the object on the table was a shining package of Lindt chocolate 
truffles, while for the other half (n = 30), the object was a plastic, 
Ziplock bag containing what was explained to be a freshly collected 
sample of dog feces. After uncovering the object on the table, the 
experimenter asked participants to perform the distance-matching 
task. When participants completed the task, the experimenter placed a 
piece of tape just in front of the toes of participants’ shoes. 
Participants were debriefed before being escorted out of the lab. After 
participants left, the experimenter measured the distance from the 
tape to the spot on the ground directly below the object on the table. 
This measurement was used as participants’ distance estimates from 
the matching task. 
Results   
  There were no main effects, F (1, 57) = 1.11, p = .30, or 
interactions with gender, F<1, thus the reported means represent the 
estimates collapsed across participant gender. 
Distance estimates 
  We expected that participants estimating the distance between  
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themselves and truffles would see the object on the table as closer 
than did participants estimating the distance between themselves and 
the feces. That is to say, participants should see the distance between 
themselves and truffles as comparatively smaller than the distance 
between themselves and feces. Thus, we specifically predicted that 
participants estimating the distance to truffles would stand further 
away from the object than participants estimating the distance to 
feces. As expected, participants positioned themselves closer to the 
object when it was feces (M = 96.0-in) than when it was truffles (M = 
105.9-in), U = 310.0, p = .03.  
Discussion 
Perception of distance depended upon what item perceivers were 
asked to approach. Perceivers estimating the distance between 
themselves and truffles saw the object on the table as closer than did 
perceivers estimating the distance between themselves and the feces. 
Importantly, this data argues that biased perception is not a result of 
attitude strength. Because perceivers estimated distance to either a 
positively or negatively valenced item about which participants held 
approximately equally strong attitudes, we can more firmly suggest 
that it is positive information and not simply the absolute value of the 
affective charge of the object that decreased perceptual estimates of 
distance. Indeed, we argue that positive information holds attention 
when negative information does not, and as a result, distances appear 
shorter. 
As additional support for our position that positive information 
holds attention, we asked a separate group of participants to gauge the  
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attention-holding nature of both objects. Participants (n = 20) rated 
how fixated they were on the object, how eye-catching and attention 
capturing the object was, and how much they avoided looking at and 
wanted to look away from the object (the last two were reverse coded). 
We averaged responses to each of these ratings to form aggregate 
measure of the objects’ ability to hold attention. Importantly, the 
truffles were described as more capable of holding attention (M = 6.0) 
than were the feces (M = 4.8), paired t(19) = 3.56, p = .002.  
Study 2: Testing Real World Desires 
  Although the previous studies argued that desired objects 
appear closer than less desirable objects, they relied upon objects that 
naturally varied in their desirability. Study 2 served as a conceptual 
replication, but in this study, we varied the visceral state of the 
perceiver expecting that the desirability of an object should vary 
systematically as visceral states change. For instance, when hungry, a 
juicy slice of pizza hot from the oven will be more desirable than after 
having just finished a full meal. Thus, we took advantage of a 
naturally occurring variation in visceral states of a perceiver. In 
particular, we captured perceiver’s state of hunger as they entered a 
campus dining hall for dinner or their state of satisfaction as they 
exited the dining hall after finishing dinner.  
In this design, we crossed this variation in visceral state with 
object type. That is, we asked hungry and satisfied participants to 
estimate the distance that separated themselves from either a plate 
holding 2 slices of fresh, glistening cheese pizza or a pyramid of clear 
plastic cups. We expected that hungry participants would find the  
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pizza more desirable than the cups and more desirable than satisfied 
participants find both the pizza and the cups. In addition, we expected 
that distances would appear shorter for hungry participants 
estimating the distance to pizza in comparison to perceptions of 
distances in each of the other 3 cells of the design. 
  Importantly, this design allows us to test an alternative 
explanation as of yet not addressed. That is, one might argue that 
distances to any object regardless of its ability to satisfy a need will 
appear shorter when in a state of arousal such as hunger. By 
including a condition where participants were experiencing arousal 
produced by a need state but estimating the distance not to an object 
of desire but a control object, we can test the viability of this 
alternative explanation. 
Participants  
Sixty-four  Cornell  University  undergraduates  participated  in 
exchange for candy. 
Procedure  
The experimenter asked students outside of two Cornell 
University dining halls to complete a short survey in exchange for 
candy. Participants sat at one of two tables near the entrance to the 
dining hall. Across the table from where participants were seated was 
an object about which the experimenter explained the survey would 
ask. Embedded within this survey were a few questions of interest. 
First, participants saw on their survey a line that was labeled as 1-in 
long. They were asked to estimate quickly and without measuring in 
any way how many inches away from where they were seated the  
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object was. After estimating the distance, participants rated how 
appealing they thought the object was. Participants indicated their 
impression on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (a great deal) Likert-scale. In 
addition, participants were asked their general opinion of the object on 
a 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive) Likert-scale. 
What we manipulated, though, was both the timing of when 
participants completed this survey but also the object to which 
participants estimated distance. Approximately half of participants 
were recruited as they entered the dining hall while the other half were 
recruited as they exited the dining hall. Crossed with this timing 
variable, approximately half of participants estimated the distance to 2 
slices of pizza while the other half estimated the distance to a control 
object, a pyramid stack of three cups. In all conditions the objects 
were exactly 28.5-in away from the edge of the table closest to the 
participant. After completing these few questions, participants were 
debriefed and were compensated with candy. 
Results 
Exclusions 
Data from one participant were removed as the distance 
estimation was greater than 5.2 standard deviations from the mean 
leaving data from 63 participants for analyses.  
Hunger 
  Participants reported levels of hunger depended upon whether 
they were entering or exiting from the dining hall, F(1, 56) = 207.36, p 
< .001. Although there was not a significant main effect of item on 
reported hunger levels, the interaction between timing and item was  
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significant, F(1, 56) = 5.13, p = .03. Although not significantly so, 
participants tended to report experiencing more hunger when entering 
the dining hall and seeing pizza (M = 5.7) in comparison to when they 
were entering and saw cups (M = 5.1), t(26) = 1.53, p = .14. 
Participants tended to report experiencing less hunger when exiting 
the dining hall and seeing pizza (M = 1.3) in comparison to when they 
were exiting and saw cups (M = 1.9), t(30) = 1.70, p < .10. 
Distance estimates 
  We expected that distance estimates would depend upon both 
the object to which they were estimating distance and the timing of 
their estimate. In particular, we expected that participants entering 
the dining hall who were most hungry would see the pizza as closer 
than participants who were estimating the distance to pizza when 
leaving the hall or estimating the distance to cups when both entering 
and exiting the hall. To test the specific prediction that the distance 
estimate to pizza when entering the hall should be smaller than the 3 
other conditions, we conducted a linear contrast with weights of -3 to 
rank order of the estimates made by those entering and estimating the 
distance to pizza, and +1 to the other 3 conditions. Our specific 
prediction was confirmed by this linear contrast, t(56) = 1.98, p = .05. 
In particular, participants estimated that the pizza was 20.7-in away 
when entering and 26.9-in away when exiting. Participants estimated 
that the cups were 28.4-in away when entering and 27.8-in away 
when exiting. 
Objects’ desirability 
  We asked participants how desirable the object was and their  
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general opinion of the object. In both cases, higher numbers indicated 
more positive ratings of the object. We averaged responses to these 2 
questions to form an average measure of the object’s desirability, r(63) 
= .57, p < .001. We wanted to investigate how the desirability of the 
object might predict distance estimates. To do this, we ran a 
regression predicting the rank order of the distance estimate from the 
4 dummy coded conditions, the averaged desirability measure, and the 
interaction between these 2 predictors. Overall, this model was 
significant, R2 = .12, F(3, 59) = 2.73, p = .05.  
We made the specific prediction that the averaged measure of 
desirability should correlate negatively with distance estimates only for 
the target group, namely participants entering the dining hall and 
estimating the distance to pizza but not in any of the other 3 
conditions. To test this specific prediction, we ran a linear contrast on 
the correlations between these two variables assigning weights of +3 to 
the correlation for our target group and -1 to the correlation between 
desirability and distance for each of the remaining 3 conditions. This 
contrast was confirmed, Z = 3.49, p = .0002. More specifically, desire 
correlated with distance within the target group, r(14) = -.56, p = .04. 
However, desire did not significantly predict distance estimates to cups 
when entering, r(17) = -.17, p = .53, when exiting, r(14) = .32, p = .26, 
or to pizza when exiting, r(14) = .38, p = .12. 
Study 3: Manipulating Objects’ Desirability 
Study 2 demonstrated that outside of the lab, participants’ 
natural variation in levels of visceral need bias distance perception. In 
study 3, we wanted to replicate this effect but with increased  
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experimental control and rigor. To do this, we manipulated the visceral 
state of the perceiver expecting that the desirability of an object should 
vary systematically as visceral states change. When thirsty, a bottle of 
water will be more desirable than when thirst is quenched. Study 3 
held constant the object to which participants estimated distance and 
varied desire by manipulating the internal state of the perceiver. In 
this study, participants either consumed a large serving of dry, salty 
pretzels to make them thirsty or 4 8-ounce glasses of water to quench 
their thirst. These participants then estimated the distance to a bottle 
of water. We included a control condition where participants 
consumed no food or beverage and estimated the distance to a neutral 
object, namely a can opener. We predicted that thirsty participants 
would see the water bottle as more desirable and the distance to the 
water bottle as smaller than quenched or control participants. 
Participants 
  130 Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for extra 
credit in their psychology or human development class.   
Procedure 
  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 possible 
conditions: thirsty, quenched, or control. To those assigned to the 
thirsty or quenched conditions, the experimenter explained that in this 
taste testing study actual taste experiences would be evaluated. For 
this reason, participants would be asked consume a food product and 
describe their reaction to it along a number of dimensions. 
Participants (n = 48) assigned to the thirsty condition were presented 
with a serving of dry, hard, Bavarian-style pretzel bits that constituted  
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over 30% of the suggested daily sodium limit and asked to consume 
the contents of the bowl. Participants (n = 44) randomly assigned to 
the quenched condition were presented with 4 glasses that each 
contained 8-ounces of water. Participants were asked to figure out 
which glass contained a different type of water than the other 3 
glasses by drinking the contents of all glasses. In addition to their 
serving of the food product, on the table in front of participants sat an 
unopened bottle of water 28-in away from the edge of the table. 
Participants in the thirsty and quenched conditions were explicitly 
instructed by the experimenter to refrain from drinking the bottled 
water.  
While consuming their food product, participants provided 
background information about themselves including the amount of 
time that since they last ate and drank any beverage. In addition, 
participants evaluated the product by indicating how much they 
enjoyed it and to what extent they preferred a different brand.  
Participants completed a survey after having finished their food 
product or when they indicated that they could not consume any 
more. First, participants indicated how thirsty they felt on a 1-7 scale 
where higher numbers represented greater thirst. Secondly, a 
horizontal line on the page was labeled as 1-in in length to provide 
some frame of reference for a distance estimation task. After seeing 
this line, participants estimated the distance between themselves and 
the bottle of water on the table. Finally, participants indicated on a 1-7 
scale how desirable the bottle of water was. 
  Participants (n = 38) randomly assigned to the control condition  
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did not consume any food product. Instead, they completed a survey 
ostensibly measuring their ability to make estimates. In particular, 
they estimated the amount of time that has passed since they last ate 
or drank among other time estimates to maintain the cover story. After 
these time estimates and other unrelated judgments, control 
participants estimated the distance between themselves and an object 
28-in away from the edge of the table after being shown a 1-in line to 
establish a frame of reference. However, in this condition, participants 
estimated the distance to a can opener and not a bottle of water.  
Results 
One person in each of the thirsty and quenched conditions 
refused to participate after learning about the product they would have 
to consume leaving 47 participants in the thirsty condition and 43 in 
the quenched condition.  
Manipulation checks 
Participants in the thirsty and quenched conditions did not 
differ in how long before arriving at the lab it had been since they last 
ate, t(88) = .12, p = .90, or drank, t(88) = -.21, p = .84. Importantly, 
after consuming their product, participants in the thirsty condition 
indicated stronger feelings of thirst (M = 6.1) than participants in the 
quenched condition (M = 1.4), t(88) = 21.99, p < .001.   
Distance estimates 
We expected that thirsty participants would see the object on the 
table as closer than control participants while quenched participants 
would see the object as further away than control participants. To test 
this specific prediction, we conducted a linear contrast with a weight of  
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-1 to the rank order of the distance estimates from the thirsty group, 0 
to estimates from the control participants, and +1 to estimates from 
the quenched group. This specific prediction was confirmed by a linear 
contrast, t(125) = 2.06, p = .04. In particular, participants estimated 
that the bottle of water was 24.5-in, while control participants 
estimated that the object was 26.3-in away. However, quenched 
participants saw the bottle as 27.7-in away. 
Mediation by feelings of thirst 
  If it is the case that perceivers’ motivational states influenced 
distance estimates, then we should find that reported feelings of thirst 
mediated the relationship between food product condition and 
distance estimates. To test this prediction, we conducted a mediational 
analysis using procedures outlined by Baron & Kenny (1986). First, we 
coded the thirsty condition as 1 and the quenched condition as 0. As 
stated above, the food product condition significantly predicted 
participants’ feelings of thirst (B = 4.67, SE = .21, p < .001). In 
addition, participants’ feelings of thirst significantly predicted distance 
estimates (B = -.08, SE = .03, p = .01). Finally, when both food product 
condition and feelings of thirst were included in the same equation 
predicting distance estimates, the former dropped to nonsignificance, 
and the latter remained marginally significant (B = .28, SE = .38, p = 
.46, and B = -.13, SE = .07, p = .09). Results of the Sobel (1982) test 
confirmed the significance of this mediated relation (Z = -1.71, p = 
.045, one-tailed). 
Study 4: Measuring Actual Breadth of Attention 
  The previous studies demonstrated that desirable objects appear  
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closer than comparatively less desirable objects. We sought to replicate 
this finding but by using another means to measure distance 
estimates. In this study, participants pulled off a piece of string from a 
roll until the length of the string equaled the distance that separated 
themselves from the object. 
In addition, Study 4 tested a possible mechanism implicated in 
this form of motivated perception. We investigated how a narrowed as 
opposed to expansive focus of attention leads to shorter or longer 
estimates of distance, respectively. In Study 4, we replicated the 
design of Study 2 and added measures that capture the breadth of 
perceivers’ span of attention. In particular, we measured perceivers’ 
ability to later recognize other objects that were located on the walls 
surrounding the target object. We predicted that desirable objects hold 
perceiver’s attention and produce a narrowed focus of attention on the 
object as quantified by less accurate recognition of objects that 
surrounded the target object. A narrowed focus of attention on the 
object is predicted to produce shorter estimates of distance in 
comparison to instances where focus of attention is more expansive.  
Participants 
  71 Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for extra 
credit in their psychology or human development class.   
Procedure 
  Participants were randomly assigned to one of 3 possible 
conditions: thirsty, quenched, or control. To those assigned to the 
thirsty or quenched conditions, the experimenter explained that in this 
taste testing study actual taste experiences would be evaluated. For  
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this reason, participants would be asked consume a food product and 
describe their reaction to it along a number of dimensions.  
All participants were seated at one end of a cubicle across from 
a table. A number of objects were located on the wall opposite to where 
participants were seated including a far side poster, letters and 
numbers cut from construction paper, a foil doily, a bumper sticker, 
and other objects approximately 4-6-inches in height and width. All 
objects were clearly visible on the wall, although no explanation was 
given nor did any participants ask why they were secured to the wall. 
Participants (n = 24) assigned to the thirsty condition were 
presented with the same serving size of Bavarian-style pretzel bits and 
same instructions as Study 3. Participants (n = 23) randomly assigned 
to the quenched condition were presented with 4 glasses of water and 
the same instructions as Study 3. On the table in front of participants 
sat an unopened bottle of water 53-in away from the edge of the table.  
While consuming their food product, participants provided 
background information about themselves including the amount of 
time since they last ate and drank any beverage. In addition, 
participants evaluated the product by indicating how much they were 
enjoying it and to what extent would they prefer a different brand.  
After finishing their food product or when they indicated that 
they could not consume any more, participants estimated the distance 
between themselves and an object on the table. In this study, we gave 
participants a ball of string and asked them to estimate the distance 
between themselves and the object by pulling off a piece of string until 
the length of the string equaled the distance that separated themselves  
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from the object. We also included the self-reported distance 
measurement used in the previous studies whereby participants write 
down the number of inches that separate themselves from the object.  
After making this distance estimate, participants indicated how 
thirsty they felt on a 1-7 scale where higher numbers represented 
greater thirst. Secondly, participants indicated on a 1-7 scale how 
appealing the bottle of water was and their general opinion about the 
bottle where higher numbers indicated more positive impressions. 
  Participants (n = 23) randomly assigned to the control condition 
did not consume any food product. Instead, they completed the same 
survey as in Study 3. After these time estimates, control participants 
estimated the distance between themselves and an object by using the 
string method. However, in this condition, participants estimated the 
distance to a can opener and not a bottle of water.  
After completing these measures, participants in all conditions 
were moved to a separate cubicle to complete a memory test. On a 
15in iBook, participants were shown photographs of a number of 
objects, some of which were located in the cubicle they just occupied 
while others were foils. Participants indicated as quickly and as 
accurately as possible whether the exact object that appeared on the 
computer was located in the cubicle from which they were just moved. 
After indicating whether each object was or was not in the space, 
participants were debriefed and escorted from the lab. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
Participants in the thirsty, quenched, and control conditions  
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and did not differ in how long it has been since they drank any 
beverage, F < 1. Importantly, feelings of thirst depended upon 
condition, F(2, 68) = 62.09, p < .001. Participants in the thirsty 
condition indicated stronger feelings of thirst (M = 5.9) than 
participants in the control (M = 4.3) and quenched conditions (M = 
1.3).   
Distance estimates 
  First, the rank order of distance estimates using the string 
method depended upon condition, χ2(2) = 5.91, p = .05. We expected 
that thirsty participants would see the object on the table as closer 
than did control participants while quenched participants would see 
the object as further away than do control participants. To test this 
specific prediction, we conducted a linear contrast with a weight of -1 
to the rank order of estimates from the thirsty group, 0 to estimates 
from the control participants, and +1 to estimates from the quenched 
group. Our specific prediction was confirmed by this linear contrast, 
t(64) = 2.44, p = .02. Using the string method, thirsty participants 
estimated that the bottle of water was 54.7-in away, while control 
participants estimated that the object was 64.2-in away. However, 
quenched participants saw the bottle as 63.7-in away. 
  We also tested distance estimates offered when participants 
reported the number of inches that separated themselves and the 
object. Although we expected the same pattern of results as when 
using the string method, we found that this was not the case, χ2(2) = 
4.41, p = .11. The linear contrast described in the preceding paragraph 
was not, significant t(68) = .72, p = .48. Thirsty participants estimated  
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the distance was 45.8-in, control participants estimated it was 50.5-in, 
and quenched participants estimated it was 42.6-in. We suspect that 
the pattern of results using the string method and self-report method 
differ because of the number of inches away from the participant the 
object actually was. In this study compared to the previous ones, the 
object of interest was 1.9 times further away thus increasing the 
variance of reported responses.  
Objects’ desirability 
  As expected, ratings of desirability varied by condition, F(1, 67) = 
12.53, p < .001. We expected that thirsty participants would see the 
object as more desirable than did control participants while quenched 
participants would rate the object as the least desirable. To test this 
specific prediction, we conducted a linear contrast with a weight of +1 
to ratings from the thirsty group, 0 to ratings from the control 
participants, and -1 to ratings from the quenched group. This contrast 
confirmed our prediction, t(67) = 4.72, p < .001. Thirsty participants 
saw the bottle of water as more desirable (M = 5.1) than control 
participants rating the can opener (M = 3.6) and quenched participants 
rating the water bottle (M = 3.2).  
Strength of attitude as a predictor of distance estimates 
We offered additional evidence to refute the alternative that 
objects toward which individuals hold strong attitudes are more likely 
to attract attention (Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992). To do this, we 
computed a difference score that represented the strength of the 
attitude participants held about the object by taking the absolute 
value after subtracting the midpoint 4 labeled as “no opinion” from the  
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average desire scores. Strength of attitude depended upon thirst 
condition, F(2, 67) = 11.57, p < .001. Thirsty participants held a 
stronger attitude towards the object than did control participants, t(45) 
= 4.65, p < .001. However, quenched participants also held a stronger 
attitude than did control participants, t(45) = 2.22, p = .03. Counter to 
the alternative explanation, strength of attitude did not predict 
distance estimates using the string method, r(66) = -.16, p = .20. In 
addition, this relationship was not significant in any of the individual 
thirst conditions, p’s > .20.    
Focus of attention 
After estimating distance and evaluating the object, participants 
were moved from the cubicle that contained the object. In a separate 
space, participants performed an object recognition task that assessed 
their memory for items on the wall beyond the object. First, accuracy 
in recognizing objects that were in fact on the wall behind the target 
object depended upon condition, F(2, 68) = 2.45, p = .09. Thirsty 
participants accurately recognized 19% of objects on the wall, control 
participants 14%, and quenched participants 12%.  
However, we were more interested in the specific location of the 
objects that participants remembered. In particular, we expected that 
thirsty participants would focus their attention on the water bottle and 
as a result would be more likely to remember objects that were closer 
to the water bottle and less likely to remember objects that were 
further away from the water bottle. We expected that control and 
quenched participants would not have their attention as narrowly   
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focused on the target object, thus this pattern for location-based 
memory should not hold for these two groups.  
We computed a memory score for each participant to compare 
location advantages. First, we divided the space around the target 
object into thirds. Objects located within a radius of 13-in from the 
target object were considered the close objects. Objects falling within a 
radius of 13 and 26 -in away from the target object were considered 
middle objects. Objects falling within a radius of 26 to 40-in away from 
the target object were considered far objects. Although ideally objects 
located in each of the 3 spaces would be equally attention-holding and 
equally memorable, that was not the case. Instead, regardless of thirst 
condition, objects on the wall were more memorable in certain 
locations over others, F(2, 140) = 6.89, p = .02. When collapsing across 
thirst conditions, accuracy was highest for mid objects (M = 56%), 
lowest for far objects (M = 43%), with accuracy for close objects falling 
between these two other locations (M = 48%). This is most likely the 
result of object-specific advantages. A few objects in the mid radius 
were quite colorful and easy to label. 
We created an index score to let us investigate the relative 
advantage of location within each thirst condition. The index score we 
computed controlled for an overall location advantage and our analysis 
controlled for thirsty participants’ overall memory advantage. 
Specifically, to compute the memory index, we took the raw number of 
accurate object recognitions in each of 3 locations for each participant 
and subtracted from that the grand mean number of objects that were 
accurately recognized in each of these 3 locations collapsing across  
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thirst condition. This difference takes into account the confounding 
effect of ease of identification, labeling, and memory for objects in each 
of the 3 locations. Then, because the number of objects that fell into 
each location varied, we divided this difference score by the number of 
objects in each location. The resulting index score allows us to make 
meaningful comparisons among the 3 location areas. This index score 
represents the relative advantage of location that can be compared 
across locations and among conditions (see Table 4.1).  
  We made the specific prediction that the index score for thirsty 
participants should be highest for close objects followed by decreased 
memory for mid object and even greater decrease for far objects. 
However, this predicted contrast should not hold for either control or 
quenched participants. To test this specific prediction, we applied the 
following weights to individual participants’ index scores to compute  
 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Participants’ Memory Index Score in Each Location and Overall Weighted 
Index Score Representing Close Object Memory Advantage 
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Thirsty   
  .16  .04  .06  .21 
 
Control 
  -.08  -.07  -.07  -.02 
 
Quenched 
  -.08  .02  .01  -.19 
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an overall index measure of the advantage in memory for close objects: 
+2 to the index score associated with close objects, -1 to the index for 
mid objects, and -1 to the index for far objects (see Table 4.1). Once we 
computed this single, overall weighted index of advantage for close 
objects for each participant, we performed a linear contrast predicting 
that this overall weighted index of close object advantage should be 
highest for thirsty participants, smaller for control participants, and 
smallest for quenched participants. Thus we assigned a weight of +1 to 
the overall weighted index of close object advantage for thirsty 
participants, 0 to the advantage index for control participants, and -1 
to the advantage index for quenched participants. This linear contrast 
confirmed our prediction, t(68) = 2.29, p = .03.  
As additional confirmation of thirsty participants’ memory 
advantage for close as opposed to far objects in comparison to the 
advantage held by participants in either of the two other conditions, 
we ran 3 separate linear contrasts—one for each of the 3 conditions. 
We assigned weights of +2 to the index score for close objects and -1 
for index scores for mid and far objects and applied these weights to 
the memory scores for each thirst condition. As expected, the linear 
contrast for thirsty participants was marginally significant, t(69) = 
1.90, p = .06, and not significant for either the control condition, t(69) 
= -.29, p = .77, or quenched condition, t(66) = -1.50, p = .14. This 
pattern of index scores and the 3 contrasts together suggest that 
thirsty participants had a memory advantage for close objects relative   
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to both mid and far objects, but this same advantage was not present 
for control or quenched participants. 
Study 5A: Asking If Desire Narrows Self-Reported Focus of 
Attention 
We wanted to test for the mediating role of focus of attention in 
distance perception. Because our proposed mediator, the diameter of 
one’s focus of attention, is difficult to measure but easy to manipulate, 
we decided to follow the advice of Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005) 
who recommended using an experimental chain design in just these 
circumstances. Chain designs utilize several studies to examine a 
psychological process by manipulating both the independent variable 
and the mediating variable. Step one is to show that the independent 
variable influences the mediator; step two is to show that when the 
mediator is experimentally manipulated, it will exert an influence on 
the dependent variable. Because it calls upon experiments to 
demonstrate causality, researchers can make stronger, more 
appropriate claims about the psychological process than with 
mediational analyses.  
Studies 5A and 5B in combination tested this mechanistic 
chain. Study 5A demonstrated that perceivers reported a more 
narrowed focus of attention on objects that they found desirable, and 
objective measures of attention confirmed these self-reports. This first 
leg of the experimental chain established a relationship between our 
independent variable, amount of desire produced as a result of a need 
state, and our mediator, focus of attention. Study 5B, showed that 
when assigned to narrowly focus attention on an object rather than  
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adopting an expansive focus of attention, objects appear closer on 
objective measures of distance. This second leg of the chain 
established a relationship between our mediator and the dependent 
measure, objective perception of distance. 
Participants 
  40 Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for $3.   
Procedure 
Students participated in what was ostensibly a marketing survey 
asking for their opinions about various products. To those randomly 
assigned to the thirsty condition, the experimenter explained that in 
this taste testing study actual taste experiences would be evaluated. 
For this reason, participants would be asked consume a food product 
and describe their reaction to it along a number of dimensions. 
Participants (n = 20) assigned to the thirsty condition were presented 
with the same serving of Bavarian-style pretzel bits as in Study 3 and 
the same instructions. Participants (n = 20) randomly assigned to the 
control condition did not eat anything but instead completed a survey 
that asked for their opinions of various products that were not related 
to any particular food product. Within this marketing survey, 
participants provided background information about themselves 
including the amount of time that since they last drank any beverage. 
Near the end of all participants’ survey but importantly after the 
thirsty group finished consuming the pretzels, participants indicated 
on a 1-7 Likert scale how thirsty they felt where higher numbers 
represented greater thirst.  
After consuming the pretzels and completing the marketing  
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survey, participants were moved to cubicle. For all participants, a 
number of objects were located on the walls of the cubicle including a 
poster of the Cornell campus, a poster of a tropical island, far side 
cartoons, among others. Participants were seated at one end of the 
cubicle at the end of a long table. At the other end of the table, 65-in 
away from the participant, sat an object. For half of the participants, 
the object at the end of the table was an 8-ounce bottle of name brand 
spring water. The other half of participants saw a control object at the 
end of the table—namely, a can opener. Object type was crossed with 
the thirst manipulation resulting in a 2 (thirsty, control) X 2 (water 
bottle, can opener) factorial.  
While seated across from the object, participants were asked a 
series of questions about this object that measured how desirable the 
object was and how focused participants’ attention was on the object. 
To measure desire, participants indicated on a 1-7 Likert scale how 
positive, appealing, tempting, and attractive they felt the object was. 
These 4 ratings were averaged together to form a single measure of 
desirability (α = .88). To measure self-reported focus of attention, 
participants indicated on a 1-7 Likert scale how attention-capturing 
and eye-catching the object was in addition to how fixated and focused 
they were on the object. These 4 ratings were averaged to form a single 
measure of self-reported focus (α = .83). 
After rating the object on theses dimensions, participants were 
moved to another cubicle where they completed an object recognition 
task. On a 15-inch iBook, participants were shown photographs of a 
number of objects, some of which were located in the cubicle they just  
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occupied while others were foils. Participants indicated as quickly and 
as accurately as possible whether the exact object that appeared on 
the computer was located in the cubicle from which they were just 
moved. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
After consuming their product, participants in the thirst 
condition indicated stronger feelings of thirst (M = 6.2) than 
participants in the control condition (M = 4.7), F(1, 35) = 16.65, p < 
.001.  
Focus of attention 
  Again, we expected that participants would report having their 
attention focused the most on the object when that object was a water 
bottle rather than a can opener and when participants were thirsty 
rather than when in the control condition. To test the prediction that 
focus of attention would depend upon participants’ thirst and the 
target object, we ran a 2 (condition: thirsty, control) X 2 (object: water 
bottle, can opener) factorial on the averaged measure of self-reported 
focus. As expected, the interaction between these 2 factors was 
significant, F(1, 36) = 6.96, p = .01. Thirsty participants reported 
focusing their attention more on the bottle of water (M = 4.5) than did 
control participants (M = 3.3), t (18) = 2.46, p = .03. Thirsty and control 
participants did not differ in how much they reported being focused on 
the can opener (M = 2.2, 2.8 respectively), t(18) = 1.33, p = .20. 
Objects’ desirability 
  We expected that while the water bottle might be rated as more  
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desirable than the can opener given the colorful label, etc., the visceral 
feeling of thirst would increase the desirability of the object when the 
object was a bottle of water rather than a can opener. To test the 
specific prediction that desirability of the object would be greatest 
when the object was a bottle of water and the participants most 
thirsty, we ran linear contrast assigning the weights of +3 to the 
desirability ratings of the thirsty group rating the water bottle, and -1 
to the 3 remaining conditions of the factorial. As expected, the linear 
contrast predicting greatest reports of desirability by the thirsty group 
exposed to the water bottle was significant, t(36) = 3.48, p < .001. 
Thirsty participants saw the bottle of water as more desirable (M = 5.6) 
than the can opener (M = 2.8) and as more desirable than did control 
participants evaluating the water bottle (M = 5.1) or the can opener (M 
= 3.5).  
Mediation by objects’ desirability 
  If it is the case that perceivers’ motivational states increases the 
desirability an object holds which leads to a narrowed focus of 
attention on that desirable object, then we should find that desire 
mediated the relationship between thirst condition and focus of 
attention. To test this prediction, we conducted a mediational analysis 
using procedures outlined by Baron & Kenny (1986). First, we coded 
the control participants exposed to the can opener as 1, thirsty 
participants exposed to the can opener as 2, control participants 
exposed to the water bottle as 3, and thirsty participants exposed to 
the water bottle as 4. Condition, as coded by the above method, 
significantly predicted participants’ ratings of object desirability (B =  
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.85, SE = .19, p < .001). In addition, participants’ ratings of desire 
significantly predicted focus of attention (B = .60, SE = .09, p < .001). 
Finally, when both condition and desirability were included in the 
same equation predicting focus of attention, the former dropped to 
nonsignificance, and the latter remained significant (B = .17, SE = .16, 
p = .30, and B = .53, SE = .11, p < .001). Results of the Sobel (1982) 
test confirmed the significance of this mediated relationship (Z = 3.28, 
p = .001). 
Recognition of target object 
  As a second measure of focus of attention, we had participants 
perform an object recognition task on the computer where participants 
needed to indicate as quickly as possible whether the exact object that 
appeared on the screen was located in the cubicle from which they 
were just moved. Although the overall rate of accuracy rate for 
correctly responding yes to objects that were in the space and no to 
foils was 72%, there were no differences among conditions in 
accurately responding that the target object was in fact located in the 
space, χ2(3) = 2.11, p = .55. Of both thirsty participants identifying the 
water bottle and the control group identifying the can opener, 90% (n = 
9 in each) accurately indicated that the object was located in the space 
while 100% of participants in the two remaining conditions (n = 10 in 
each) did so as well.   
  However, of greater interest in the speed with which participants 
are able to identify the object. Given the skewed nature of the reaction 
times, we ran our analyses on the natural log transformation. However 
we report the back-transformed means for ease of presentation. Faster  
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speeds at identifying the target object, we argue, is a proxy for a 
greater focus of attention on the object as faster response times 
indicates increased accessibility that is the product of the greater 
amount of attentional focus. In fact, the speed at which participants 
recognize the target object correlates negatively with self-reported 
focus of attention, r(40) =  -.31, p = .05.  
A priori, we made the prediction that thirsty participants who 
viewed the water bottle would be faster than any other group of 
participants when controlling for overall reaction times to other 
accurately identified objects. To test this specific prediction we ran a 
linear contrast assigning weights of -3 to reaction times from the 
thirsty group viewing the water bottle and +1 to all other groups and 
included the covariate described above. To control for reaction time 
differences among conditions that result from different states of 
arousal, we used as a covariate the time it took participants to 
accurately indicate that other objects were in fact in the room and that 
foils were not in the room. Our prediction was confirmed by this linear 
contrast, t(35) = 2.21, p = .03. In particular, thirsty participants 
indicated the water bottle was in the room in 1394 msec. Thirsty 
participants indicated the can opener was in the room in 2881 msec. 
Control participants indicated the water bottle was in the room in 
2204 msec and the can opener in 2262 msec. 
Study 5B: Manipulating Breadth of Attention 
  Study 5A suggested that desirability led to a narrowed reported 
and actual focus of attention on the object. Study 5B investigated the 
consequences of focus of attention on perception of distance. In this  
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study, we manipulated focus of attention by asking participants to 
adopt narrow or expansive spans of attention and investigated 
differences in perceptions of distance to a desirable object. We 
predicted that when adopting a narrowed focus of attention, distance 
to a desirable object would appear shorter than when adopting an 
expansive focus of attention. 
Participants 
  Forty Cornell undergraduates participated in exchange for extra 
credit.   
Procedure 
Students participated in what was ostensibly a marketing survey 
asking for their opinions about various products. The experimenter 
explained that this was a study about first impressions of freshly 
baked cookies before they were consumed. On the far end of a long 
table 65-in from participants, a toaster oven was baking 2 chocolate 
chip cookies as participants heard this description. To those randomly 
assigned to the focused condition (n = 20), the experimenter explained 
that the participant should focus his or her attention on the cookies 
that were baking in the oven. They were reminded to look up as 
frequently as possible so as to remind themselves of the sights and 
smells of the cookies. Because this was a marketing study, the 
experimenter explained participants needed to be as familiar with the 
product as possible outside of having a tasting experience. At several 
points in the marketing survey, participants were instructed to look up 
and look directly at the cookies baking in the oven.  
To those randomly assigned to the expanded attention condition  
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(n = 20), the experimenter explained that participants needed to make 
sure to take in their surroundings. In the real world, people would not 
form opinions about products in such a small office space. Instead, 
people would be in a large grocery store or a big kitchen with lots of 
merchandise surrounding them. Because of this, participants were 
asked to look up as frequently as possible to take in the information 
around them. Participants were directed to look at the walls to their 
left and right, straight ahead, and up and down. By looking around 
and taking in more information, the experimenter explained it is 
possible to mimic a real world experience. Again, at several points in 
the marketing survey, participants were instructed to glance up from 
their packet to look around them. For all participants, a number of 
objects were located on the walls of the cubicle including a poster of 
the Cornell campus, a poster of a tropical island, far side cartoons, etc. 
All participants completed what was ostensibly a marketing 
survey. In this survey, participants provided background information 
about themselves including the amount of time since they last ate or 
drank anything. Participants answered a number of filler questions, 
embedded within which were 2 prompts to either look up at the 
cookies or to look around themselves at their surroundings. 
Immediately following the second of such prompts, participants were 
asked to estimate the distance between themselves and the oven 
baking cookies. Participants saw a horizontal line on the page that was 
labeled as 1-in in length meant as a frame of reference. Participants 
estimated the distance between themselves and the oven by writing 
down the number of inches that separated themselves from the oven.   
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As an additional measure of distance estimates, a subset of the 
total sample was asked to rate the subjective size of the oven. Closer 
objects that are closer appear larger while objects further away appear 
smaller. Thus, if the oven feels closer, it should also feel larger than 
when the object feels further away. To test this subjective size estimate 
as an additional measure of perceptions of the distance that separates 
oneself from the oven, 32 participants indicated on a 1-7 Likert scale 
how big the oven felt where higher numbers indicated larger subjective 
estimates of the oven’s size.  
After completing the marketing survey, participants were moved 
to another cubicle where they completed an object recall task. 
Participants were asked to write down all of the items that they 
remember seeing in the cubicle from which they were just moved. We 
used the object recall task as a manipulation check to ensure 
participants either focused their attention on the oven or looked 
around the space as instructed. 
Results 
Manipulation checks 
As expected, participants in the focused condition remembered 
fewer items on the walls of the cubicle (M = 2.2) than did those in the 
expansive attention condition (M = 6.3), t(38) = 4.88, p < .001. 
Participants in the focused and expansive attention conditions did not 
differ in how long it has been since they last ate or drank or their 
subjective feelings of hunger or thirst, t’s < 1, p’s > .40.  
Distance estimates 
  In this study, distance estimates were roughly normally  
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distributed. As a result, we conducted analyses on the non-
transformed data1. We expected that participants who were focused on 
the oven with cookies would see the oven as closer than did 
participants in the expansive focus condition. As expected, 
participants estimated that the oven was closer in the focused 
condition (M = 36.7-in) than those in the expansive attention condition 
(M = 43.1-in), t(38) = 2.30, p = .03.  
  As an additional measure of distance estimates, we asked 
participants to report on a 1-7 scale how big the oven baking the 
cookies felt. The means suggest that participants who were focused on 
the oven tended to indicate that the oven felt larger (M = 5.5) than 
participants who looked around the room (M = 4.6), t(30) = 1.88, p = 
.07 
General Discussion 
  Although Johnny Nash claims to “see clearly now,” rarely are 
perceivers capable of seeing the world around them without bias. We 
asked if motivations might be one source of influence clouding 
perceptual experiences. We asked if motivations extend down to basic 
perceptual processes. Across these studies, we provided convergent 
evidence suggesting that desires lead perceivers to see what they want 
to see in their visual environment—to focus their attention on objects 
of their desire. We then went on to examine the downstream 
consequences of this narrowed focus of attention on perception of 
                                                 
1 For the sake of consistency, we also conducted an analysis on the 
distance estimates using a Mann-Whitney test of the ranks. This 
analysis also supports our prediction, however marginally so, U = 
133.5, p = .068.  
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distance, an element of nature with which perceptual systems should 
be well-acquainted. 
Study 1A provided initial evidence that distances to desired 
objects such as chocolate are seen as shorter than distances to a 
neutral object. In study 1B, we argue that it is not the case that an 
object that commands a strong attitude, regardless of valence. Even 
though people held a marginally stronger attitude towards feces, 
chocolates were seen as seen as closer. In addition, we gathered 
distance estimates by relying on nonverbal, perceptual measurement 
techniques. In Study 1B, participants physically moved their body so 
that the distance between themselves and the object was equal to the 
set distance they were asked to estimate. In Study 4, we gathered 
distance estimates using another type of nonverbal, perceptual 
measurement technique where participants pulled off a piece of string 
from a roll until the length of the string equaled the distance that 
separated themselves from the object. 
Study 2 replicated this basic pattern but captured people’s 
naturally occurring state of hunger as they entered a dining hall. In 
this study, we accounted for an alternative explanation that any object 
regardless of its desirability will appear closer when a perceiver is in a 
state of arousal such as hunger. In studies 3 and 4, we manipulated 
participants’ visceral need to satisfy thirst expecting that this state will 
influence the desirability of the same object. We found that visceral 
states lead to decreased estimates of distance only to objects that 
might satisfy that need. Across these studies, participants estimated 
that the objective distance separating themselves from the more  
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desired object was smaller than the distance to a less desired object.  
In addition, we offered evidence that motivation influences 
perception through expansiveness of attention. Study 4 provided initial 
evidence that a narrowed focus of attention on the desired object was 
associated with reduced distance estimates. Studies 5A and 5B use an 
experimental chain methodology to further confirm that desire leads to 
decreased perceptions of distance. Study 5A demonstrated that 
visceral states lead to changes in the ratings of an object’s desirability 
which narrows the focus of attention on that object. Study 5B 
continued by demonstrating that when attention is narrowed as 
opposed to expanded on a toaster oven baking fresh chocolate chip 
cookies, perceptions of distance decrease. In short, perceivers tended 
to focus their attention on desired objects resulting in decreased 
perceptions of distance. 
Alternative Accounts 
A critic might argue that the paradigms we used took advantage 
of psychological processes other than motivation that could influence 
participants’ estimates of distance. First, one could argue that we 
selected objects that differed objectively in the strength that was 
associated with that object regardless of whether the attitude was 
positive or negative (Roskos-Ewoldsen & Fazio, 1992). We, however, 
controlled for this possibility. In Study 1B, participants estimated the 
distance to chocolates that were pretested to be objectively positive or 
to dog feces pretested to be objectively and not just relatively negative. 
That is, both objects held a strong affective charge and were equally 
attention-holding to pretest participants. In fact, perceivers held  
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marginally stronger attitudes towards feces in comparison to the 
chocolates, yet it was the chocolates that appeared closer.  
Study 4 offered additional evidence that refutes this alternative. 
The strength of perceivers’ attitude towards the target object did not 
predict distance estimates. That is, the correlation between strength of 
perceivers’ attitudes did not significantly correlate with their distance 
estimates when collapsing across condition or when looking at the 
simple correlations within each of the visceral states conditions. Thus, 
attitude strength is not a viable alternative explanation for the biased 
distance estimates we observed. 
  Second, a critic may argue that inducing a state of arousal in 
perceivers by, for instance, making them exceptionally thirsty, would 
lead to shorter distance estimates not just to the object of their desire 
such as a water bottle, but to any object that was the focus of 
attention. If pushed for a rationale, this critic might offer the mildly 
supported proposition that the ability to describe peripheral features of 
a scene when engaged in a weapon focus scenario increases when in 
states of low versus high arousal (see metaanalysis by Steblay, 1992). 
That is, when in high-arousal, perceivers focus more on the central 
target item, a weapon in a crime scene, than when in states of low-
arousal. Thus, inducing arousal might focus perceivers’ attention on 
central rather than peripheral items. It may not be desire, per say, but 
arousal that biases distance perception. 
  Our data argue against this general arousal alternative. In Study 
3, we employ a fully crossed design such that participants 
experiencing hunger as they enter a dining hall at dinner estimate the  
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distance to either 2 slices of pizza or a control object. The data 
indicates that distances appeared shorter to the hungry group only 
when they estimated the distance to pizza and not the control object. 
In addition, Study 5A employed a similar factorial design and showed 
that the visceral state of thirst focuses attention only on an object that 
could satisfy thirst and not a control object. These data argue against 
the alternative that arousal focuses attention on any object, which 
then decreases distance estimates.  
  A harsh critic, though, might argue that arousal is not just a 
product of the visceral state. Instead, this critic might argue that 
arousal is maximal when experiencing the visceral state while being 
exposed to the object of a perceiver’s desire. That is, the most aroused 
participants in our studies are those that are thirsty and are 
estimating the distance to a bottle of water they have been told not to 
consume. Although our data cannot speak to these various levels of 
arousal a thirsty or hungry perceiver might experience, we contend 
that arousal is still not a viable alternative. Certainly, fear is a state in 
which physiological markers of arousal are heightened and will 
increase when exposed to the feared object. For instance, worrying 
about the possibility of seeing a alligator while canoeing 6-inches 
above water in murky Florida swamps certainly will make the heart 
beat faster and blood pressure rise, all while perspiration and 
respiration increase. Importantly, these signs of arousal will increase 
dramatically if a snout and 2 yellowy eyes rise above the water’s 
surface.  
  However, unlike the state of fear with all its physiological  
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markers of arousal, thirst and hunger do not manifest themselves in 
the same manner. The state of thirst can increase without 
accompanying rises in these markers of arousal as they are controlled 
by different mechanisms (Messing & Campbell, 1971). When people 
have been deprived of hunger, systolic blood pressure, pulse, and 
respiration do not increase but instead decrease (Engel, 1959). In 
addition, physiological markers of anxiety have been well-documented 
using animal models. For instance, the heart rate and bar-pressing 
behaviors of thirsty rats suggested that thirsty rats will press a bar to 
receive water, but heart rate was uncorrelated with thirst (Hahn, 
Stern, & Fehr, 1964).  
  We cannot address whether a thirsty participant who sees a 
water bottle is more aroused than a thirsty participant with a can 
opener. However, this literature suggests that hunger and thirst are 
states that do not reliably manifest themselves by physiological 
markers of arousal that would lead to the perceptual biases we 
observed. Hunger and thirst do not produce states of physiological 
arousal such as anxiety, increased heart rate, increased pulse, etc. 
that would lead to a heightened focus on a target item. Therefore, we 
contend that our experimental designs and the state of the literature 
argue against arousal as an alternative explanation for biased 
perceptual experiences of distance.  
Notes on the Mechanism Underlying Biased Perception   
  These studies left open one ambiguity about motivated distance 
perception that future work could profitably address. In Study 1B, we 
found that people tended to see the less desired object, the dog feces,  
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as further away than the pleasant object, the chocolates. We can ask if 
this bias arose because perceivers’ motivational state was an 
“approach” one, facilitating processes associated with seeing a desired 
object as closer, or a “avoidance” one, facilitating processes that could 
lead perceivers to see the less desired object as further away. Although 
we did not explicitly test the role of avoidance motives, future work 
could potentially tease apart whether the phenomenon we uncovered 
is one in which people are biased toward seeing wanted stimuli or 
against seeing unwanted stimuli as closer.  
In testing approach and avoidance motivations, future work 
might also provide empirical support for an adaptive motivational 
regulatory system we proposed early in this paper. Again, we 
suggested that motivations might restore or top off energy reserves to 
encourage action meant to approach and reach a desired goal. To 
accomplish this, motivations might also trick the perceptual system to 
convince it that a desired object is close enough to be considered 
reachable. By investigating the interaction between approach and 
avoidance motivations and the functional value of reaching a target 
object, future work might better understand how motivations regulate 
action via perception.  
Where Does the Bias Reside in the Perceptual System? 
We argue that desire led to a narrowed focus of attention on the 
object of desire even when information in the visual array was quite 
plentiful. Although we did point out the target object to participants, 
we do not think such a step is necessary when motivations, and in 
particular desires, are involved. Desires themselves, and not  
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necessarily the experimenters’ statements that directed attention to 
the target object, might influence the expansiveness of perceivers’ 
attentional spotlight. Upon entering into a state of desire such as 
thirst, perceivers may begin scanning the environment, consciously or 
nonconsciously, for objects that might satisfy their desire. When 
finding that such an object is present in the environment, desires 
might constrict the focus of attention to just that object. However, if a 
scan of the environment suggests that no such object exists, attention 
may remain expansive. Although we have demonstrated that desires 
influence the narrowness of perceivers focus, it may be the case that 
in fact motivations enter into the perceptual process at an earlier 
stage. 
This question about the stage at which higher-order influences 
mold perceptual processes became a major theoretical battle in the 
New Look period of psychology in the 1940s. Critics of New Look 
research argue that higher-order constraints influence not basic 
perception but rather later stages of the perceptual processes that 
could be termed “post-perceptual” or “perceptual decision making” 
(Pylyshyn, 1999). However, asserting that part of the perceptual 
system is sealed off from higher-order influences is litigious (see the 
commentaries that accompany Pylyshyn, 1999). Recent evidence 
posits that higher-order processes penetrate very early stages of 
perception. For instance, Muller, Bartelt, Donner, Villringer, & Brandt 
(2003) observed with fMRI that the higher order constraint attention 
and not eye movements could modulate processing in V1, V2, primary 
visual cortex, and V4 (see also Meng & Tong, 2004).   
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Our work will not put this issue to rest, but it does suggest that 
the impact of motivation may not be limited only to later stages of 
perception but might instead extend to earlier and more primitive 
tasks the perceptual system utilizes such as the narrowness of 
attention’s focus. Future work could examine when motivational 
influences, like other higher-order factors, have an impact on 
perception. Such a question would be relevant not only to work on 
motivation, but also to work on other higher-order constructs (e.g., 
stereotypes, expectations, frames) that have been at the focus of social 
cognitive work. 
When does one wear black-tinted or rose-colored glasses? 
We argued that attention is allocated preferentially to positive 
rather than to negative information. However, literature and theory 
suggests an alternative view that being prepared to ward off dangers is 
generally more important for the survival than making use of 
opportunities (see Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Thus, attention should be 
allocated to negative stimuli (see, e.g., Hansen & Hansen, 1988, 1994; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Pratto & 
John, 1991). For instance, it would be imperative for a backpacker to 
take notice of the hungry grizzly bear unsuccessfully fishing for 
salmon just upriver from his camp. One might ask how we resolve this 
seeming discrepancy between our work demonstrating that people see 
what they want to see and a negativity bias in perceptual attention 
that pervades much of judgment and decision-making.  
We suggest that perceptual systems are not simply 
computational machines that are insensitive to situational constraints,  
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differential consequences, or social influences. Instead, perceptual 
systems might be differentially sensitive to positive information for the 
following reasons. First, if the consequences of misperceiving an 
object, particularly a negative one, are low, then allocating resources 
to gain rewards might outweigh the costs of attending to a negative 
stimulus. For instance, failing to see a bag of trash may not be as 
egregious an oversight as failing to notice an edible sandwich when 
hungry. Second, the goals of the perceiver might dictate when positive 
information will be treated in a preferential manner to negative 
information. Consider a situation when one’s acceptance in a social 
group has been threatened. Noticing the smiling face of a sympathetic 
other may be more important than noticing the neutral or frowning 
faces of the ostracizing group. 
In addition to the cost benefit ratio and the goals of a perceiver, 
allocation of attention to positive or negative information can be 
predicted by personality traits. For instance, populations of people 
suffering from anxiety attend to personally threatening rather than 
neutral information (Pineles & Mineka, 2005). Optimists show 
attentional biases towards positive information (Segerstrom, 2001) as 
they are less likely to look first to and spend less time processing 
negative images (Isaacowitz, 2005). By examining the characteristics of 
the situation a perceiver experiences, their temporary goals, and 
chronic motivations, we might better predict when negative 
information will dominate perceptual processing and when people will 
see what they want to see.   
In addition to their general disposition, people’s reactions to  
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objects might predict when perceptual systems will be guided by 
wishful thinking rather than negativity dominance. A bowl of chocolate 
truffles provokes a different reaction than a freshly collected sample of 
dog feces, which will provoke a different reaction than a snake 
glistening in his warm, humid tank. Although the truffles will be seen 
as pleasant, desirable, or tempting, the feces will most likely be 
considered disgusting and the snake terrifying.  
These object-specific reactions might be the predictive force that 
reconciles the positivity-negativity dominance debate within motivated 
perception. People may see what they wish to see unless the 
alternative is an object that requires immediate attention in order to 
successfully navigate one’s world. If an alligator lays waiting in the 
marsh as a boater takes her canoe out for a morning paddle, that 
boater might be best served by noticing, attending to, and correctly 
identifying the reptile so that she might take the actions necessary to 
stay out of harms way. Alternatively, disgusting objects are less likely 
to require immediate action. To successfully navigate a refrigerator 
that contains leftover rigatoni a la vodka 3-weeks past its prime, the 
hungry graduate student does not need to have her attention fixated 
upon the foil-covered takeout box. In fact, her appetite and intestinal 
track might be better served by her failure to notice the takeout box at 
all. Thus, people may wear rose-colored glasses while surveying their 
surroundings unless its contents contain objects that must be 
attended to in order to ensure safety and well-being. 
In fact, disgust-induced blindness and fear-induced vigilance are 
supported by physiological differences in the body’s reactions to these  
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two emotions. As measured by neuroendocrine stress responses, 
disgust lowers blood pressure and cortisol levels while fear increases 
blood pressure and cortisol (Lerner, Gonzalez, Dahl, Hariri, & Taylor, 
2005). Arguably, increased blood pressure and the hormonal marker 
of stress, cortisol, suggest the body and the perceptual system is 
prepared to take action. These biological markers suggest that 
although both disgust and fear are aversive states of arousal, fear is a 
motivating force that promotes action and, we argue, engages the 
perceptual system, demanding processing resources. Increased blood 
pressure and stress hormones may be the proximal mechanism by 
which perceptual systems attend to the fear-inducing object over a less 
aversive possibility.  
Final note  
  If the world is really seen through the heart’s eye, perhaps 
Christopher Ray was correct to remind us that “perception is merely 
reality filtered through the prism of your soul.” The submission of this 
statement certainly begs one to ask how much of the real world does 
one really know, how much is one really aware of? If the answers to 
these questions suggest a less accurate representation, then one must 
ask, to what extent does one view the world through the eyes of 
accuracy as opposed to rose-colored glasses?  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FETTERS OF ONE’S DESIRES: A SYNOPSIS  
OF MOTIVATED PERCEPTION 
There are times when one’s view of the world is indistinct. In 
October 1995, African American Johnny Gammage drove a Jaguar 
sedan through a nearly all-white Pittsburgh suburb of Brentwood in 
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. He was pulled over by 3 Caucasian 
police officers for allegedly driving erratically. During what the police 
report was a scuffle, Gammage was suffocated on the pavement 
through excessive force on his back and neck. The officers testified 
that they saw Gammage emerge from his vehicle carrying a gun. This 
item was later confirmed to be a cellular phone. After 2 mistrials all 
officers were acquitted (Jenkins, 1995).  
In 1972, Eastern Air Lines Flight 401 prepared to land in Miami, 
Florida when the pilot and crew became distracted by a non-
functioning gear light flashing on the control panel. While pre-
occupied with fixing the light, the autopilot was inadvertently 
disengaged. The pilot and his fellow officers never noticed the plane 
approaching the ground or heard the alarm indicating as much. The 
crash killed 101 people (Gilmore, 1996; Herald Wire Services, 1985; 
Twigg, Castaneda, & Sharp, 1996). 
These tragedies are difficult to accept because, among other 
reasons, it hard to understand how the police officers or the pilots 
could have seen the world so differently than what it really was. 
Assuming they honestly saw it as such, how was it possible for the 
officers to have mistaken the phone for a dangerous weapon? How  
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could the pilot and crew of Flight 401 not have noticed the ground as 
it quickly approached? How could the officers and the pilot have failed 
to accurately see what lay right before their eyes?  
Within these chapters, I asked how perceptual systems make 
sense of the mixed, multiple, and ambiguous information and what 
strategies are employed to handle the wealth of information the world 
offers. I suggested that motivations are an integral variable in the 
formula for perceptual processing. Motivations offer solutions to visual 
ambiguity, filter and sort the onslaught of information, and allocate 
processing resources where they are most needed or most desired. In 
addition, I examined the consequences of motivated perception on self-
regulation and goal pursuit. Finally, I investigated the perceptual tasks 
that are shaped by motivational forces.  
In the sections that follow, I will summarize the line of research 
described in the previous chapters. In the second section, I will use 
these data to expand upon my discussion of the ability of motivations 
to leave their mark on a variety of tasks perceptual systems face. 
Although Chapter 4 was specifically designed to test whether 
motivations bias the deployment of attention, other data contained 
within these chapters suggest that motivations are implicated in 
several other perceptual tasks. In the third section, I will discuss the 
consequences of motivated perception as they relate to self-deception 
and self-regulation of psychological states. In addition, I will suggest 
motivated perception can be considered an adaptive strategy. I will 
suggest ways in which a seeming discrepancy between my work and 
negativity dominance can be reconciled through the consideration of  
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individual differences and situational circumstances. Finally, I will end 
by suggesting applications of motivated perception.  
I.  Summary of Chapters 
  In the previous chapters, I explored one general psychological 
state shown to have a profound influence on the ways people come to 
judge themselves, evaluate others, and navigate their social world. 
That influence is perceivers’ motivational drive to see the world as they 
want to see it rather than how it actually is. I examined the scope of 
motivated reasoning to investigate whether the motive to see the world 
through rose-colored glasses percolates down from conscious 
judgment and decision-making to preconscious perceptual processing. 
In doing so, I offered evidence of times in which people see the world 
not how it is but how they hope it would be, suggested the 
consequences of motivated perception for self-regulation and goal-
pursuit and investigated one possible mechanism by which they might 
accomplish this.  
A.  CHAPTER 2: SEE WHAT YOU WANT TO SEE: MOTIVATIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON VISUAL PERCEPTION 
  In this paper, I asked if perceivers’ perceptual experiences could 
be molded, in part, by such psychological states as personal wishes 
and preferences. I examined if perceivers, when presented with 
ambiguous visual information, would reach a perceptual conclusion 
that allows them to see what they want to see. Across the studies 
presented in Chapter 2, I provided converging evidence to suggest that 
participants’ desires, hopes, or wishful thinking led them to see 
information they desired over what they did not.   
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     1.  Overview 
  In all studies, participants knew they would perform either a 
desirable task such as consuming orange juice or an undesirable task 
such as drinking a gelatinous green slime labeled “organic veggie 
smoothie.” Participants learned that their assignment would be 
determined by the specific stimulus that appeared on their computer 
screen. For all participants, I manipulated what category of stimuli 
would bring about the desired and undesired outcomes. Then, 
participants saw an ambiguous figure that could be interpreted as a 
member of both categories. I predicted and found that desire led 
perceivers to see the stimulus in the desired way.  
  Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants interpreted an 
ambiguous visual stimulus in a manner that fit with their wishes and 
preferences over one that did not. In addition, Chapter 2 provided the 
first account of motivated perception that is void of a viable response 
selection alternative explanation. Studies 3 and 4 added implicit 
measures to eliminate the possibility that the bias resided at the level 
of response selection by using a hidden video camera to track gross 
eye movements without participants’ awareness. A majority of the 
time, participants’ first saccades suggested they interpreted the 
ambiguous figure in the favored manner rather than the disfavored 
one. In Study 4, I added measures of concept accessibility. Perceptual 
bias produced by desire led to quicker reactions in a lexical decision 
task to words consistent with a preferred interpretation of the 
ambiguous stimulus than to words consistent with the less preferred 
interpretation. This pattern was exaggerated for those performing a  
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lexical decision task after viewing the ambiguous stimulus suggesting 
that both desire to see an animal and having seen that stimulus in the 
desired way facilitated response times to words consistent with that 
desire.  
  Study 5 added a procedural variation to affirm that participants 
had not seen both interpretations and chose to report the one that 
brought about the favored outcome. After establishing desire and 
motivation, participants viewed an ambiguous stimulus, but then the 
experimenter switched which interpretation was the favored one before 
participants reported what they saw. Participants tended to report 
seeing the interpretation they favored at the time they viewed the 
stimulus, even though that report, after the switch, assigned them to a 
less desired task. Wishful thinking constrained interpretations before 
perceptual judgments were made. If it was the case that wishful 
thinking was involved at a post perceptual stage—after reaching an 
interpretation—then participants would have offered a response that 
ultimately assigned them to the desired task. Whatever work the 
perceptual system had done to bias their interpretation involved 
processes taking place before participants became aware of their 
perceptual judgment.  
     2.  Addressing Alternative Explanations 
  Data contained within this chapter also speak against a number 
of alternative explanations. First, in Studies 2, 3, and 4, I ruled out the 
possibility that perceivers fell prey to the gambler’s fallacy; 
expectations that a favored outcome was bound to show up after a 
string of disfavored ones was not responsible for producing the  
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observed effect. Second, in all studies, I controlled for salience. In 
these experiments, I paired both the favored and less favored 
interpretations with equally salient events such as drinking delicious 
orange juice and drinking a foul smelling and looking concoction.  
     3. Motivated Perception as a Self-Regulatory Strategy 
Finally, although not the primary goal, this chapter suggests one 
reason why perception may lack veridicality. Over the decades, social, 
personality, clinical, and cognitive psychologists have chronicled the 
paths by which people distort information so that they can believe that 
they are good people who live in a kind world (for reviews, see 
Baumeister & Newman, 1994; Dunning, 2001; Kunda, 1990; Mele, 
1997; Pittman, 1998). To accomplish this feat, it is imperative that 
people remain unaware of the distortions they place on their thinking. 
If they knew that they construed themselves in an unjustly positive 
manner simply because they wanted to believe it was true, they might 
also begin to suspect, at least in part, how illegitimate that thought 
was. If those motivated cognitive and perceptual processes did not 
take place preconsciously, before any content of perception and 
cognition reached consciousness, people could not remain blind to the 
motives underlying their flattering self-construals.  
This type of self-deception requires that such self-serving biases 
remain outside of conscious awareness, monitoring, and control. One 
way in which these efforts towards positive beliefs may remain covert 
is through motivated perception. That is, motivations can sort, filter, 
and monitor incoming information before the information even reaches 
judgment and decision making faculties.  
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To summarize, people see the world as they wish to rather than 
how it really is. Nonconscious mechanisms such as this stay behind 
the scenes, filtering the world before the information reaches 
conscious awareness so that people can see things as they wish to 
rather than how they really are. This self-regulatory strategy, whether 
occurring in cognition or perception, allows people to think of and see 
the world favorably. 
B.  CHAPTER 3: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND THE PERCEPTION 
OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 
In Chapter 3, I explored another type of motivation that serves 
the goal of allowing people to feel better about themselves—namely the 
desire to reduce cognitive dissonance. In particular, I investigated if 
the motivation to reduce this specific type of psychological and mental 
turmoil can lead people to see their world in a way that allows them to 
alleviate distress. Specifically, I investigated whether the drive toward 
dissonance reduction can bias the way people perceive an element of 
their environment that they are interacting with at the time of 
experiencing dissonance. 
Cognitive dissonance theory assumes a drive-like motivation to 
maintain consistency among relevant thoughts and actions (Festinger, 
1957). Although it is well documented that when attitudes and actions 
contradict one another, a drive-like motivation is produced that aims 
to restore harmony by shifting beliefs to realign them with behavior. 
Most documented is the restoration of harmony via a change in 
judgments, decisions, or attitudes (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Knox 
& Inkster, 1968; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980). In this research, I asked if  
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restoration of harmony could prove successful through shifting 
perceptions. That is, I asked if motivated perception could assist the 
goal to produce consistency in thought and action.  
In order to successfully pursue goals, people need to regulate 
their internal states, physical actions, and stores of energy. To act 
efficiently in the world, one must ensure that the energy stores are 
plentiful enough to meet the goal. Of course, there are downstream 
consequences of such effort regulation and in particular on perceptual 
processing. For instance, the amount of effort a person must expend to 
complete an action influences their perception of the relevant 
environment. For example, Proffitt and colleagues (e.g., Bhalla & 
Proffitt, 1999) argued that as the effort required to complete some 
physical action increases, the perceptual system responds by 
portraying the environment as more challenging, presumably to guide 
the individual toward what actions to take (or to avoid) as well as how 
to execute those actions successfully. The distance one expects to walk 
seems longer after strapping on a heavy backpack (Proffitt, Stefanucci, 
Banton, & Epstein, 2003). Hills appear steeper when perceivers wear a 
backpack, are fatigued after a long run, suffer from low physical 
fitness, or are in poor health (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999).  
Chapter 3 explored how the goal to alleviate cognitive 
dissonance might be accomplished through biased perception. I 
investigated how a psychological goal that arises when people 
experience cognitive dissonance biases perception of natural 
environments.  
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     1.  Overview 
  In both of the studies discussed in Chapter 3, participants 
performed an aversive task. In Study 1, participants walked across a 
campus quadrangle while wearing a costume inspired by Carmen 
Miranda, the Brazilian singer, dancer, and actress of the 1940’s and 
50’s invariably clad in a large fruit-basket headdress. In Study 2, 
participants knelt on an all-terrain skateboard and pushed themselves 
up a grassy hill. In each study, I manipulated participants’ subjective 
feelings of choice about completing the task to be either high or low. 
Under high choice, people needed to resolve the dissonance caused by 
their voluntary agreement to perform an aversive action. Under low 
choice, dissonance was easily resolved because participants attributed 
their agreement to lack of choice (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967). 
Participants resolved their dissonance in high choice conditions by 
altering their perception of the environment to make the task less 
aversive, relative to perceptions reported by low choice and control 
condition participants. In Study 1, high choice participants saw the 
distance they had to walk as shorter. In Study 2, they saw the hill as 
less steep. Taken together, these studies demonstrated that 
psychological motivations like cognitive dissonance reduction 
influenced perceptual processes. The goal to resolve psychological 
tension systematically biased perception of natural environments. 
C.  CHAPTER 4: DISTANCE AND THE FOND HEART—AN 
EXAMINATION OF HOW DESIRES BIAS DISTANCE PERCEPTION  
Although the Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence that perceptual 
experiences do not accurately represent reality, the process by which  
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motivation infiltrates perception is as of yet ill-defined. In Chapter 4, I 
proposed that perceptual systems are tuned to positive information. 
Although this might be the result of attentional biases, changing 
thresholds for detection, biased constraints, etc., I investigated one 
mechanism among what might be many routes to motivated 
perception. I proposed that motivations lead perceivers to narrowly 
focus their attention on positive information at the expense of 
comparatively less desired information. In addition, I examined the 
downstream consequences of such focused attention on other 
perceptual tasks such as estimating distances. I suspect that narrowly 
focusing attention on a desired object will draw it in closer decreasing 
perceptions of the distance that separates oneself from the desired 
object. 
     1.  Overview 
In these studies, participants estimated distances between 
themselves and an appealing or less appealing object. In Study 1A, 
participants estimated the distance to a plate of chocolates or a 
neutral object, while in Study 1B they did the same to either 
chocolates or dog feces. In Studies 2 and 4, I manipulated 
participants’ visceral thirst by asking them to consume a large portion 
of dry, salty pretzels or to drink 4 8-ounce glasses of water then 
estimate the distance to a bottle of water. In Study 3, I captured 
people’s naturally occurring state of hunger as they enter a dining hall 
in contrast or their sated state as they exited the hall after dinner and 
asked them to estimate distances to 2-slices of fresh cheese pizza or a 
control object. Across these studies, participants estimated that the  
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objective distance separating themselves from the more desired object 
was smaller than the distance to a less desired object.  
     2.  Mechanism 
Motivation influenced perception through attention. Study 4 
provided initial evidence that a narrowed focus of attention on the 
desired object decreased perceptions of distance. Studies 5A and 5B 
used an experimental chain methodology (Spencer, Zanna, & Cooper, 
2005) to further confirm that appeal led to decreased perceptions of 
distance. Study 5A argued that visceral states changed an object’s 
appeal which narrowed the focus of attention to that object. Study 5B 
argued that when attention was manipulated to be narrowly focused 
on a toaster oven baking chocolate chip cookies rather than broadly 
focused on all the objects in the room, perceptions of distance to the 
cookies decreased. In short, perceivers tended to focus their attention 
on desired objects resulting in decreased perceptions of distance. 
     3.  Addressing Alternative Explanations 
  In addition to offering demonstrations and testing a mechanism 
by which perceptions are biased, I addressed two alternative 
explanations. First, I accounted for the possibility that distances 
seemed shorter not because the object was desired but because 
perceivers held a stronger attitude towards it than they did of the 
other objects. Secondly, I addressed the role of arousal. A critic may 
argue that inducing a state of arousal in perceivers by, for instance, 
making them exceptionally thirsty, should lead to shorter distance 
estimates not just to the object of their desire such as a water bottle,   
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but to any object that was the focus of attention. My data argue 
against these alternatives. 
II.  Where Do Motivations Hide? Where Does the Bias 
Reside? 
Given the multifaceted and multi-component process that 
precedes conscious perceptual experience, one issue that these 
chapters begin to explore is the variety of perceptual tasks that are 
subject to influence by motivational factors. These chapters suggest 
the possibility that the reach of motivations extends to many of the 
tasks perceptual systems must undertake. In the sections that follow, 
I will suggest and use the preceding chapters as support for the 
position that motivations are implicated in 3 perceptual tasks. First, 
motivations bias perception even before the visual system is engaged. 
Motivations establish filters that allow some information to enter into 
visual processing and exclude other information. Second, motivations 
can bias where attention is deployed as information streams in. Third, 
motivations bias the way in which visual information is processed once 
it is received but before conscious judgment and decision making 
faculties are made aware of it.  
A.  PREPERCEPTUAL FILTRATION 
Motivations begin to exert an influence on perception very early 
on, even before perceptual input is presented to visual faculties. 
Higher order constraints, including psychological states and 
motivations, prepare perceptual systems to receive, process, and 
interpret information. In preparation for the wealth of perceptual 
information to come, motivations, as one strategy, activate filters  
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through which perceptual information will be sifted. Importantly, 
motivations activate filters before receiving visual input, therefore 
beginning to bias perception even before perceptual processing has 
data to work with. 
The filters that motivations activate are often called sets. Sets 
can be distinguished by the type of information contained within them 
(see Balcetis & Dale, 2006). One type of set, perceptual set (Bruner & 
Minturn, 1955), is a form of filter that prepares perception by 
activating specific, related, directly relevant perceptual information 
immediately descriptive of upcoming visual stimuli. Consider taking a 
visit to the Dali Museum outside Barcelona. You happen upon a rather 
eccentric room complete with a plush sofa shaped like a pair of lips 
nestled close to a nostril-shaped fireplace. Now, only if you had just 
caught a re-release of Sextette featuring Mae West in her final silver 
screen performance would you see the items in this installation come 
together as the face of this actress. Empirical work confirms that 
previous experience with visual information will assist in future object 
identification tasks. For example, Leeper (1935) activated perceptual 
sets by showing participants with drawings of a young or old woman. 
These images established a perceptual set that served as a filter when 
subsequently shown an ambiguous drawing that could be seen as an 
old or young woman. Participants reported an interpretation that was 
congruent with their prior visual experience (see also Fisher, 1967).  
Another type of set known as conceptual set contains incidental, 
loosely related information that is not perceptual in nature but that 
subtly guides the perceptual system. For instance, sipping a mai tai  
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while walking on the beach with a new romantic partner at sunset 
might make it more likely that you notice the pooled water in the sand 
taking on the shape of a heart or the clouds in the sky as puckered 
lips. Outside of these anecdotes oddly reminiscent of daytime soap 
operas, Balcetis and Dale (2003, 2006) argue that conceptual sets bias 
object identification. Resolution of the Necker cube was biased when 
participants imagined looking up a tall building, down a deep canyon, 
or across the Great Plains. Perceivers who imagined looking up a 
skyscraper were more likely than perceivers in either of the other two 
conditions to resolve the Necker cube in a manner that suggested they 
saw the figure from below just as would be the case if looking up a tall 
building. 
  Just as sets filter perception, Chapter 2 offered evidence that 
psychological states such as preferences or desires privileged one type 
of filter over another. That is, perceptual information was filtered by 
wishful thinking as perceivers tended to interpret ambiguous visual 
information in a way that was consistent with the desired set. 
Specifically, reaction times during a lexical decision task just before 
participants viewed the ambiguous figure suggested that such desires 
activated a set of information related to a favored animal category. 
Participants provided quicker reaction times to words associated with 
the favored outcome than they did to words associated with the less 
favored one. This pattern suggests that a set was activated even before 
perceptual systems were exposed to the target object.  
  Although evidence that desires activated sets that filtered 
perception and biased resolution of ambiguity, it is not clear whether  
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desires activated a perceptual or conceptual set or both. That is, these 
data cannot attest to the level of specificity or content in the activated 
set. Anecdotal information supports the activation of perceptual set. In 
debriefing, one participant described her experience as follows: “I kept 
getting +5 and –5 over and over, making me worry about eating the 
beans. At the last minute, I was sure I would have to eat the heinous 
beans and I prayed for the horse to give me a +5. I got it! Yes!” Her 
statement suggests that perhaps participants in these studies 
activated perceptual sets. This participant may have been looking for 
the snout of a horse, the pointy ears, or the cute tail. The content of 
the activated set or filter was feature-based, specific, and directly 
related to the upcoming ambiguous figure. 
  However, in other studies within Chapter 2, I did not offer 
participants specific hints about what piece of visual information was 
indicative of a favorable outcome. Instead, participants knew only that 
farm animals foretold a pleasant future task. That is, I created 
situations in which perceivers could only activate broad categories 
(e.g., farm animal). Wishful thinking, in this case, activated sets that 
that were composed of many features. This broad and diffuse set of 
features would have been much too large to enact a specific and 
efficient feature search strategy to bias perception. Perceptual  
filters inspired by motivation can be quite diffuse and nonspecific. 
Whether divine intervention is required is still an empirical question. 
  In Chapter 2, I manipulated the breadth of the filter. Desires 
systematically biased ambiguity resolution through the activation of 
sets. Although this work did not address whether perceptual or  
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conceptual sets were activated, future work might explore through 
which type of set motivations resolve perceptual ambiguity. 
B.  ATTENTION 
  The second possible point in perceptual processing at which 
motivations filter information is after processing has begun. 
Motivations filter the stream of perceptual information as it trickles in. 
Specifically, motivations determine where attention will be deployed, 
what part of the perceptual stream the visual system will fixate on, 
and where it will fixate next. After an initial scan of the environment, 
motivations direct attention to certain elements of the environment at 
the expense of others, a process called selective attention (Posner & 
Petersen, 1990; Yantis, 1996).  
  One metaphor that has proved useful, although not 
comprehensive, in describing the role of attention suggests attention is 
a spotlight. Attention can act like a spotlight illuminating the visual 
field, casting light on items and events that happen to fall within its 
beam (Humphreys & Bruce, 1989). Perhaps, motivations direct the 
beam of the attentional spotlight to desired items or objects that might 
fulfill a need.  
In contrast to the attentional spotlight with its "fixed aperture" 
(Humphreys & Bruce, 1989), an additional metaphor describes 
attention as the iris of a "zoom lens" that can be narrowly focused or 
quite expanded (Eriksen & St. James, 1986). A zoom lens on a camera 
can produce a richer image of a narrowly defined space as the 
photographer zooms in, but can include more square footage in the 
image as he zooms out. Therefore, there is a trade-off: attention can be  
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held with a wide angle but poor resolution of detail, or attention can be 
zoomed in on a part of the scene to improve the resolution. Just as is 
required of a photographer, attention must find an appropriate 
balance between richness of representation and expansiveness of 
coverage. 
  In support of the zoom lens model of attention, recent 
neurological evidence confirms the tradeoff between richness of 
representation and expansiveness of coverage. When perceivers 
narrow their attention to a smaller visual surface area, the cortical 
surface area responsible for processing this information decreases 
even in regions as primary as V1, but the proportional amount of 
activation in each of these early processing areas increases (Muller, 
Bartelt, Donner, Villringer, & Brandt, 2003). However, when attention 
is diffusely spread, the amount of surface area in early visual cortex 
used to process the scene increases, while the amount of activation in 
each area is proportionally less. Thus, there is a neurological tradeoff 
between richness of representation as measured by the strength of 
activation per unit of cortical area and the expansiveness of coverage 
as measured by the amount of cortical surface area activated. 
Chapter 4 explored attention as a mechanism for motivated 
perception. I proposed that desires acted like the operator of the 
attentional spotlight directing attention to favorable, flattering, or 
positive elements of the environment. Then, like the zoom lens on a 
camera, desires narrowly focused attention on the object of desire at 
the expense of other objects in the environment. I explored the 
downstream consequences of this attentional focus on distance  
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perception. Specifically, I demonstrated that desires bias how much 
distance perceivers feel the world has placed between them and 
desired objects.  
I tested attention as the mediating force between desires and 
distance perception. Desires focused attention on the object of desire 
and narrowed the scope of the attentional beam, at the expense of 
attention to peripheral objects. Desire narrowed attention, leading to a 
focus on fewer items and only the most important central, rather than 
peripheral, items in the environment. Narrowly focusing attention on a 
desired object made that object loom large which drew it in closer. 
Using an “experimental chain” methodology (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005), I first confirmed that desires led to changes in the ratings of an 
object’s appeal which narrowed the focus of attention on that object. 
Secondly, a manipulation that narrowed the focus of attention 
decreased perceptions of distance.  
Chapter 4 proposed attention as one among what might be 
many possible mechanisms behind motivated perception. In doing so, I 
argued that in the theater of perceptual processing, motivations act as 
a stagehand directing the attentional spotlight to desired objects then 
adjusting the beam onto just those objects. 
C.  MOTIVATED VISUAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 
In this section I will discuss how psychological states and 
motivations infiltrate perception at later points of processing by 
biasing the manner in which perceptual information is processed after 
it is perceived. Indeed, even when all features of an object have fallen 
upon the retina and the visual system has taken in all a scene has to  
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offer, motivations still bias perception through the allocation of 
resources devoted to making sense of this input. This I call motivated 
visual information processing.  
People are motivated to come to a desired conclusion (see 
Kunda, 1990 for review), and the ways in which they process 
information come to reflect this bias. This is no less true in perception. 
Kunda's (1990) theory of motivated reasoning posits that "people rely 
on cognitive processes and representations to arrive at their desired 
conclusions, but motivation plays a role in determining which of these 
will be used on a given occasion" (Kunda, 1990, p. 480). I suggest 
modifying this statement regarding social judgments to reflect a 
similar bias in perceptual judgments. Motivations may play a role in 
determining the type and amount of perceptual processing that will be 
allocated to perceptual information consistent or inconsistent with the 
motivation.  
In order to arrive at the preferred perceptual outcome, perceivers 
might hold information to different levels of scrutiny. Other work in 
motivated reasoning has shown that information consistent with a 
favored conclusion is held to a lower standard of scrutiny than 
information consistent with an unwanted one (Dawson, Gilovich, & 
Regan, 2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Trope & Ferguson, 2001). The 
standards applied when determining the validity of a piece of 
information vary depending on the type of information that is under 
consideration. For instance, motivation influences skepticism. People 
are less critical of information that supports a desired or existing belief 
(Ditto & Lopez, 1992). That is, they are more likely to accept positive  
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information without question, while they seek more evidence before 
accepting a conclusion that is inconsistent with prior beliefs (Ditto & 
Lopez, 1992). 
  In the same way that skepticism is dependent upon the 
motivation to accept a piece of information, motivated skepticism 
might influence the manner in which visual information is processed. 
Differential standards are applied to the amount or quality of 
information offered as evidence for a particular conclusion. Similarly, 
motivations might lower the threshold a feature must reach before the 
visual system allows it into consciousness. It could be then that 
desired components of the environment are recognized faster or more 
easily because the perceiver requires less of a match between what he 
or she hopes to see and what is offered by the environment.  
  It is plausible that wishful thinking contributed to visual 
ambiguity resolution (see Chapter 2) through differential standards 
and changing thresholds for detection. For instance, perceivers may 
have evaluated the ambiguous figure with a sufficiency mindset when 
attempting to identify the stimulus as a member of the desired class. 
Automatically and unconsciously, perceivers may have asked 
themselves if the features they saw were sufficient to warrant 
identification of the stimulus as the desired object. However, if having 
to entertain the possibility that the stimulus was a member of the less 
desired class, perceivers may have automatically and nonconsciously 
asked themselves if the information offered fully satisfies the 
components necessary to be identified as such. Thus, visual   
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information consistent with desired and less desired outcomes might 
be held to different standards of scrutiny. 
  Future work might examine the amount of tolerance a visual 
system withstands for blurred, vague, or imprecise objects or the 
clarity, precision, and accuracy the system requires to identify more 
and less desirable objects. I would predict that these standards for 
clarity would vary with desire and the ability of the object in question 
to satisfy the desire.  
  In addition, future work might examine the speed at which 
desired and less desired objects are identified. Of course, the original 
New Look researchers proposed this same investigation yet were 
unable to firmly conclude that thresholds for detection depended upon 
desirability of the target object (Erdelyi, 1974; Eriksen, 1963; Eriksen 
& Browne, 1956; Spence, 1967). Specifically, they could not 
disentangle changing perceptual thresholds from response biases. For 
instance, it is difficult to know whether taboo words took longer to 
recognize because of their negative nature (assuming researchers 
controlled for frequency) or because perceivers were reluctant to report 
that they had seen such a word (Chapman & Feather, 1972; Dulany, 
1957; Howes & Solomon, 1950; Levy 1958).  
  To overcome this methodological issue, future research might 
employ nonconscious measures of perception or create situations 
where perceivers would not know that the dependent measure of 
interest actually reflected their perceptual experience. Inattentional 
blindness paradigms (Downing, Bray, Rogers, & Childs, 2003; Mack & 
Rock, 1998) allow researchers to test changing thresholds for detection  
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in a manner that eliminates issues of response bias and the possible 
contribution of attention. One could create a situation where 
participants will soon complete either a pleasant task or a less 
desirable task. In this paradigm, participants learn that if the 
computer displays one type of object, they will complete the pleasant 
task, but if it displays a different type of object, they will complete the 
less desirable one. Before completing the assignment process, 
participants complete what is ostensibly a visual acuity test. In this 
acuity test, participants fixate on a point before a cross appears on  
the screen for approximately 200 msec. Participants indicate whether 
the vertical or horizontal line of the cross was longer.  
  After several practice rounds of this task, the critical trial 
appears. During the critical trial, an item appears in one of the 
quadrants created by the cross and is immediately masked with an 
image suggesting the computer crashed. Following the crash, 
participants are asked if anything unusual appeared on the screen 
before the crash. If the object in a quadrant happened to be one 
previously established as the upcoming desired object, I would predict 
that participants would be more likely to have seen it and be able to 
report its presence. However, if the object was a less desired one, 
participants would be less likely to have seen it and less likely to be 
able to report it.  
  Because participants are attending to the arm length evaluation 
task and are not expecting either the desirable or less desirable object 
to appear during the critical trial, this paradigm, as argued by Mack 
and Rock (1998), eliminates the possible contribution of attention.  
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Participants are engaged in the secondary task, which focuses them on 
the center of the screen. The object, whether present or not and 
regardless of quadrant location should be equally salient to perceivers 
outside of this manipulation. In addition, because participants are not 
expecting the visual acuity task to be the circumstances by which they 
will be assigned to either task, they should be equally comfortable with 
offering a response that reflects either a desired or less desired 
outcome. This paradigm demonstrates preattentive perceptual 
filtration which is a measure of changing thresholds for detection. It 
measures differences in the sensitivity to detect positive and negative 
visual information that overcomes issues of response bias and 
attention.  
D.  SUMMARY 
  Motivations leave their mark on several perceptual tasks. First, 
motivations bias perception during pre-perception. Visual faculties 
may not even pick up information inconsistent with a hot motivational 
state. Secondly, motivations bias perception by changing where 
attention is deployed. In particular, motivations activate perceptual 
and conceptual sets that filter perceptual information before the visual 
system receives input. Once the visual system is exposed to an array 
of information, the attentional spotlight or zoom lens can differentially   
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focus processing resources on different elements. Finally, motivations 
are implicated in visual information processing.  
  In support of this 3-part proposition, Balcetis and Dale (2006) 
demonstrated that higher order constraints activate perceptual and 
conceptual sets that filter perceptual information. Chapter 2 takes the 
first step beyond this general claim to argue that motivations are one 
such higher order constraint. Chapter 4 provides extensive evidence 
arguing that motivations bias what information receives attentional 
resources; desired objects are attended to and narrowly focused on. 
Finally, motivations bias perceptual information processing. 
Preliminary evidence within Chapter 2 suggests that preferred visual 
stimuli are held to different levels of scrutiny than less preferred 
stimuli. Motivations are implicated continuously throughout many 
perceptual tasks that are required of the system.  
E.  ADDENDUM: PARRALLEL PROCESSING OF PERCEPTUAL 
TASKS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH 
I have proposed specific points in time and means by which 
motivations are tied to perception. I fear that, in doing so, I have 
inadvertently suggested that motivations call upon or are themselves 
bounded or static, symbolic entities. I suggested that wishful thinking 
activates perceptual sets with a highly specified membership. 
Certainly, it is common in addition to pragmatically useful to use 
discretely bounded, mental contents when describing the ways in 
which perception is biased. For instance, suggesting that features of a 
horse are activated and serve as a perceptual filter before the visual 
system is presented with an ambiguous image is easier (at least to me)  
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than discussing how normalized recurrence models might use a 
temporally synchronized overlapping, probabilistic, distributed 
representation or population code to explain perceptual bias. 
Unfortunately, the convenient description, and the one I chose to 
employ throughout these chapters, simplifies the process of reaching a 
perceptual conclusion. 
Although I posited 3 perceptual processing tasks molded by 
motivations, this is not to say that I espouse the conception of 
perception as a factory line, assembly construction process where one 
function must be completed before the next can begin. Instead, it is 
important to acknowledge that these 3 tasks, among many other 
component parts to perception, are called upon simultaneously to 
assist in perceptual processing. There is no linear progression from 
one distinct stage to the next, no distinct and rigid temporal order of 
tasks. Filters are not engaged strictly only before input is received. 
Biased processing does not begin only after the environment finishes 
offering relevant input. Behavioral action plans are not engaged only 
after a perceptual conclusion has been reached. Instead, perceptual 
processing requires the concurrent interaction of several tasks. 
Motivations activate filters, sort the perceptual stream, direct 
attention, and construct perceptual thresholds continuously and 
simultaneously as time passes. Although the outcome of perceptual 
processes might be quite discrete (i.e. defining a visual stimulus as a 
horse), the patterns of perceptual organization that emerge over the 
course of processing and the mechanisms responsible for reaching a 
perceptual conclusion fluctuate and are rarely static.   
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There are, in fact, several analogs attesting to the dynamic and 
parallel nature of the component processes that comprise perception. 
For instance, in spoken word recognition, the individual parts of a 
word (the phonemes) are heard more or less one at a time. Therefore, 
even apparently unambiguous words, like candle, are temporarily 
ambiguous as they are spoken over the course of 500 msec (Marslen-
Wilson, 1987; Marslen-Wilson & Welsh, 1978). Just as with completely 
ambiguous words, this temporary ambiguity leads to the concurrent 
activation of competing responses. That is, after a listener hears only 
the first phoneme, can, it is relatively a toss up when taken out of 
context whether the word will be candle or candy.  
Consider a situation when a participant is instructed to click on 
the candle that appears within an array of objects on a computer 
screen that includes both a candle and a piece of candy. Spivey, 
Grosjean, and Knoblich (2005) recorded the x,y coordinates of the 
trajectories of participants’ mouse movements when attempting this 
task. Interestingly, participants’ movements often reflected the partial 
activation of the competitor object, candy. Participants’ movements 
were directed slightly towards the competitor, candy, even as 
participants attempted to move directly to the candle. This evidence 
suggests that competing resolutions of the lexical ambiguity are 
simultaneously active as a spoken word is being heard. In addition, 
arm movements reflected the ambiguity and dynamic process of 
resolution. 
As another point of clarification, the mechanisms by which 
perceptual input is organized are, in part, directed and orchestrated by  
203 
what information the environment offers to perceptual faculties. In 
other words, the relationship between higher-order influences and 
lower-level data is mutually constraining and interactive. Although 
most of my discussion implies a top-down filtration process where 
higher order constraints direct the processing of lower-order 
information, the system should generally be construed in a less 
hierarchical manner. Just as these tools of perceptual filtration 
influence the perceptual product, raw perceptual data will mutually 
constrain the types of tools perceptual systems can use. In the most 
extreme case, a perceiver can hope, wish, long for, and squint as much 
as he likes, but he has few tools available that will allow him to see a 
white square as, instead, a black circle. Just as filters bias processing 
of the input, the input will direct what filters can be called upon in 
processing.  
In fact, the mutually constraining and parallel-processing 
interaction among perception, cognition, and behavior solves a 
problem that contributed to the defeat of the original New Look 
theorists. The traditional conception of perception as a linear series of 
stages posed a serious and ironic dilemma for New Look theorists—the 
mechanisms underlying perceptual defense required that an object 
first be perceived before motivational filters could defend against it. 
That is, by the time motivational forces knew that the object in 
question came with baggage or that it was consequential to the 
organism, the steps to achieve identification had already been taken. 
The object had already been perceived. Thus, perceptual defense must 
not have been perceptual at all. However, if motivational forces along  
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with many other higher and lower order constraints work in tandem, 
in parallel, to produce a perceptual conclusion, then perceptual 
defense mechanisms, as posited by the original New Look researchers, 
in addition to many other forms of motivated perception described in 
this work can indeed be perceptual biases. 
  So then, why might I have digested perception to focus on 
component processes if doing so creates the illusion that each 
component is an isolated stage? Well, I distinctly chose to break the 
big picture of perception into smaller, bite-sized chunks. I tested 
proximal, rather than distal or large scale, mechanisms that interface 
motivation and perception. However, this is far from the end of the line 
for motivated perception researchers. By establishing a clear and tight 
understanding of the proximal mechanisms underlying motivated 
perception, researchers will create a firm foundation for and have at 
their disposal solid materials to build a larger model of Perception—
with a capital P. The goal, then, is to eventually offer a complete 
picture of the mutually constraining, dynamic process that includes 
filtration, motivated direction and expansiveness of attention, and 
information processing among many other component processes that 
work together to reach a perceptual conclusion and promote action.  
III.  Consequences of Motivated Perception 
Throughout this work, I argue that people see the world as they 
wish to rather than how it really is. In this section, I explore the 
consequences of seeing the world in this way. Motivated perception 
allows people to self-regulate by first serving to alleviate psychological 
distress associated with cognitive dissonance. Second, motivated  
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perception serves an adaptive function assisting motor and perceptual 
systems in obtaining objects that can satisfy desires. 
A.  MOTIVATED PERCEPTION ALLEVIATES PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DISTRESS 
A dieter standing outside a Parisian pastry shop eyes a fresh 
pain au chocolat begging to be removed from its delicate lace 
placemat. A financially strapped, infomercial addict sees the Sweep ‘N 
Mop spokesman offering the limited time buy-one-get-one free offer if 
only she would call now. An old friend begs the graduate student 
trying to finish her dissertation to meet in a few weeks in Venice and 
go sailing in the Mediterranean. In each case, the circumstances these 
actors find themselves in pull him or her further away from achieving 
an important goal such as maintaining a healthy diet, a balanced 
budget, or a schedule for finishing up her degree.  
People frequently encounter temptations that lead them away 
from achieving an important goal. Given that the experience of such 
deterrents is common, an enduring interest is understanding how 
people deal with conflicting goals and competing interests. One 
prevailing explanation suggests that a self-regulatory system assists in 
efficiently handling temptations, managing goals, and guiding 
behaviors toward desired means. This system regulates internal states, 
prioritizes goals, and directs behavior in order to achieve beneficial 
ends. 
Chapter 3 explored a specific facet of the self-regulatory system. 
In particular, the self-regulatory system might assist in achieving a 
common goal to avoid psychological distress and mental turmoil. To  
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accomplish this, the self-regulatory system might use motivated 
perception as a means to arriving at a happy mental space. Just as 
people need to regulate their efforts towards maintaining a diet, 
spending habits to remain fiscally responsible, and daydreams about a 
vacation in order to remain focused on writing a dissertation, a similar 
regulation of action, intention, and thought is called upon when 
experiencing the aversive state of cognitive dissonance. Chapter 3 
found that self-regulation extended down to visual perception, using 
motivated perception as a means to reducing dissonance. I argued that 
when perceivers found themselves in a distressing situation caused by 
dissonance, the regulatory system called upon motivations to bias 
perception in an effort to diminish the distress. In Study 1, 
participants experiencing dissonance saw the distance they had to 
walk as shorter than those not experiencing it. In Study 2, they saw 
the hill as less steep. Participants saw their environments in less 
extreme ways in order to cope with the distance they chose to walk in 
an embarrassing costume or the difficulty of ascending a hill in an 
embarrassing manner. That is, motivated perception is a means 
toward self-regulation and the eventual achievement of the goal to 
avoid psychological distress. 
Taken together, these studies demonstrated that motivational 
pressures, including higher-order, intrapsychic motivations like 
cognitive dissonance reduction, influenced perceptual processes. 
When perceptual experiences of the world are malleable, when 
perceivers can push around the perceptual conclusion they reach, 
perceivers can take advantage of that fact to help them feel better,  
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reconcile unease, and settle mental unrest that might arise from a 
contradiction between action and belief. This paper argues that people 
see the world the way they want to see it in order to self-regulate, to 
feel good about themselves, their choices, and the world around them. 
Motivated perception is a byproduct of a broad-reaching self-
regulation mechanism. This self-regulatory strategy allows people to 
think of the world as benevolent, charitable, and one in which it is 
possible to accomplish psychological and physical goals and satisfy 
wants. Importantly motivated perceptions works within the 
preconscious so that this goal is not undermined by the realization 
that this benevolent world is a perceptual illusion. Motivated 
perception exists to hide the fact that people distort information with 
the goal to maintain rosy views of the self and of the world. In sum, 
this work offers that a motivated perception exists to assist in self-
regulation of physiological and physical states. 
B.  MOTIVATED PERCEPTION ASSISTS IN GOAL PURSUIT 
A second consequence of motivated perception is that it assists 
in goal pursuit. It tricks the perceptual system in order to facilitate 
actions meant to acquire a needed or desired object, and in doing so, 
motivated perceptual trickery serves an adaptive function. When 
motivated to satisfy a need, it would be wise for an organism to ensure 
that the resources required to satisfy that need are plentiful. 
Motivations might serve to regulate perceptions and behaviors to 
accomplish this adaptive goal. So that an organism feels that the 
resources available are sufficient to undertake the task of reaching the 
desired object (see Chapter 4), desires might refuel the system  
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providing energies to encourage action towards the favored object. If 
motivations energize the system or at minimum lead an object to 
appear closer than it otherwise would, motivations might encourage 
the system to take on the task of approaching the object. If the 
distance appears reachable, then the organism may be less reluctant 
to use its resources to take on the approach goal. If, however, the 
object seems too far away, the organism may be less likely to expend 
the resources in attempts to reach it. Thus, motivations might lead the 
perceptual system into seeing a desired object as closer than it really 
is, thus encouraging behaviors meant to acquire that object. 
C.  SUMMARY 
One consequence of motivated perception is that the mind and 
body’s ability to pursue goals effectively, be they psychological or 
physical, increases. These data argues that motivated perception 
assists in alleviating psychological distress and serves an adaptive 
function during goal pursuit. To accomplish these goals, people must 
be blind to the work that goes on behind the scenes and outside of 
awareness. Thus, motivated perception filters information outside of 
awareness. Motivated perception produces a distorted view of the 
world that results in improved psychological states and increases the 
effectiveness of goal pursuit. 
IV.  BLACK-TINTED AND ROSE-COLORED GLASSES: 
RECONCILING NEGATIVITY BIAS AND WISHFUL THINKING 
Although the bulk of this work argues that people see the world 
as they want to see it, this certainly is not an accurate statement in all 
circumstances and across all populations. Rather, some people are  
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motivated to avoid harm, defend themselves against danger, and 
prepare for the worst-case scenario. To do so, these people are less 
interested in achieving or acquiring positive rewards and are more 
concerned with preventing the acquisition of negative outcomes. 
Although these people maintain a chronic orientation that precludes 
the dominating influence of wishful thinking, the perceptual bias they 
experience is still the result of motivational pressures. These 
individual differences in combination with situational pressures lead 
to the predominance of an alternative motivational goal. 
This section will suggest a solution to the seeming discrepancy 
between positivity and negativity biases. I will discuss both chronic 
and temporary individual differences that predict negativity dominance 
in perceptual bias. Likewise, I will discuss situational circumstances 
that prescribe the content of the perceptual bias. For instance, I will 
suggest that the consequences of misperception will implicate either a 
positivity or negativity bias. The controllability of the outcome a 
perceiver experiences, the degree of ambiguity in the visual 
information, and the immediacy of required action also predict the 
color of the glasses perceivers wear. 
A.  DEFINING NEGATIVITY BIAS 
Paul Rozin and Edward Royzman (2001) ask their readers to 
consider one of the most delicious meals ever presented before them. 
Then, imagine a cockroach sauntering across it. Much to the readers’ 
chagrin, that delicious meal is now rendered completely inedible. 
However, the inverse phenomenon is completely implausible. A pile of 
cockroaches on a platter will never become edible regardless of the  
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amount of caviar, triple cream Brie, or dark chocolate placed on top. 
The asymmetrical dominance of this type of contamination offers a 
striking demonstration of a general principle called negativity bias. 
Negative events can be more salient and potent than positive events.  
Threatening information commands more attention because of 
the asymmetry between the psychological impact of negative events 
and objectively equivalent positive events. For instance, when 
participants scan a collection of faces of the same person with the goal 
of identifying the one discrepant facial expression, participants do so 
the quickest when the target face is angry rather than happy (Hansen 
& Hansen, 1988). In addition, reaction times for naming the colors of 
words in a Stroop test are longer for undesirable than desirable trait 
words, suggesting an attention-grabbing power for negative social 
information (Pratto & John, 1991).  
  Negative events are more potent than positive ones, and this 
potency can manifest itself in several ways. First, even if experiencing 
events of equal objective magnitude, negative events are hedonically 
more potent than positive events. For instance, a seller might demand 
significantly more money for a ticket to one of basketball’s March 
Madness Final Four games than a buyer is willing to pay. A seller who, 
in essence, loses that sporting experience feels more of a hedonic shift 
than a buyer who gains it. Secondly, the combination of events of 
equal but opposite subjective valence will not equal the same absolute 
value. For instance, the hedonic impact of losing $100 might be equal 
to winning no less than $150. Beyond self-reported emotional states, 
the asymmetrical impact of negativity is marked by greater  
211 
physiological arousal to negative events than positive events, and 
negative stressors impact health more than do equivalent positive 
experiences (Taylor, 1991).   
B.  INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES THAT PREDICT NEGATIVITY BIAS 
Certainly, people do not always see the world how they wish to. 
Indeed, certain situations and certain psychological states lead a 
perceiver to see what is feared or dreaded. In the sections that follow, I 
will describe how chronic ruminations, personality characteristics, and 
temporary goals lead perceivers to the dark side of perceptual 
experience and attenuate the tendency to see the world favorably.  
     1.  Chronic Traits 
  Personal dispositions reflect a chronic activation of a set of 
traits. A person who is dispositionally happy often entertains cheerful 
thoughts, acts in ways that promote his own happiness and usually 
the happiness of others, and generally goes about his day singing a 
jolly tune. However, a person experiencing paranoia often goes about 
her day with a sense of dread, a fear that the worst is just about to 
happen. Beyond thought and action, chronic traits can impinge upon 
the way people literally perceive the contents of their surroundings. In 
the sections that follow, I explore specific types of individuals who 
might more closely resemble the paranoid character. Although most 
people might consider themselves happy or at least aspire to that 
description, there are a great many who simply are not. I argue that 
the people who, for example, feel the world is out to get them might 
literally be more likely to see the bad in the world. In addition, people 
who maintain an excessive concern with their body image often hold  
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vastly exaggerated self-views that rarely reflect the actual shape and 
size of their body. I explore these types of chronic dispositions and 
their effect on perception. Additionally, I explore how these perceptual 
differences change over the course of the lifespan. 
a. Anxiety and fear. People prone to anxiety often fear that the 
worst is about to happen. Anxious people think the cloud overhead 
will soon rupture when umbrella-less or the doctor is bound to say the 
spots are adult chicken pox rather than the remnants of a mosquito 
infested campout. In other words, anxiety leads people to think the 
worst. In addition, anxiety can similarly lead people to literally see the 
worst. Anxious populations pay particular attention to negative or 
threatening visual information (Mogg, Millar, & Bradley, 2000; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997; Yovel & Mineka, 2005). 
Social phobics’ attention is capture by information signaling social 
threats. Social phobics show an attentional bias toward heart-rate 
information, an internal cue for feelings of threat (Pineles & Mineka, 
2005). Patients coping with psoriasis demonstrated an attentional-bias 
in a modified Stroop task for disease-specific words (Fortune, 
Richards, Corrin, Taylor, Griffiths, & Main, 2003).  
To be sure, chronic positive personality traits bias perceptual 
processes. Optimists, for example, maintain an attentional preference 
for positive information in an emotional Stroop task (Segerstrom, 
2001). Optimists maintain an avoidance orientation towards negative 
information as they look less frequently from the very first trial at 
cancer images, even when the information could be self-relevant   
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(Isaacowitz, 2005). Personality traits and general orientation perceivers 
chronically hold from one day to the next guide perceptual processing. 
b.  Body image. When people look at their reflection in the 
mirror, perceptual experiences are rarely veridical, and in fact are 
more negative than reality warrants. Individuals who are preoccupied 
with body size and shape generally see themselves as larger than they 
really are and do so automatically and without awareness (Williamson, 
1996). The picture in our mind of how our body appears is formed and 
more importantly disturbed, by perceptual, attitudinal, and behavioral 
input (Williamson, 1990). In fact, emotion and stress exacerbate 
discrepancies between perceived and actual body size (Baker, 
Williamson, & Sylve, 1995; Kulbartz, Florin, & Pook, 1999; McKenzie, 
Williamson, & Cubic, 1993; Slade, 1985). Negative mood leads to even 
greater overestimations of current body size by women with bulimia 
nervosa (Kulbartz, et al., 1999). People who ruminate over body image 
differentially attend to and remember body-related stimuli, thus 
perpetuating dissatisfaction with their body size (Baker, et al., 1995; 
Sebastian, Williamson, & Blouin, 1996; Watkins, Martin, Muller, & 
Day, 1995). Further, individuals judge ambiguous situations or  
stimuli in a manner congruent with their negative self-perceptions of 
body image (Jackman, Williamson, Netemeyer, & Anderson, 1996).  
  An additional danger of such erroneous self-perception is the 
consequences for self-representation and body satisfaction. 
Consistently looking in the mirror and distorting self-perceptions 
might lead to the formation of chronic representations of oneself that 
are harsher than is actually the case. In addition to forming inaccurate  
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representations of the self, people generally hold representations of the 
general public that are extreme caricatures of reality (Johnson & 
Tassinary, 2006). When examining a line up of figures whose waist to 
hip ratio is systematically varied along a continuum, what participants 
considered prototypical of male and female bodies were physically 
implausible shapes even nature cannot create. 
Unfortunately, these extreme external standards are used as a 
point against which (inaccurate) representations of oneself are 
evaluated. In fact, basic perception of personal body size correlates 
with the extremity of the representation one holds for female bodies. 
Women who hold an extreme caricature of the prototypical woman 
perceive their bodies to be bigger than women who hold more 
moderate and accurate representations. However, after exposing 
women to pictures of the actual prototype of the average woman, basic 
perceptions of their bodies became more accurate in comparison to 
women exposed to the extreme prototype. This suggests that exposure 
to caricatured sex prototypes misleads basic self-perception, quite 
literally making self-perceptions of personal body size appear larger 
than is objectively warranted. Perhaps fearing that one’s body does not 
conform to the norm, however misinformed one is about that norm, 
actually leads a person to literally see his or her body as a different 
size than it actually is which increases dissatisfaction with one’s body. 
c. Age and time perspective. Individuals maintain an intricate set 
of goals that are chronically pursued, guide action, and suggest 
approaches to life. The set of goals an individual pursues throughout 
the course of his or her life biases the way in which people take in  
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information about their world and influences the way in which 
perceivers process the information once they receive it. Although 
chronically activated, goals can evolve as situational pressures grow or 
as time passes. 
  One constraint known to have a profound impact on the 
evolution of goals is age, or more specifically one’s stage in life 
otherwise called time perspective. In particular, socioemotional 
selectivity theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) posits that 
with increasing age, goal hierarchies are reorganized such that goals 
toward emotional satisfaction are prioritized over goals that maximize 
long-term payoffs. When time is perceived as open-ended as is often 
the case for younger, healthy adults, goals of gathering and expanding 
one’s knowledge base and experiencing novelty weigh heavily.  
  However, as people approach the end of life because of age or 
terminal illness (Carstensen & Fredrickson, 1998), goals associated 
with emotional meaning and well-being increase in salience whereas 
goals associated with acquiring knowledge for future use decrease. It is 
less pivotal for aging adults to accumulate stores of information as the 
goals emphasizing feeling states and goals to maintain satisfying 
relationships meant to optimize well being becomes increasingly 
important. To illustrate, younger adults are more likely to chose to 
interact with social partners offer new information, such as a book 
author, whereas older adults are more likely to chose social partners 
likely to satisfy emotional goals, such as close friends or family 
members (Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990).  
  People can self-regulate and prioritize these emotional and  
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informational goals at a very preliminary point in processing. In 
particular, regulation can occur at the very point at which people are 
exposed to information that might assist or derail the pursuit of these 
informational or emotional goals. Older adults were slower to react to 
negative faces than neutral faces, and faster to respond to positive 
faces rather than neutral ones. By contrast, younger adults did not 
show any biases for the faces. Eye-tracking measures argue that both 
younger and older adults glance initially at the negative picture. 
However, younger adults in comparison to older adults looked longer 
at the negative pictures. According to the theory, the biased manner in 
which adults at various stages in life process perceptual information is 
a result of the motivation to pursue two very different types of goals. 
The focus on emotional goals among older adults leads them to favor 
positive and avoid attending to and processing negative information. 
Thus, the goal to pursue fulfilling, meaningful social and emotional 
relationships leads to biased processing of the surrounding 
environment. 
  As time perspective decreases, people spend less time attending 
to negative information. That is, older adults seem to have their 
attention initially captured by negative information just as do younger 
adults, but they quickly look away and are less likely to look back to 
that negative information. Given this propensity, it is plausible that 
older adults may interpret ambiguous information in a favorable light, 
seeing information with more than one interpretation as offering a 
favorable perceptual solution. This may be particularly true when one 
possible construal is emotionally consequential. An older adult may  
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resolve ambiguity positively if that positive result is suggestive of 
emotional bonds.  
Alternatively, given the complexity of the surrounding world, it is 
quite possible that in some situations information highly relevant to a 
focal goal such as emotional fulfillment is present in close proximity to 
negative information. Time perspective might predict the strength of 
the attentional bias towards that goal relevant information. For 
example, the speed with which a perceiver’s gaze comes to land on the 
goal-relevant information may correlate negatively with age. First 
saccades may be less likely to fall upon negative information. In 
addition, time perspective might predict the amount of temptation the 
visual system experiences. That is, as age increases, the number of 
switches from positive, goal-relevant information to negative 
information may decrease.    
The existing literature argues that time perspective interacts 
with goals leading to attentional biases in visual processing. However, 
the boundary conditions that establish the limitations of goal-directed 
perceptual biases are as of yet unknown. Establishing these conditions 
will offer insight into the malleability of perception more generally. For 
instance, examining the types of information that emotional or 
information goals activate can suggest the influence of set on pre-
perceptual processes. In addition, adding to the existing literature on 
goal-based attentional biases such as those offered by socioemotional 
selectivity theory can suggest how goals serve to filter perception and 
amend perceptual judgments that occur at later levels of processing. 
Thus, using time perspective as a context in which to examine  
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perceptual biases can add to the general understanding of the 
penetrability of perception. 
     2.  Temporary Goals  
Perception assumes a powerful position in the self-regulation of 
goals. In order to accomplish goals, one must efficiently detect 
elements of environments that are goal-relevant and can assist in 
satisfying the need. Just as important, though, is the ability to detect 
pitfalls, temptations, or features of the environment that are 
detrimental to a particular goal. Thus, because successful regulation 
of one’s personal goals relies in part upon the way in which the 
environment is scanned and the elements of the environment that are 
attended to, perception is often biased by the goals a perceiver holds. 
Successful goal pursuit depends on how good a perceiver is at finding 
elements of the environment that assist in goal pursuit and avoiding 
elements that hinder goal pursuit. That is to say, effectively managing 
and attaining goals requires more than just ambition but a set of 
cognitive and motivational tools that serve as filters to the visual 
world. However, goals do not always lead perceivers to see what they 
desire but lead perceivers to see information congruent with their 
negative aversive need state they seek to alleviate. Perceivers see not 
only what can pull them closer to a goal, but also those less helpful 
elements that push them further away. 
a.  Self-regulation to fulfill needs. Motivations, objectives, and 
goals direct attention, ultimately serving a functional role in the 
accomplishment and regulation of goals. However, working in concert 
with goal pursuit, are influences on perception that may not assist in  
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the satisfaction of goals. For instance, the goal to satisfy one’s thirst 
arises because one is thirsty. Thus, the deprived state of thirst is also 
accessible and exerts an influence on perception. At the same time 
that a thirsty perceiver scours the environment with the hopes of 
finding a bottle of water, the deprivation state pushes the perceptual 
system to find objects descriptive of that need state such as a cactus. 
In fact, Balcetis and Ferguson (in prep) demonstrated that both 
the goal to satisfy thirst and the actual need state direct visual 
attention to different objects in the environment. After eating a serving 
of dry, salty pretzels constituting over 30% of their daily serving of 
sodium, thirsty participants were more likely to notice, remember, and 
freely recall objects that would satisfy their thirst, like a water bottle, 
in comparison to a control condition. However, these same thirsty 
participants were also more likely to notice, remember, and freely 
recall objects that were descriptive of their state of thirst, such as a 
cactus, even after controlling for total number of objects remembered. 
Goals bias perception towards items in the environment that will 
satisfy the goal but also to items descriptive of the deficit state but 
that will not assist in goal-pursuit. 
Given these opposing influences on perception that differentially 
affect the success of goal pursuit and self-regulation, future work can 
examine the consequences of such biased perceptual processes on 
behavior. This particular interest may, in fact, be informed by 
including individual differences in a model of motivated perception. 
Leave aside the example of thirst, and instead consider a social 
interaction where the individual difference of need to affiliate is  
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measured. Future work might use a social exclusion manipulation on 
participants high or low in a need to affiliate. Using a lexical decision 
task, the accessibility of concepts representing the deficit state (i.e. 
alone), and the actual goal to affiliate (i.e. together) could be measured. 
Then, participants could be invited to join a partner in a separate 
room. Upon entering, it would be clear that the partner has stepped 
out, but the partner has left a book bag next to the only chair clearly 
indicating the seat he or she will be sitting in. The  
experimenter could direct participants to take a chair into the room, 
have a seat, and wait for the partner’s return.  
Of particular interest is how the relative accessibility of goal and 
deficit-relevant information will interact to predict goal-relevant 
behavior. This paradigm would allow for the development of a model 
that includes the relative accessibility of information descriptive of the 
state of exclusion, the accessibility of goal-relevant information related 
to inclusion, and the individual difference of need to affiliate to predict 
the actual distance participants place their chair from their partner.  
Additionally, perceptions of physical and subjective distance 
might depend on the accessibility of both types of information. 
Participants’ estimates of the physical distance separating themselves 
from their partner and their subjective feelings of closeness to their 
partner might depend on the accessibility of goal-relevant information 
and information descriptive of the state of exclusion. In particular, as 
the goal increases in accessibility, distances might be increasingly 
underestimated as participants might be motivated to restore 
closeness with others. Similarly, participants should feel closer to their  
221 
partner as goal accessibility increases. This pattern might be stronger 
for those high in a need to affiliate than for those low in a need to 
affiliate. This could produce a striking disconnect between actual 
physical distances that separate a person from their partner and their 
subjective feelings of closeness. The goal to affiliate may lead people to 
actually sit further away as they see the distance that separates the 
two of them as smaller than it really is all the while feeling quite close. 
b.  Approach and avoidance motivations. Some items are desired 
more than others (consider a delicious slice of dark chocolate New 
York style cheesecake versus a Hostess Twinkie past its expiration 
date) and some times the same object is desired more than at other 
times (a down parka during the dead of winter versus the sweltering 
heat of summer). Generally speaking, people wish to acquire positive 
objects and experiences while distancing themselves from bad ones. 
Typically, when people encounter a desirable object, they use their 
arms to pull it in towards themselves. People try to approach 
situations or facilitate an object’s approach to the self that provide the 
promise of positive, or at minimum a lack of negative, outcomes. 
Conversely, situations and items are avoided or pushed away that 
suggest a threat of negative outcomes or a lack of positive ones. Motor 
movements, then, can be a signal to safety suggesting benign or 
problematic objects and situations as pushing and pulling with the 
hands and arms signal approach and avoidance motivations 
(Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson 1993; see also Friedman & Forster, 
2000).  
If approach and avoidance motivations are associated with these  
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behavioral contingencies, then one might predict they would also 
maintain a relationship with specific perceptual distortions. For 
instance, flexing the arm activates approach goals and acquiring a 
desired object. Because of this, I predict that distances to a desired 
object should appear closer when flexing rather than when extending 
the arm. A goal to move an item closer might lead a perceiver to see 
that object as closer to encourage action towards acquiring the object. 
In addition, flexing the arm might represent an embodied signal of 
safety further encouraging perception and action meant to acquire the 
object. 
  Motor movements also influence information processing styles 
through the activation of approach and avoidance motivations. 
Movements that engage an avoidance motivation foster the 
spontaneous adoption of a detail-oriented, bottom-up processing style. 
However, bodily actions associated with approach motivations 
encourage heuristic, top-down processing resulting in greater 
creativity. When flexing and enacting an approach behavior, Friedman 
and Forster (2000) found that participants generate more creative 
solutions to a categorization task (see also Ekstrom, French, Harman, 
& Dermen, 1976; Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 1971). However, 
extending the arm engaged a more fine-grained, detail-oriented 
processing strategy. Fewer items were considered representative 
members of each category. A situation is scrutinized and processing 
becomes more detail-oriented when arm movements signal a 
problematic situation. However, global processing strategies are   
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implemented when movements hint to the safety of the situation (Riis 
& Schwarz, 2003).  
  Just as approach and avoidance motivations bias the ways 
people parse the contents of their judgments, motivations bias the 
ways in which people parse their visual environments. As approach 
motivations engage global information processing styles, I predict that 
approach motivations also engage global visual processing strategies, 
while avoidance motivations should engage local visual processing 
strategies. Certainly this hypothesis could be tested using the Navon 
task where perceivers are asked to identify an image. The image might 
take the form of a capital letter T made up of smaller objects like lower 
case h’s. When using a global strategy, people quickly identify the T, 
while local strategies lead to faster identification of the component 
parts such as the h’s. In addition, field dependence should be greater 
when in an approach motivational state rather than an avoidance one. 
Approach motivations that engage global processing strategies, such 
as those enacted when pulling up on a table, should increase  
perceivers’ reliance upon contextual elements and backgrounds to 
parse a scene. 
  In addition to processing style, approach and avoidance 
motivations result in differential allocation of attentional resources to 
positive and negative information in the environment. In particular, 
Neumann and Strack (2000) asked participants to hold their arms 
with a 90-degree bend at the elbow while seated at a table. Some 
participants turned their palms up and pushed upwards on the table 
while others turned their palms down and applied slight downward  
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pressure to the top of the table. While applying pressure, participants 
responded to words that appeared on the computer screen in front of 
them, specifically by categorizing them according to their affective 
connotation. The identification of positive adjectives was facilitated 
when participants were flexing their arm as opposed to extending it. 
That is, when the body assumed an approach posture, attention was 
captured and held by positive information in the environment as 
measured by faster response times to positive words. However, when 
the body assumed an avoidance posture, attention was captured by 
negative information. Future work might investigate the boundary 
conditions of such approach and avoidance motivations induced by 
motor movements. Is it possible for such motivations to influence the 
resolution ambiguous visual information? Can approach and 
avoidance motivations not only facilitate the identification of 
information congruent with the motivation but filter out incongruent 
information such that perceivers are literally blind to it? Just as 
wishful thinking assists in the disambiguation of visual information, 
would engaging an approach rather than avoidance motivation result 
in a positivity bias in visual ambiguity resolution? 
The consequences of such biased information processing and 
allocation of attentional resources are most extreme when considering 
situations that require assessments of risk. In order to make good 
judgments, one must weigh the pros and cons of various facts, 
opinions, evidence, and details. If approach motivations lead to 
heuristic processing in comparison to avoidance motivations, then the 
ways in which such information is filtered and how attention is  
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allocated during information processing might be proportional to its 
affective value. Approach motivations may lead people to avoid 
attending to and thus seeing information suggesting the harm in an 
option being considered. In addition, positive affect, often implicated in 
approach motivations, increases risky-behavior in low-risk situations 
(Nygren, 1998). Because this motivation produces positive affect and 
heuristic processing, approach motivations and positive affect may 
lead to an underestimation of risk and ultimately suboptimal 
decisions. 
These suggested studies and predicted results contribute to a 
larger theoretical debate within cognitive science. It is difficult to 
imagine the evolutionary constraints on an organism that would lead it 
to be satisfied by perfecting an ability to represent the external world 
with complete authenticity. Representations are not the goal, purpose, 
or ideal end state of vision. Evolutionary pressures care not about the 
veridicality of internal representations but the ability to map 
representations onto behavior. Consider the thought experiment posed 
by Spivey (in press). When our caveman ancestor, oft called upon to 
illustrate an important evolutionary perspective, went out for a stroll, 
what allowed him to make it home to enjoy a romantic evening with 
his cave wife was not his ability to detect an alligator in the swamps 
that bordered the path or even recognize the beast as the one that 
found the next door neighbors as a tasty treat. Forming an internal 
representation of the visual scene did little to protect the caveman 
from the approaching alligator. Instead, what mattered was the   
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caveman’s ability to map or pair that visual information onto action; 
that caveman needed to run away.  
Action-based approaches to vision (e.g., Allport, 1989; Gibson, 
1979; Spivey, in press; Tucker & Ellis, 1998) contend that object 
recognition is tied to the activation of motor patterns an organism 
might use when interacting with that object. For instance, recognizing 
a mug as such simultaneously activates the action one associated with 
the mug such as grasping it with the hand closest to the handle (Ellis 
& Tucker, 2000). The concurrent activation of intended grasping 
prepares the motor system for action, which slightly facilitates 
response times to a decision making task that requires the same hand 
to respond with a press of a button. This series of experiments, and 
many others like them, argue for a trifecta: perception, cognition, and 
importantly action are mutually interactive.  
C.  SITUATIONAL DETERMINANTS OF THE DOMINANCE OF THE 
NEGATIVITY  BIAS 
     1.  Consequences of Misperception 
Positivity biases are partially a result of the natural distribution 
of perceived objects and events in the surrounding world. Because 
negative events are rarer than positive events, it is adaptive to assume 
the world is benevolent while continuing to be on guard for the 
occasional sign of danger (e.g., Lewick et al., 1992; Peeters, 1971, 
1989; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). However adaptive positivity biases 
might be, there are certain situations where the consequences of such 
misperception are too great (see Rozin & Royzman, 2001 for a 
discussion). In some situations, negative events are more threatening  
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than positive events are beneficial. At the extreme end of the 
spectrum, avoiding death is, arguably, of the highest priority. To avoid 
death, one must be vigilant for experiences that tempt this irreversible 
end state. Negative events require rapid responses whereas positive 
ones usually do not. In addition, negative events are more contagious 
than positive ones. Again, one cockroach can ruin a good meal, but no 
amount of yummy treats can make more appetizing a plate of 
mealworms (Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, & Imada, 1997).  
  Although attempting reproduction is another important task, 
there are usually multiple opportunities to do so, but a blundered 
attempt to avoid death blows out the candle illuminating these 
options. Thus, from an evolutionary perspective, it is advantageous to 
be on guard for danger rather than seeking gains when in a situation 
where one faces the possibility of harm. However, when in situations 
where such grave threats do not loom large, as is the case most often, 
then seeking advancement or looking for affordances to further goal 
pursuit may be quite productive.  
     2.  Controllability 
  Another situational dynamic predicting the prevalence of 
positivity or negativity dominance is the controllability of the 
perceptual experience. If the situation is construed as one where fate, 
or more likely the experimenter, has already determined the outcome 
of the perceptual task, then a person may be less likely to feel that any 
particular hope can change the outcome of the event. For example, an 
intern at a magazine publishing company learns he will either be 
assigned to assist the beer critic for the food and beverage section or  
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index the muscle-toning, body-sculpting, 
vitamin/nutrient/supplement ads for the back pages. If the intern is 
told that his assignment was decided yesterday, he might feel less 
control over his assignment than if he is told he will be assigned 
tomorrow regardless of whether he gets to offer his preference to the 
supervisor. If the assignment is already decided, there is little that can 
be done to change the outcome. Hoping can do nothing but produce 
disappointment. However, if the assignment will be decided tomorrow, 
the intern might feel more control over the outcome as there is still 
time and room for hoping, praying, or wishing on the first star of the 
night to perhaps direct the winds of good fortune in his direction. In 
other words, the act of hoping may only be engaged if one feels that 
hope can be effective. 
Certainly, situations vary in the amount of control they allow a 
person to experience. Additionally, perceivers themselves vary in the 
amount of control they feel that they have over an outcome. Locus of 
Control (Rotter, 1966) is an individual difference that captures 
generalized expectancies for internal versus external control over 
events. People with an internal locus of control feel their own actions 
determine outcomes they experience, while those with an external 
locus of control believe that their own behavior is irrelevant to their 
outcomes. Given that they expect they are responsible for their 
outcomes, those with an internal locus of control may be prone to 
motivated perception. However, those with an external locus of control 
might be prone to relatively more accurate perceptual experiences as   
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they are less likely to engage in wishful thinking or defensive 
pessimism to prepare for an upcoming perceptual experience. 
     3.  Degree of Ambiguity 
Consider an ideal perceptual experience, where the perceiver has 
sufficient time to take in all visual information, where the lighting 
conditions are perfect, the physical and cognitive context not 
misleading, and the stimulus clear. In this situation, perception 
should be as accurate as is possible. Rarely do perceivers experience 
these ideal circumstances. Instead, most perceptual circumstances 
more closely resemble those created in the experiments previously 
described. Most commonly, the stimulus in question lacks clarity and 
is to some degree and by some manner ambiguous. It might be in just 
these circumstances that there is room for motivational forces to 
infiltrate perception. That is to say, motivated perception may occur 
only when more than one construal is easy to settle on. In analog, 
when personality traits are ambiguous (i.e. intelligent), people will 
define them in idiosyncratic ways to ensure that these traits will be 
descriptive of them (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Suls, 
Lemos, & Stewart, 2002). Thus, when possible to construe self-
relevant information in a positive light, people will do so. It is not too 
much of a stretch to argue that the perceptual system functions in a 
similar manner; when there is room to construe visual information in 
a way that will reflect positively on the self or one’s situation, the 
visual system will do so. 
     4.  Emotion and Immediacy of Required Action 
To better predict when perceptual systems will be guided by  
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wishful thinking rather than negativity dominance, it might be 
necessary to examine the emotion that is evoked within the situation. 
Being in the presence of a freshly collected sample of dog feces will 
rarely evoke the same emotional response as being in the presence of a 
tarantula that recently found the escape hatch from her tank and is 
freely roaming the tabletop. It is quite likely that the first object will be 
met with disgust reactions while the latter with fear. Although both 
fear and disgust are negative emotions and ones that produce arousal, 
fear differs from disgust physiologically as measured by 
neuroendocrine stress responses. In response to stressful 
circumstances, disgust decreases blood pressure and cortisol, the 
hormonal marker of stress, while fear increases blood pressure and 
cortisol (Lerner, Gonzalez, Dahl, Hariri, & Taylor, 2005). Arguably, 
increased blood pressure and cortisol suggest the body is prepared to 
take action. These biological markers suggest that although both 
disgust and fear are aversive states of arousal, fear is a motivating 
force that promotes action while disgust leads to withdrawal and 
inaction.  
Given the physiological differences produced by fear and 
disgust, one might argue that these emotions should systematically 
bias action and perception systems. The presence of a feared object 
might activate a defense system that promotes action. If a cougar lay 
waiting in the shrubs as a hiker takes a morning stroll, that hiker 
might be best served by noticing, attending to, and correctly 
identifying the animal so that he might take the actions necessary to 
remain out of harms way. Alternatively, disgusting objects are less  
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likely to require immediate action. To successfully navigate an 
environment that contains the rotting carcass of a squirrel, the 
student walking to school does not need to have her attention 
captured by or fixate upon the item (provided the poor thing is not 
lying in one’s path). In fact, misinterpreting the remains as a pile of 
leaves or not seeing them at all might better serve her.  
In other words, emotions vary in terms of the immediacy of 
reaction that they require. Some emotions, such as fear, require a 
person to engage in action quickly to prevent a dangerous outcome. 
Other emotions, such as disgust, may not require immediate action to 
avoid harm. A feared object that requires immediate action might be 
noticed and accurately perceived, while disgusting objects that do not 
require immediate action can be distorted or left unattended at the will 
of the motivated perceptual system. In fact, a person might benefit by 
allowing the motivational system to activate coping strategies to deal 
with the disgusting although not immediately threatening situation. 
Thus, objects that evoke different emotions and behavioral reactions at 
various degrees of immediacy predict when wishful thinking rather 
than negativity dominance will lead to perceptual bias. 
D.  WHY POSITIVITY BIASES IN MOTIVATED PERCEPTION EXIST 
IF BAD IS STRONGER THAN GOOD  
  Baumeister and colleagues (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenhauer, & Vohs, 2001) put forth a treatise emphatically stating 
that bad is stronger than good. They flood their readers with countless 
examples, discuss generations of research, offer theoretical rationales, 
and search for evidence to argue for the contrary yet find only a few  
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exceptions to the fact that negative information and events command a 
larger presence than do positive. Bad parents, bad emotions, bad life 
experiences, bad relationships, and bad feedback, among many other 
examples of negativity all impact life in more extreme ways than their 
positive counterpart. It might seem that Baumeister’s well-supported 
assertion undermines the conclusions warranted by my work. On the 
contrary, I see this as an opportunity for additional insight into the 
motivation for the existence of motivated perception but, more 
specifically, for the specific variety of motivated perception I 
investigated: positive motivated perception.  
People need a system, a strategy, a defense system, or a bastion 
against the power of bad to cope with its prevalence in so many facets 
of daily life, its power, and its asymmetric relationship with good. 
Students experiencing bad social support systems had weaker 
immune systems (Kiecolt-Glaser, Garner, Speicher, Penn, Holliday,  & 
Glaser, 1984). Students’ self-views took a bigger blow after receiving 
negative feedback (Coleman, Jussim, & Abraham, 1987). Of course, 
these are only a few of the many examples of the discrepancy between 
positive and negative outcomes for the self, one’s health, and one’s 
prospects. Positive motivated perception may be a member of the 
garrison defending the mind and body from the detrimental effects of 
negative information. Seeing the world favorably may deter from the 
otherwise oppressive presence of and consequential reaction to the 
great quantity and powerful punch of negative information. Positive 
motivated perception allows people to achieve their goals of feeling like 
a good person, in a benevolent world, with favorable prospects for the  
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future. If no such defense system were in place, then it is quite 
possible that we might fall under the force of the slings and arrows 
that are tossed in our direction by negative information. 
E.  SUMMARY 
The glasses through which people view the world are not always 
rosy. Instead, there are certain individuals who seem inclined to 
interpret ambiguity in the harshest light, to see the bad at the expense 
of the good. But, of course, there are times when this is the safer 
strategy. In some circumstances, it might be best to be on guard for 
the bad that lurks in the dark. At times, the consequences of missing 
a hazard far outweigh the benefits of seeing something beneficial. For 
instance, when immediate action would be required to prevent harm, 
one might be best served by identifying the threat so that behavioral 
action systems can be launched. Other times, it is just not possible to 
see the world in any way other than what it is. The ability to 
manipulate incoming information is out of one’s control either because 
the information is so clear or the outcome has already been decided 
and room for hope closed. Although this project is devoted to 
explicating the role of desires in motivated perception, I acknowledge 
the boundaries and conditions of this bias. 
V.  Applied Value of Motivated Perception Research 
Motivated perception is a process that invites itself into many 
important facets of daily life. In the sections that follow, I will describe 
how motivations influence the effectiveness of self-performed screening 
exams for cancer and the evaluation of information that might assist 
in early detection. In addition, I will speculate about how motivated  
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perception may lead couples to literally see their partners in 
substantively different ways, which affects well being and satisfaction. 
Finally, I will discuss how promotion and prevention goals might 
differentially influence what information is attended to when 
evaluating products in a marketing context. 
A.  PREVENTATIVE ACTIONS TO DETECT CANCER 
Early detection of cancer is a critical component of effective 
treatment. Yet early detection often requires that an individual combat 
many emotional, motivational, and perceptual urges that might 
undermine attempts at early detection. In this section, I will discuss 
motivational biases in cognitive and perceptual processing of cancer-
related information. 
One of the most controversial options for decreasing the risk of 
breast cancer in women not yet diagnosed with the disease is bilateral 
prophylactic mastectomy (Snyderman, 1988). With this preventative 
procedure, both breasts are surgically removed in order to reduce the 
risk of developing breast cancer. Although some studies suggest a 
reduction in risk (Hartmann, Schaid, Woods, Crotty, Myers, Arnold, et 
al., 1999), the preventive value of prophylactic mastectomy in high 
risk, unaffected women is yet to be determined (see Stefanek, Enger, 
Benkendorf, Honig, & Lerman, 1999). What is agreed on though is that 
mastectomy is effective only before cancer develops, and treatment 
options narrow if detection occurs too late. One way in which to assess 
the likelihood of developing breast cancer before it exists is through 
genetic screening for mutation. Of women who have the specific 
genetic mutation, 50–85% to develop the disease. Given the mixed  
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nature of the effectiveness of and extensive, dramatic nature of 
bilateral prophylactic mastectomy, it is important to get a sense of 
public opinion about the procedure. Will women entertain this as an 
option, or, providing the research concludes the procedure is effective, 
will it be necessary for health-care providers to campaign to convince 
the public of its value?  
In a vignette study, Stefanek and colleagues (1999) asked 
women whether they would opt for prophylactic mastectomy. Women 
reported levels of worry about personal risk of breast cancer and 
estimated the 10-year risk for the woman in the vignette. High 
personal worry and greater risk estimates increased the likelihood of 
the selection of surgery, regardless of whether the participant had a 
first-degree relative with breast cancer. Although this hypothetical 
scenario study suggests women worried about cancer were no more 
likely to opt for the treatment, there is reason to suspect that if instead 
faced with the gravity of a real diagnosis themselves, women at risk 
may act quite differently than their predictions suggest. That is, 
predictions and actual behavior may be discordant. 
It is important to understand what underlying factors predict 
what type of women will entertain the notion of surgery. More 
generally, it is important to capture what factors underlie women’s 
decision to pursue preventative and treatment options to the full 
extent of availability. This is of most concern when considering that 
selective genetic testing in addition to self-performed breast exams are 
often the first means by which women are made aware of a possible 
problem. One particular factor that might predict different approaches  
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to selecting genetic testing or performing the self-exam is the 
motivational state of the woman in question. That is, predictive genetic 
testing can bring reassurance to many, but can also cause 
considerable distress to others (Salkovskis & Rimes, 1997; Shaw, 
Abrams, & Marteau, 1999). In addition, the quality of self-screening 
may depend upon the motivations and psychological states of the 
women performing the self-exam.  
When investigating interest in undergoing genetic testing, Shiloh 
and Ilan (2005) found that when women’s dominant motivation was to 
prevent disease, higher perceived risk led to more interest in testing. 
By contrast, if the dominant motivation for testing was emotional 
reassurance, then high-risk perceptions predicted opposite tendencies. 
In fact, the integration of affect and cognitive factors in predicting 
behavioral intentions accounted for 15% of the explained variance. 
The prevention of breast cancer is dependent upon women 
engaging in detection and preventative behaviors. The effective 
performance of monthly self-breast exams increases the likelihood that 
breast cancer can be detected early on. To perform a monthly self-
breast exam effectively and combat breast cancer most aggressively, 
one must be sensitive to lumps while documenting any changes in 
breast tissue. Although some evidence, however mixed, suggests a 
positive correlation between self-reported worry about cancer and 
performance of self-exams (Lerman, Kash, & Stefanek, 1994; McCall, 
Schroeder, & Reid, 1996), there is little evidence that speaks to the 
quality of the self-exam that at risk populations perform. Women with 
high and low risk for cancer may differ dramatically in the quality of  
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the self-breast exam. For instance, women at high risk may perceive 
their breast tissue and process the tactile information they receive in a 
very different manner than women at low risk. 
Women at risk, perhaps because of family history, are well 
aware of the difficult road ahead for a cancer patient. Because of 
emotional involvement and fear, women at risk maintain a desire to 
avoid receiving threatening information, thus they do not take all steps 
possible to detect cancer at early stages (Welkenhuysen, Evers, & 
d'Ydewalle, 2001). That is to say, this knowledge could produce greater 
motivation to avoid detecting cancer. One might predict that if at risk 
women do engage in self-exams, the ways in which they process the 
tactile information they obtain during the exam might be undermined 
by the motivation to avoid detection. The consequences of this error, 
obviously, have grave potential. 
Alternatively, women with a family history of cancer might 
realize the benefits of early detection. Because they might be better 
informed or more familiar with detection strategies and action plans 
for combating the disease, women at risk may perform self-breast 
exams more effectively. That is, they might be more attuned or 
sensitive to changes in their breast tissue because they are motivated 
to detect it in its early stages. 
A motivation for knowledge about one’s health may produce 
different types of preventative action taken by women at risk or alter 
the quality of the action taken. At odds with this is that a motivation 
towards emotional regulation may undermine these actions. These 
results suggest that the quality of self-screening may in fact be biased  
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by the underlying motivations of the screener. Given the consequences 
of not detecting a lump as it begins to form, the implications for biased 
detection and perception are severe.  
B.  RELATIONSHIPS 
  Visual perception plays a pivotal role in relationship satisfaction 
and well being. The ways in which couples perceive themselves, their 
partners, and others in their world are related to their happiness 
within their relationship. In investigating signals of successful, lasting 
relationships, Miller (1997) found that satisfied relationship partners 
are unlikely to think about or even look at attractive alternative 
partners (Miller, 1997). In addition, they derogate available others in 
efforts to support optimistic and positive views of their own partners 
(VanYperen & Buunk, 1991; Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Simpson, 
1987). One might ask if happy couples see attractive others in ways 
that differ from partners in unhappy relationships, single others, or 
otherwise unavailable others. Perhaps happy partners are happy 
because they are more likely to literally see the imperfections of 
alternative mates.  
The ways in which couples see one another predicts relationship 
satisfaction. Seeing one’s partner in the most positive light possible 
leads satisfied individuals to feel more committed within their 
relationships (Murray, Holmes, Griffin, 1996a, 1996b; Van Lange & 
Rusbult, 1995). In fact, such overly favorable views and optimistic 
perceptions are critical for healthy well being (Murray & Holmes, 
1997). Indeed, there is not much comfort to be gained by exaggerating 
a partner’s weaknesses or vices. Instead, commitment, security, and  
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satisfaction are the by-product of seeing one’s partner charitably and 
favorably (Murray, 1999). Given the benefits of literally seeing the best 
in one’s partner, other perceptual experiences might also reflect this 
motivated bias. Might a satisfied relationship partner perceive time 
differently? Would they see stubborn behaviors as lasting less long as 
there is little to be gained by feeling committed to a stubborn partner? 
Will satisfied partners be motivated to see their partner as smiling 
rather than smirking even after controlling for experience with both 
expressions? 
In an effort to improve the quality of long-term relationships, 
much research documents emotional distress in marital arguments. 
Wives are significantly more upset by marital arguments than are 
husbands (Almeida & Kessler, 1998; Almeida, McGonagle, Cate, 
Kessler, & Wethington, 2003; Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 
1989). Further, emotional reactivity on the part of wives increased as 
self-esteem decreased and dependency increased (Almeida et al., 
2003). Tentative evidence suggests that husbands’ reactivity was 
positively correlated with self-esteem and negatively with dependency. 
Almeida and colleagues suggest that these gender differences may be 
due to wives perceiving marital arguments as more threatening and 
uncontrollable than did husbands.  
Gender biases construal of the relationship but may also lead to 
differences in physical perception of the interaction partner, as well. It 
might be the case that wives are more emotionally reactive because 
they view their husbands differently than husbands see their wives. 
Wives may see a more hostile or non-cooperative interaction partner.  
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That is, wives might be more sensitive to small facial twitches, smirks, 
condescending looks, or other fleeting behavioral responses that 
suggest their interaction partner is hostile. Wives, then, might be 
reacting to what they literally see as a more negative interaction 
partner. This tendency may be exaggerated as wives grow increasingly 
less assured, but increasingly dependent upon the companionship of 
their husband.  
Psychological states, such as low self-esteem, dependency, and 
anxieties of various forms can cloud even the best intentions to 
achieve satisfaction. Certainly, dating individuals’ high anxiety lead 
them to interpret their partners’ imagined and actual transgressions in 
suspicious ways leading to feelings of distrust and decreased 
conviction (e.g. Collins, 1996; Collins & Allard, 2004; Simpson, Rholes, 
& Phillips, 1996). Outside of anxious partners’ construal of 
information of which they are consciously aware, anxiety might lead 
relationship partners to filter their sights, sounds, and memories. 
When interacting with their partner, anxious individuals might level 
and sharpen their perceptual experiences such that they only see and 
remember the slights or interpret the ambiguous actions of their 
partner negatively. Through the commotion and constant banter by 
the other guests at a party, the anxious partner might hear their mate 
say “break up” and fear the worst when in actuality the conversation 
was about the new line of Sephia make-up products. 
A specific form of anxiety that taints attempts at relationship 
satisfaction and undermines well-being is an excessive concern about 
being rejected (Ayduk, May, Downey, & Higgins, 2001; Downey,  
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Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998). Rejection sensitivity is the 
disposition to anxiously expect, readily perceive, and intensely react to 
social rejection (Downey & Feldman, 1996). Individuals high in 
rejection sensitivity are both concerned about the possibility of 
rejection and expect that others will indeed reject them (Feldman & 
Downey, 1994). Such sensitivity is the by-product of previous rejection 
experiences (Feldman & Downey, 1994). In rejection-relevant 
situations, these expectations are automatically activated, preparing 
those high in rejection sensitivity to detect the occurrence of rejection 
in the negative or ambiguous behaviors of others (Ayduk, Downey, 
Testa, Yen, & Shoda,1999; Ayduk, Downey, & Kim, 2001; Downey & 
Feldman, 1996, Study 2). Just as other forms of anxiety bias the 
intake and processing of information, fear of rejection might also filter 
and bias perceptual experiences. For instance, individuals fearing 
rejection or those high in a similar individual difference, need to 
belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), might see the distance that 
physically separates themselves from their partner at a party, for 
example, as greater than it actually is. These same individuals might 
see expressions on interaction partners’ faces differently. Fearing 
isolation, rejection sensitive individuals might interpret an ambiguous 
facial twitch as a smirk or signal of contempt when the intent behind it 
was hardly negative. 
C.  REGULATORY FOCUS IN A MARKETING CONTEXT 
The ways in which people pursue goals and the actions they 
take to work towards a desired end influence the way they think about 
and see the world around them. According to regulatory focus theory,  
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there are two pathways by which people regulate their actions in an 
effort to achieve their goals (see Higgins, 1997, 1998). One might 
employ a promotion focus that is concerned with hopes, aspirations, 
and desired end-states. This focus is sensitive to the presence and 
absence of positive outcomes and focuses regulatory efforts on using 
strategies to maximize gains and minimize nongains. Regulation can 
also occur with a prevention focus that is concerned with 
responsibilities and security and is sensitive to the presence and  
absence of negative outcomes. This system focuses individuals’ efforts 
on strategies to avoid losses and attain non-losses.  
Regulatory focus and situational constraints lead to systematic 
biases in judgment and decision-making. Wang and Lee (2006) asked 
participants to compare 2 different brands of toothpaste along a 
number of dimensions. Evaluators who were promotion-focused and 
less involved in the decision opted to evaluate the brands along more 
promotion (i.e. whitens teeth) than prevention features (i.e. prevents 
gingivitis), whereas prevention-focused participants selected more 
prevention than promotion features.  
In extension, the ways in which information is extracted from 
the environment might coincide with chronic or temporary focus 
states. Although the contrived setting of the previously described 
marketing study offered participants easy glances at all the 
dimensions by which they might evaluate the toothpaste, in a drug 
store, grocery store, or market the dimensions may not be so obviously 
displayed. Dimensions that are promotion or prevention oriented may 
be a bit less salient or easily distinguishable. Regulatory focus might  
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predict the type of information that is attended to. That is, perceivers 
might have their attention drawn to information consistent with their 
focus state. However, it might also be the case that equally important 
information although dissimilar in purpose might be overlooked. A 
chronic promotion focus may bias a shopper to notice the phrase 
“freshens breath” on a tube of toothpaste, but overlook another brand 
that not only freshens breath but prevents gingivitis, plaque, and tooth 
decay. Whether these are predictions testing motivated attention 
rather than motivated perception is a question for the empirical 
research to address. Although, obviously, both weigh heavily in the 
ultimate perceptual representation that the perceiver forms about his 
or her surroundings. 
D.  SUMMARY 
This work informs not only the theoretical understanding of 
perception, but this work also maintains an important relationship 
with applied dimensions outside of the laboratory. This work suggests 
additional dimensions that warrant attention within such domains as 
early detection of cancer. Motivated perception research may address 
reasons for emotional reactivity as well as satisfaction and well-being 
in relationships. Suggesting an implication for marketing, the goals 
perceivers assume may direct attention and processing within product 
evaluations. These are a few among many applications for the role of 
motivations in perception.  
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VI.  Conclusion 
In February 2006, Vice President Dick Cheney went hunting at 
the Armstrong Ranch outside of Corpus Christi, Texas. Unfortunately, 
Cheney failed to notice his friend and financial supporter, 78-year old 
fellow hunter Harry Whittington, about 30-yds away before peppering 
him with a round from his 28-gauge shotgun (VandeHei & Moreno, 
2006). It is difficult to imagine how Cheney missed his friend’s obvious 
presence. How could Cheney have been blind to, mistaken, or 
interpreted the outline of a fellow hunter for the birds that were his 
target? Although the White House was not forthcoming with an 
explanation, it is possible that the complexity of the landscape, 
Whittington’s unexpected presence, and Cheney’s quick reaction 
contributed to this unfortunate occurrence. Or perhaps Cheney quite 
literally saw Whittington as the quail (Quayle?) he was hunting. 
Motivations do impact perception. The world people know, the 
one they act in and upon which their actions are based, is the one 
they take in through their senses. However, perceptions of the world 
are subject to influence from a host of characters much greater and 
much more broad-reaching than pure bottom-up, details the retina is 
responsible for funneling. A plethora of preconscious processes 
including motivational urges mold, shape, twist, filter, and bias this 
information continuously throughout the many tasks perceptual 
systems undertake before people realize they have had a perceptual 
experience. Wishful thoughts, intrapsychic goals, and visceral desires, 
all of which are activated long before conscious awareness, are only a 
few among many of the forms that motivations can assume. The  
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message is clear. Perceptual systems are penetrable. The world as we 
know it is not the world as it really is for people come to know 
perceptual reality only as it appears through “the fetters of one's own 
ever-shifting desires” (Einstein, 1918).  
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